SPOUSES ERLINDA PABLO AND HOSPICIO PABLO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. VICENTO ASELO S. SICAT, PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF NUEVA ECIJA, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, …
BALTAZAR-PADILLA, J.:
FACTS
Spouses Hospicio and Erlinda Pablo (Spouses Pablo) and Spouses Danilo Carpio and Imelda Mariano, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Brgy. Estrella, Rizal, Nueva Ecija covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-164520.
Spouses Hospicio and Erlinda Pablo and Spouses Danilo Carpio and Imelda Mariano will hereafter be collectively referred to as spouses-owners.
Sometime in 1985, James Deus (Deus) and Juan Bucaneg (Bucaneg) entered the subject lot and erected their houses on the same.
For failure of Deus and Bucaneg to vacate the property despite demand from the spouses-owners, the latter were constrained to file an ejectment case against Deus and Bucaneg before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) docketed as Civil Case No. 903 on November 18, 1985. As their defense, Deus and Bucaneg alleged that they were in possession of the subject lot for several years as tenants of the late Maria Carmen Bucaneg, the former owner of the property.
On August 30, 1988, the MTC ruled in favor of spouses-owners, the fallo of which states:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by applying the Rule on Summary Procedure in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, to viz:
1. Ordering the defendants to vacate and to surrender the possession to the plaintiffs the residential lot covered by TCT No. NT-184520, with an area of 2,415 square meters, more or less, situated at Estrella, Rizal, Nueva Ecija;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally litigation expenses of P1,000.00 plus attorney’s fees of P2,000.00.
No pronouncement as to costs.”[3]
Deus and Bucaneg appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) but to no avail. In a Decision[4] dated April 21, 1989, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.
Deus and Bucaneg filed a petition for certiorari before this Court praying that the decision of the MTC which was affirmed by the RTC be set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Deus and Bucaneg alleged that the case involves an agricultural land which constitutes their homelots and are the subject of a pending application before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), therefore, the case is within the jurisdiction of DAR and not the trial courts.
On August 29, 1990, this Court, through its Fourth Division, dismissed the petition based on this ground, to wit:
“That there is no doubt that the landholdings are not connected or adjacent to the residential lot being claimed by the plaintiffs. The lot in question is separate and distinct from the landholdings of the defendants. The physical situation and distances of the landholdings of the defendants on the lot is (sic) a (sic) very substantial evidence that cannot be rebutted by the defendants.
From the evidence submitted by the parties there are several facts and and circumstances which negate the existence of tenancy relationship between the defendants and the late Maria Carmen Bucaneg. The evidence of the defendants failed to show how, as they claimed, that they are tenant-lessees. The unrebutted credible evidence on record is the joint sworn statement of Maria Carolina Rafael Bugayong and Pedro Carmen that defendants are lawful tenants of Petronila Carmen Rafael and Petronilla, Enrique, Pedro. Leonor and Clarita, all surnamed Carmen. The defendants cannot show any contract of tenancy between them and the deceased nor can they produce any receipt of payment of the rental on the land or for the delivery of the share of the owner of the land on the produce of the land. Death has already closed the lips of Maria Bucaneg to be able to deny the pretentions of the defendants, so that the latter under the circumstances are liable to commit against the estate of deceased persons the law prohibits testimony in support of the transaction of the witness with a person since the deceased, it being a policy of the law that when death has closed the lips of one party shall likewise remain closed (Amante vs. Manzanero, 71 Phil. 553; Maximlom vs. Tabotabo, Phil. 390). The application for homelot transfer and mere presentation of a certificate by the defendants are not concrete evidence that they are in truth and in fact tenants of Maria Carmen Bucaneg.
