ALIPIO N. CASILAN AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LEYTE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. FILOMENO B. YBANEZ, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TACLOBAN CITY, AND ANTONIO MONTILLA, …

Casilan versus Ybanez

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Alipio N. Casilan against Judge Filomeno B. Ybanez of the Court of First Instance of Leyte and against Antonio Montilla, to set aside the writs of preliminary injunction issued by the Leyte court and the judgment making that injunction permanent. Casilan had won a final judgment in Quezon City against Hipolita Chapman, and he complains that the Leyte court unlawfully interfered with the judgment and orders of a coordinate court when it restrained his sheriff from proceeding with the execution sale. The case matters because it draws a clean line between a court acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, which certiorari may correct, and a mere error of law in a judgment, which must be corrected by a timely appeal and cannot be reached by certiorari once the judgment has become final.

Procedural History

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City rendered judgment in favor of Casilan and against Hipolita Chapman. After that judgment became final, a writ of execution issued, and the Provincial Sheriff of Leyte levied on properties and advertised them for sale. Before the sale could be held, Antonio Montilla, claiming to be a prior judgment and execution creditor, and Paz B. Tiongson, claiming to be a mortgagee of the lands levied upon, filed separate actions in the Court of First Instance of Leyte and obtained writs of preliminary injunction restraining Casilan and the Sheriff from proceeding with the sale. After trial, the Leyte court rendered judgment declaring Casilan's levy subordinated to the claims of Montilla and Tiongson and making the injunction permanent. Casilan moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and he then came to the Supreme Court on certiorari, on the ground that the injunctions constituted unlawful interference with the judgments and orders of a coordinate court.

Facts

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City rendered a decision in favor of Casilan and against Hipolita Chapman, sentencing her to pay him 15,000 pesos. The judgment became final, and the corresponding writ of execution issued in March 1961. Pursuant to that writ, the Provincial Sheriff of Leyte levied upon properties allegedly owned by Chapman, consisting of two parcels of land, a residential house, and some machinery, and advertised them for sale.

The levy on the realty was entered in the daybook of the Register of Deeds and noted on the back of the original certificate of title in the name of Louis Chapman, the deceased husband of Hipolita Chapman. It appears, however, that since March 1954 that certificate had been cancelled and replaced by a transfer certificate of title in the name of Hipolita, and the levy was not noted on the latter certificate at the time it was entered in the daybook, apparently because Casilan was unaware of the transfer.

Before the sheriff's sale could be held, Montilla, claiming to be a prior judgment and execution creditor of Hipolita Chapman, and Tiongson, allegedly a mortgagee of the lands levied upon, filed separate actions in the Leyte court, claiming to be preferred and duly recorded creditors, and obtained writs of preliminary injunction against Casilan and the Sheriff. After due trial, the Leyte court rendered judgment declaring Casilan's levy subordinated to the claims of Montilla and Tiongson and making the injunction permanent. Casilan moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and he then filed this petition for certiorari.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court may still interfere with the preliminary injunctions issued by the Leyte court, they having been superseded and replaced by the permanent injunction ordered in the judgment on the merits.
• Whether or not the Leyte court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in determining that the credits of Tiongson and Montilla are entitled to priority over that of Casilan.
• Whether or not certiorari may be used to set aside a judgment on the merits that has already become final and unappealable.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision. Its reasoning rests on the settled rule governing the remedy of certiorari, which lies only where a tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and not to correct mere errors of law in a judgment. That rule bears on the case because the Court held that the Leyte court had the power and the right to determine the question of preference among creditors, so that any mistake in its findings would be an error of law correctible by appeal, not by certiorari.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that it can no longer interfere with the preliminary injunctions issued by the Leyte court, because those preliminary writs had already been vacated, being superseded and replaced by the permanent injunction ordered in the decision on the merits.

On the second issue, the Court held that no action can be taken on the permanent injunction without reviewing the judgment on the merits, since the injunction is but a consequence of the pronouncement that the credits of Tiongson and Montilla are entitled to priority over that of Casilan. The Court explained that the court below had the power and the right to determine such question of preference, so its judgment is not without, nor in excess of, jurisdiction. Even assuming that its findings are not correct, they would at most constitute errors of law, and not abuses of discretion, correctible by certiorari.

On the third issue, the Court held that the obvious remedy for Casilan was a timely appeal from the judgment on the merits to the Court of Appeals, the amount involved being less than 200,000 pesos. But the judgment had become final and unappealable, and it cannot be set aside through certiorari proceedings.

Doctrine

A court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties may determine the question of preference among competing creditors, and its judgment on that question is not without or in excess of jurisdiction. If its findings are wrong, the error is one of law, not an abuse of discretion, and the remedy is a timely appeal, not certiorari. Once the judgment on the merits has become final and unappealable, it cannot be set aside through certiorari proceedings. A permanent injunction that is but a consequence of the judgment on the merits cannot be reviewed without reviewing that judgment itself. And a preliminary injunction that has been superseded and replaced by a permanent injunction in the decision on the merits is already vacated, so there is nothing left for the appellate court to interfere with.

Disposition

The petition for a writ of certiorari was denied, with costs against the petitioner, Casilan.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that a wrong judgment is corrected by a timely appeal, not by certiorari, and once it becomes final it cannot be set aside through certiorari. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between errors of law and grave abuse of discretion, and the rule that a permanent injunction cannot be attacked without reviewing the final judgment on the merits from which it flows.