CLEMENTE SUMCAD, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS GUILD, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal by certiorari from the order of the respondent court in Case No.
249-ULP-Cebu, of May 27, 1961 sustaining its co-respondent’s motion to
dismiss, and from its resolution en banc of July 7, 1961 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On May 31, 1955, respondent Philippine Marine Officers Guild,
hereinafter referred to as the Union, was duly certified as the
representative of all marine officers and engineers of the William
Lines, Inc., a duly organized, domestic corporation engaged in the
business of coastwise shipping, hereinafter referred to as the Company,
for collective bargaining purposes.

On December 30, 1957, the Company and the Union entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with a closed-shop provision partly to
this effect:

The COMPANY hereby agrees that membership in good standing
with the UNION shall be a strict requirement as a condition of
employment of all the marine officers and marine engineers employed and
hereafter to be employed by the COMPANY in connection with its vessel.”

“Upon written notification by the UNION that an officer or engineer is
no longer in good standing with the UNION, the COMPANY shall
immediately dismiss such officer or engineer from employment.”

At that time petitioner Clemente Sumcad was the Master of one of the
vessels of the Company. As he refused to affiliate with the Union
because the law did not allow him to join a labor organization of his
subordinates, the Union sought his dismissal. On February 3, 1958, the
Company sent him a written notice requiring him to affiliate with the
Union within twenty-four hours from receipt thereof, otherwise he would
be dismissed from the service. Thereupon, petitioner filed with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint, with a petition for a writ
of preliminary injunction, against the Company to restrain the latter
from dismissing him. Having been allowed to intervene, the Union moved
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. The court sustained the motion
and dismissed the case. As petitioner’s appeals first to the Court of
Appeals and later to Us were unsuccessful, the Company dismissed him.

As a result of his dismissal, petitioner filed with the respondent
court a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Company and the
Union (Case No. 249-ULP- Cebu). The latter filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. While
the same was pending resolution, petitioner and the Company submitted
to the Court a written amicable settlement by virtue of which, on May
27, 1955, said court, through Judge Tabigne, issued the first order
appealed from approving the amicable settlement and dismissing the
charges against the Company, granting, at the same time, the Union’s
motion to dismiss on the ground that there was “no unfair labor
practice act committed” by the latter. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the court en banc, he filed the
present petition for review by certiorari.

Under Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act employees have the right,
inter alia, to join any labor organization of their own choice for the
purpose of collective bargaining. On the other hand, under Section 4 of
the same Act, it constitutes unfair labor practice for a labor
organization to, inter alia, “coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights under section three”.

In the light of these legal provisions and upon the facts stated
heretoforeùif established during the trial of the case for Unfair Labor
Practice mentioned aboveùthe Union could be found guilty, irrespective
of whether petitioner was or was not covered by the collective
bargaining agreement between the Company and the Union. If he was
coveredùin spite of the nature of his employment of Master of a
vesselùthe unfair labor practice on the part of the Union was clear,
because petitioner, being already in the employ of the Company, when
the agreement was entered into, was not under, obligation to join the
Union to keep his job. If he was not covered, the fact would still
remain that the Union “coerced” him to join its ranks and caused his
dismissal because he refused to join. This appeal is, therefore,
meritorious. Wherefore, the orders appealed from are set aside and this
case is remanded to the respondent court for further appropriate
proceedings, with costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.