These findings were affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in its decision of April 21, 1989. No further appeal was taken by the petitioners, with the result that this decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court is now final. It would thus appear that, in questioning the jurisdiction of the MTC on the ground that this case involves the right of tenant farmers to their homelots, which pursuant to P.D. No. 946, sec. 12 (7) is vested in the then Regional Trial Court, petitioners are seeking to reopen a question already settled by final judgment. For the question of jurisdiction turns on a question of fact, i.e., whether the land in question is a farmlot and whether the petitioners are tenants entitled to such homelots. This question of fact was decided adversely against the petitioners by the MTC and the RTC which ruled that the land is not a farmlot and that petitioners are not tenants of the former owner, Maria Carmen Bucaneg. If petitioners did not agree with such finding of fact, they should have appealed from the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It is settled that a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for the right to appeal.”[5]
No appeal was taken by Deus and Bucaneg from the afore-quoted Decision of this Court.
Subsequently, the MTC issued a writ of execution for the implementation of its August 30, 1988 Decision.
On February 4, 1991, the writ was partially executed with Deus vacating the property and removing his house thereon. However, Bucaneg, represented by his daughter, refused to comply with the writ.[6]
As a result of Bucaneg’s refusal to comply with the writ, a Special Order of Demolition was issued by the MTC on August 31, 1994. Bucaneg, represented by his daughter, Estelita Bucaneg, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the RTC questioning the Special Order.
On January 27, 1995, the RTC issued a Decision denying the petition for certiorari for being moot an academic as the assailed Special Order of Demolition was already implemented.[7]
It appears, however, that after the MTC promulgated its August 30, 1988 Decision, Deus and Bucaneg filed a complaint before the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on October 17, 1988. In their complaint, they alleged that they are tenant-beneficiaries of Maria Carmen Bucaneg and as such are entitled to homelots. Thus, they prayed that the sale of the subject lot to Spouses Pablo and Spouses Carpio be declared null and void.[8] On March 26, 1990, the Regional Director dismissed the complaint on the ground of the August 30, 1988 MTC Decision.
Deus and Bucaneg appealed the dismissal to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
On July 9, 1997, the DARAB granted Deus and Bucaneg’s appeal, the dispositive portion of its Decision states:
“Wherefore, finding reversible errors committed by the Regional Director, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED by entering a new one as follows:
1. Declaring Plaintiffs-Appellants as the lawful tenants of the landholding in which their houses were erected;
2. Ordering the reinstatement of plaintiffs-appellants to their landholding. If they have been ejected, or maintaining them, if not;
3. Ordering the Provincial DARAB Sheriff of Nueva Ecija (North), with the assistance of the PNP in the locality, if necessary, to implement this decision;
4. Ordering the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of the Municipality of Rizal to generate Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) or Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) as the case may be over the landholding subject of controversy, and facilitate the redemption of the subject landholding which plaintiffs-appellants may exercise under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844.
SO ORDERED.”[9]
Spouses-owners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2000.[10]
No further appeal was taken on the matter.
On August 27, 2010, Deus and Bucaneg filed before the DARAB, Office of the Provincial Adjudicator a Motion for Execution of the July 9, 1997 DARAB Decision. Spouses-owners filed their opposition to the motion citing the August 30, 1988 MTC Decision which had long attained finality and in fact, had already been executed.
On June 6, 2012, the Provincial Adjudicator issued an Order granting the Motion for Execution.[11] On June 21, 2012, a Writ of Execution was issued.
Spouses-owners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order but the same was denied in a Resolution dated September 5, 2012.[12]
Hence, Spouses Pablo filed the extant petition.
Pending the resolution of the present petition, Bucaneg passed away and was substituted by his heirs Estelita Bucaneg dela Cruz, Magdalena Bucaneg Tulyao and Florida Bucaneg Co, collectively referred to as Heirs of Bucaneg. James Deus also passed away and was substituted by his heirs (Heirs of Deus).
On May 17, 2013, Hospicio Pablo passed away and was survived by his wife Erlinda and his children, Alejandro Pablo, Branda Magpantay, Cesar Pablo, Dennis Pablo and Edgar Pablo, collectively referred to as Heirs of Hospicio.
