PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JUAN REGINALDO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. PEDRO PADRON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

From the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, dated August
10, 1959, dismissing the information in Criminal Case No, 3195 of said Court as
against Pedro Padron, and the order of August 18, 1959, denying the motion for
reconsideration, the State has appealed to this Court on points of law.

The following facts are not disputed: On January 13, 1959, a complaint for
“Double Murder with Assault upon the Person of an Agent in Authority” was filed
against Carlos Dacuycuy, Juan Reginaldo and Pedro Padron in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Bacara, Ilocos Norte. The complaint was amended twice, after
which, preliminary investigation was conducted by the Justice of the Peace.
Counsel for accused Pedro Padron thereafter filed a motion dated February 21,
1959, for the discharge of said accused on the ground that the preliminary
investigation failed to show his participation in the offense charged.
Conformably, the Justice of the Peace discharged Padron from the complaint in an
order dated February 25, 1959. A motion for reconsideration, captioned
“Manifestation” and dated February 28, 1959, was denied on March 3, 1959. A
memorandum thereafter also filed by the private prosecutor was denied by an
order dated March 9, 1959.

The records were remanded to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte,
whereupon, after conducting his own preliminary investigation, the Provincial
Fiscal filed Criminal Case No. 3195 for “Double Murder with Assault upon the
Person of an Agent in Authority”, not only against Reginaldo and Dacuycuy but
also against Pedro Padron, who, however, was charged this time only as an
accomplice.

On July 8, 1959, the Provincial Fiscal moved for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest for Pedro Padron, which, by order of even date, was denied by the lower
court, based on the fact that the Justice of the Peace had dismissed the case as
against Padron on February 25, 1959. On July 10, 1959, the Provincial Fiscal
manifested to the lower court that he was not agreeable to the findings of the
Justice of the Peace as to the discharge of Pedro Padron, for which reason he
conducted his own preliminary investigation on .July 2, 1959, as a result of
which he found that a prima facie case exists against Padron, whom he
cited to appear in said investigation. The manifestation reiterated the prayer
for the issuance of a warrant for Padron’s arrest.

Arguments and memoranda, of parties were received, and the lower court, in
the order dated August 10, 1959, dismissed the information-, as against Pedro
Padron, at the same time denying the motion to issue a warrant for his arrest.
The order of August ,18, 1959 subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration
of the order of dismissal. In issuing the above orders, the lower court acted on
the belief that—

“* * * the Provincial Fiscal cannot conduct a preliminary investigation of
his owe under the provision of Republic Act 732 of the present case originally
filed in the Justice of the Peace Court, and thereafter, include in the
information an accused discharged from the complaint by said court for lack of
evidence.”

Prominently cited for the above rule are Villanueva vs. Gonzales, et
al., 99 Phil., 679; 52 Off. Gaz., [12] 5497 and People vs. Magbanua, et
al., CA-G. R. No. 19544-R, 54 Off. Gaz., 4500.

The trial court erred in issuing the orders appealed from. Only recently, and
based on a practically identical background (People vs. Pervez, 110
Phil., 214), we sustained the action of the Provincial Fiscal in conducting a
preliminary investigation, and afterwards, filing an information against an
accused who had previously been discharged by the Justice of the Peace. There,
we made the following observation—

“* * * we see no substantial distinction between those cakes originally
investigated by the Justice of the Peace, and dismissed by him, and those
originally investigated by the Provincial Fiscal (as in the Villanueva
and Napagao cases, with respect to some of the Accused), in both of
which, before filing an information in court, the Provincial Fiscal has to rely
on the result of his own investigation. If, in the latter cases, the Provincial
Fiscal may conduct the investigation without the accused who did not request to
be present, we sec no reason for changing the rule where a Justice of the Peace,
in a preliminary investigation, had previously dismissed the charge, when, as
aforesaid, the findings of the Justice of the Peace do not bind the Provincial
Fiscal (Of course, where a Justice of the Peace forwards a case to the Court of
First Instance with the finding that there is a prima facie case, the
Fiscal cannot, on his own authority, dismiss the case, but should file with the
court, a motion to dismiss).”

Construing the Villanueva case invoked by the Court below, we said—

“In that case, this Ruled that—

‘Republic Act 732 governs preliminary investigations conducted by provincial
fiscals in cases originally instituted by them in courts of first instance. It
does not apply to cases began in Justice of the Peace Courts and thereafter
forwarded to the corresponding Court of First Instance * * *’

Obviously, the ruling refers to those cases where the Justice of the Peace
conducted the second stage of preliminary investigation, and found a prima
facie case, or where the accused waived preliminary investigation therein.
In such cases, the Provincial Fiscal may rely on the evidence presented
in the Justice of the Peace, and is under no obligation to conduct an entirely
new preliminary investigation. But certainly, there is nothing in said decision
to justify the conclusion that after a previous dismissal by the Justice of the
Peace, the Provincial Fiscal may not conduct a separate independent
investigation of liis own, and this, without the presence of the accused, if the
latter did not so reque’st. In fact, the Villanueva case upheld the
legality of the preliminary investigation conducted by the provincial fiscal
with respect to one of the accused who was not among1 those originally
investigated by the Justice of the Peace, and who was not given notice by the
provincial fiscal in his own investigation.” (People vs. Pervez,
supra).

The operative rule, therefore, is now that—

“In resumé, We reiterate our previous rulings that if the charge for a crime
cognizable by the Court of First Instance is filed by a competent party or
officer in the Justice of the Peace Court, and the accused waives preliminary
investigation therein, or the Justice of the Peace, after regular preliminary
investigation, finds that a prima facie case exists, and consequently,
elevate the records to the Court of First Instance, the Provincial Fiscal is not
called upon to conduct another preliminary investigation, and may forthwith file
the information in the Court of First Instance. Republic. Act 732 does not apply
in such a case. But if the Justice of the Peace, after due investigation,
dismissed the charge, then, the case stands as if no charge had been made, and
the Provincial Fiscal may thereafter conduct his own investigation of the same
charge under the aforesaid Republic Act 1799 (amending R.A. 732), making it in
the presence of the accused if and when the latter so requests.” (People
vs. Pervez, supra.)

Wherefore, the orders appealed from are reversed, and the case is ordered
renjanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this
decision. Costs against defendant-appellee Pedro Padron.

Bengzon, C.J.,
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.