On November 13, 2013, as per Sheriff’s Report dated November 20, 2013, the June 21, 2012 Writ of Execution was implemented.[13]
ISSUES
Spouses Pablo raise a sole issue for OUR consideration, to wit:
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE MOTION FOR EXECUTION OF THE HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
RULING
The petition is impressed with merit.
When the DARAB issued its July 9, 1997 Decision, it was very much aware of the Decision of the MTC in ejectment case.
In deciding to take cognizance of the case, the DARAB ratiocinated in this wise:
“Before going to the main issue of the case, let us first examine the attendant circumstances that might affect the jurisdiction of this Board over the case.
A perusal of the records disclosed that on August 30, 1988, the Municipal Trail Court of Rizal rendered a decision involving the same issues, parties and subject matter. It simply means that at the time of filing which was on November 16, 1985, the regular courts had still jurisdiction over all agrarian cases. This is so because from 1980 which was the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Courts of Agrarian Relations were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts ( Romero, et. al., vs. CA, et. al., 147 SCRA 183). It was only withdrawn upon the passage of Executive Order No. 229 vesting jurisdiction with the DAR. The said law took effect on July 22, 1987. If we will anchor our adjudication from the foregoing facts, one will say that indeed the Department of Agrarian Reform has no jurisdiction. But the instant case should not be examined from that angle alone, other facts should also be considered.
The records further reveal that plaintiffs-appellants as per certification of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, are the registered tenants of Maria Carmen. Hence, the issue involved has agrarian complexity. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, only the Regional Trail Courts (RTC) have jurisdiction over the cases of ejectment where the subject matter is agricultural land. The law never vested the Municipal Trial Courts (MTC) with such jurisdiction. Of course, if the issue involved was a simple ejectment case which involves residential lot, then the Municipal Trial Court would have been within its province in rendering the decision under question.
In the case at bar, the subject matter is an agricultural land so that the Municipal Trial Court of Rizal had overstepped its jurisdiction when it rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 903.”
WE do not agree.
The decision in the ejectment case had already attained finality even before Deus and Bucaneg lodged a complaint before the DAR’s Office of the Regional Director. Thus, the DARAB should have dismissed the appeal before it and upheld the decision of the Regional Director which correctly dismissed the complaint in the light of the MTC judgment.
The doctrine of res judicata should have been observed/applied by the DARAB. Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” It sets forth the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits and without fraud or collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.[14]
Res judicata has two concepts: (1) “bar by prior judgment” as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) “conclusiveness of judgment” in Rule 39, Section 47(c), which reads as follows:
“(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.”[15]
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is “conclusiveness of judgment.” Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues.[16]
This case falls under the second concept of res judicata. While the causes of action in the two cases differ, their issues are common to wit: whether or not the subject lot is agricultural and whether or not Deus and Bucaneg were Maria Carmen Bucaneg’s tenants-beneficiaries.
In the ejectment case, it was already established with finality that first, the subject lot was residential in nature; and second, Deus and Bucaneg were not tenants-beneficiaries of Maria Carmen Bucaneg.
As a matter of fact, in the ejectment case, Deus and Bucaneg even admitted that the subject property is a residential lot. As properly observed by the RTC, viz:
“Finally, on March 3, 1986, the parties, through counsels, agreed that the issues are as follows:
xxx
3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to eject the defendants considering that the lot in question is residential, hence, not within the jurisdiction of the MAR; xxx
xxx
From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the land in question is a residential land, and that this fact was not negated by rather admitted, by the defendants.”[17]
Deus and Bucaneg are bound by their admission in the ejectment case as to the nature of the property. They are already estopped from claiming that the land is agricultural in nature, thus, within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
As to the tenancy relationship averred by Deus and Bucaneg, the said issue was already laid to rest with the finding of the MTC, RTC and this Court that they had never been tenants of Maria Carmen Bucaneg.
These findings became conclusive upon Deus and Bucaneg when they failed to question the same before the Supreme Court.
In taking cognizance of the complaint and deciding the case in favor of Deus and Bucaneg, DARAB, in effect, did not just re-open a case that is already closed, it overturned a decision of a court of justice which had long attained finality.
The extant controversy could have been avoided had the DARAB simply dismissed the complaint lodged before it by Deus and Bucaneg on the ground of res judicata.
Unfortunately, the July 9, 1997 DARAB Decision had already been implemented with spouses-owners being evicted from the litigated property to which they were formerly restored by virtue of the MTC decision.
In the case of Collantes vs. Court of Appeals,[18] the Supreme Court resolved the issue that involves two conflicting final decisions in this wise —
“Two Conflicting Final and Executory Decisions
Jurisprudence in the United States offers different solutions to this problem:
Where there have been two former actions in which the claim or demand, fact or matter sought to be religated has been decided contrarily, the rule that, where there is an estoppel against an estoppel, it “setteth the matter at large” has been applied by some authorities, and in such case both parties may assert their claims anew. Other authorities have held that, of two conflicting judgments on the same rights of the same parties, the one which is later in time will prevail, although it has also been held that the judgment prior in time will prevail. It has been held that a decision of a court of last resort is binding on the parties, although afterward, in another cause, a different principle was declared.
There are thus three solutions which we can adopt in resolving the case at bar: the first is for the parties to assert their claims anew, the second is to determine which judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort.
As there are conflicting jurisprudence on the second solution, it is appropriate for this Court to adopt either the first or the third solution. The first solution involves disregarding the finality of the two previous judgments and allowing the parties to argue on the basis of the merits of the case anew. The third solution merely involves the determination of which judgment has been rendered by this Court, the court of last resort in this jurisdiction.
Adopting the third solution will result in the denial of this Petition for Certiorari. Whereas the finality of the 13 August 2001 CSC Resolution came about by the failure to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal within the proper reglementary periods, the finality of the 30 August 2001 Court of Appeals Decision was by virtue of the 12 November 2001 Resolution28 of this Court which declared the case closed and terminated upon the manifestation of petitioner that he decided not to pursue his appeal and was thus withdrawing the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari.
The better solution, however, is to let the parties argue the merits of the case anew, and decide the case on the basis thereof. We can do this either by remanding the case to a lower court, or by resolving the issues in this disposition. The latter recourse is more appropriate, for three reasons: (1) all the facts, arguments, and pleadings in support of the parties’ contentions are now before us, with the parties advancing the very same contentions as those in this Petition; (2) a remand to the Court of Appeals would entail asking the latter to resolve the very same issues it had passed upon twice; and (3) a remand to the Court of Appeals would only entail another unnecessary delay in the termination of the case when the case is now ripe for adjudication before us.”
A similar issue confronted the High Court in the case of Government Service Insurance System vs. Group Management Corporation.[19] Citing the Collantes case, the Supreme Court decided:
“Conclusion
Nonetheless, like we said, substantial justice requires the resolution of this controversy on its merits. It is the duty of this Court to put an end to this long-delayed litigation and render a decision, which will bind all parties with finality.
Although it is settled that the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision was not in any way nullified by the Manila RTC Decision, it is this Court’s duty to resolve the legal implications of having two conflicting, final, and executory decisions in existence. In Collantes v. Court of Appeals, this Court, faced with the similar issue of having two conflicting, final and executory decisions before it, offered three options to solve the dilemma: “the first is for the parties to assert their claims anew, the second is to determine which judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort.”
In Collantes, this Court applied the first option and resolved the conflicting issues anew. However, resorting to the first solution in the case at bar would entail disregarding not only the final and executory decisions of the Lapu-Lapu RTC and the Manila RTC, but also the final and executory decisions of the Court of Appeals and this Court. Moreover, it would negate two decades’ worth of litigating. Thus, we find it more equitable and practicable to apply the second and third options consequently maintaining the finality of one of the conflicting judgments. The primary criterion under the second option is the time when the decision was rendered and became final and executory, such that earlier decisions should prevail over the current ones since final and executory decisions vest rights in the winning party. In the third solution, the main criterion is the determination of which court or tribunal rendered the decision. Decisions of this Court should be accorded more respect than those made by the lower courts.” (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, considering that the first case was filed on November 16, 1985, resorting to the first solution would seem impractical as the parties have already been in litigation for almost three decades now.
Hence, WE find it more practicable to apply the second and third options.
The second option states that earlier decisions should prevail over the current ones since final and executory decisions vest rights in the winning party. The third option, on the other hand, gives more respect to a decision rendered by a court of last resort.
Applying both, the MTC Decision should prevail over the DARAB Decision.
The MTC Decision was promulgated on August 30, 1988 and attained finality sometime in 1990 which was way before DARAB rendered its Decision on July 9, 1997. Furthermore, the MTC ejectment case reached this Court wherein WE upheld the decision of the MTC and RTC while the DARAB decision was never challenged before any court. Thus, it could be generically said that this Court is the court of last resort before which the final appeal was made insofar as the issues on the nature of the property in litigation and relationship existing between Deus and Bucaneg, on one hand, and Maria Carmen Bucaneg, the former owner, on the other hand, are concerned.
WE understand that in issuing the June 21, 2012 writ of execution, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator relied on the long standing rule that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court or quasi-judicial agency to order its execution.
However, the said rule admits of certain exceptions as in cases of exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution; whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust.[20]
In this case, it would have been more in accord with justice if the Provincial Adjudicator denied Deus and Bucaneg’s Motion for Execution on the ground of the finality of the MTC Decision in the ejectment case involving the same parties, same property and same issues.
Lastly, WE are aware that June 21, 2012 DARAB Writ of Execution was already implemented on November 13, 2013. However, the same will not render the present petition moot and academic.
An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. In that situation, there is no actual substantial relief to which respondents would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of their original complaint.[21]
In this petition for certiorari, the issue raised by Spouses Pablo was whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the DARAB’s issuance of the June 21, 2012 Writ of Execution. The implementation of the writ did not render moot the resolution of the main issue presented before US via this petition.
In the light of the foregoing disquisitions, WE discern that grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the assailed Order and Resolution.
There is grave abuse of discretion “when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”[22]
The public respondent’s Order for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and its subsequent denial of Spouses Pablo’s motion for reconsideration are not in accord with applicable law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Order dated June 6, 2012 and Resolution dated September 5, 2012 of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB) are declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Abdulwahid, H. S., Chairperson and Inting, S. B., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo p. 33
[2] Id. p.35
[3] Id. p. 45
[4] Id. p. 49
[5] Id. p. 53
[6] Id. p. 58
[7] Id. p. 63
[8] Id. pp. 65-66; DARAB Decision dated July 9, 1997, pp.1-2
[9] Id. p. 65
[10] Id. p. 73
[11] Id. p. 34
[12] Id. p. 35
[13] Id. p. 150
[14] See Rivera vs. Heirs of Villanueva, G.R. NO. 141501, July 21, 2006
[15] See GSIS vs. GMC, G.R. No. 167000, June 8, 2011
[16] Supra. G.R. No. 167000, June 8, 2011
[17] Rollo pp. 50-51; RTC Decision dated April 21, 1989, pp.2-3
[18] G.R. No. 169604, March 6, 2007
[19] G.R. No. 167000, G.R. No. 169971, June 8, 2011
[20] See Premiere Development Bank vs. Flores, G.R. No. 175339, December 16, 2008
[21] See Philippines Airlines, Inc. vs, Pascua, G.R. No. 143258, August 15, 2003
[22] See Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. vs. Panado, G.R. No. 167118 June 15, 2006