THE HEIRS OF PAIDU DUMACON, NAMELY: DELIA HASSAN-DUMACON, AND BAILYN D. ABDUL, REPRESENTED BY: DELIA DUMACON-HASSAN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE BUANAY CAMPI, REPRESE…
LOPEZ, J.:
(1) August 4, 2009 Order[2] issued in Civil Case No. 08-99, entitled “Heirs of Uga Campi, represented by: Buanay Campi, Alfonso Campi and Rene Boy C. Birangan v. Heirs of Datu Paido Dumacon, represented by: Delia Dumacon-Hassan, Salama D. Mendoza, Abdul Dumacon and Bailyn D. Abdul” which denied petitioners’ motion for leave of court to admit motion to dismiss; (2) May 13, 2010 Order[3] which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the August 4, 2009 Order; and the (3) September 7, 2011 Order[4] which denied petitioners’ second motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.
The Facts:
The late Uga Campi, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, applied for a homestead patent over a parcel of public land situated at barrio Lanao, Kidapawan, Cotabato more particularly described as Lot No. 31, Block 24, Kidapawan Public Land Subdivision, Pls-54, containing an area of 43,881 square meters (subject property). Uga Campi died during the pendency of the homestead application, hence, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2776 over the subject property was issued in the name of the Heirs of Uga Campi represented by Ukada Campi on May 18, 1966.
On November 14, 1972, the heirs of Uga Campi namely: Udog Tumindag Campi (the surviving spouse of Ukada Campi) with her children Pilar Campi, Alfonso Campi, Merlinda Campi, Rowena Campi and Buanay Campi (the daughter of Uga Campi) filed Civil Case No. 236 against the Heirs of Paidu Dumacon, represented by Delia Hassan (petitioners herein) for recovery of possession and right of ownership before the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan City, Branch 17. The heirs of Uga Campui sought to recover the possession of the subject property illegally occupied by the Heirs of Paidu Dumacon.
On March 15, 1993, however, the Heirs of Uga Campi and the Heirs of Paidu Dumacon entered into an Amicable Settlement whereby the parties agreed:
(1) That the HEIRS OF UGA CAMPI hereby recognize the actual physical possession and right of ownership over the parcel of land involved in this case, known as Lot No. 31, Block 24, Kidapawan Public Land Subdivision, Pls-59, by DATU PAIDU DUMACON and his heirs since 1945 up to the present;
(2) That by virtue of the aforesaid recognition, the Heirs of Uga Campi hereby bind themselves to execute the necessary deed of conveyance, or transfer, or sell over the aforesaid lot in favor of the HEIRS OF DATU PAIDU DUMACON upon the termination of the cases now pending in Court, and as soon as the title over the land – Original Certificate of Title No. P-27760, in the name of the “Heirs of Uga Campi, represented by Ukada Campi” – shall have been cleared of whatever liens and encumbrances that may be attached thereto.
(3) That for and in consideration of the foregoing recognition of their rights of possession and ownership over the land subject herein by the HEIRS OF UGA CAMPI, the HEIRS OF DATU PAIDU DUMACON hereby bind and obligate themselves to pay the former the sum of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,00.00) Philippines currency, payable as follows:
(a) P100,000.00 upon the signing and execution hereof;
(b) P1,400,000.00 on or before the execution of the deed of conveyance stated in paragraph (2) above;
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(6) That both parties herein hereby jointly move for the dismissal of the above-entitled case upon the filing hereof; and
(7) That the parties herein hereby agree and covenant to faithfully and honestly comply with the terms and conditions of the Amicable Settlement.
DONE at Kidapawan, Cotabato, Philippines, this 15th day of March, 1993.
HEIRS OF UGA CAMPI:- HEIRS OF DATU PAIDU DUMACON:- By: UDOG TUMINDAG CAMPI (Surviving Spouse of Ukada Campi, Son of UGA CAMPI) PILAR CAMPI ALFONSO CAMPI
I HEREBY WITNESS AND AFFIRM THE THUMBMARK OF MY MOTHER; BUANAY CAMPI:
On July 19, 1993, presiding Judge Rodolfo M. Serrano of Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan City, Branch 17 approved the above compromise agreement of the parties.
In compliance with the compromise agreement, the heirs of Uga Campi executed a declaration of heirship with sale in favor of the Heirs of Paidu Dumacon (herein petitioners). Resultantly, OCT No. P-27760 in the name of the Heirs of Uga Campi was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-92083 was issued in the name of Buanay Campi, Alfonso Campi, Pilar Campi, Merlina Campi, and Rowena Campi. Subsequently, TCT No. T-92083 was cancelled and TCT No. T-92084 was issued in the name of the Heirs of Paidu Dumacon, namely: Delia Dumacon-Hassan, Salama DUmacon-Mendoza, Abdul Dumacon and Bailyn Dumacon-Abdul.
The controversy in this case however arose when the Heirs of Paidu Dumacon despite the transfer of the title in their favor pursuant to the terms of the amicable settlement allegedly failed to pay the Heirs of Uga Campi the amount of Php1,500,000.00 as consideration for the transfer of the subject property in their favor.
This prompted the Heirs of Uga Campi, represented by Buanay Campi, Alfonso Campi and Rene Boy C. Berangan to file Civil Case No. 08-99[6] against the petitioners for reconveyance and/or declaration of nullity of title, damages and attorney’s fees with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the court a quo on May 27, 1999.
In their Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim,[7] petitioners maintain that they have fully complied with their obligation to pay to the Heirs of Uga Campi the consideration of their Amicable Settlement in the amount of Php1,500,000.00. They prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action as the claims of the Heirs of Uga Campi have been fully paid, waived or extinguished.
On June 14, 2000, Alfonso Campi, the co-petitioner of Buanay Campi in Civil Case No. 08-99 filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint[8] purportedly in behalf of the Heirs of Uga Campi, alleging that they have already ironed out their misunderstanding with the petitioners.
However, on October 15, 2001, Buanay Campi, in her capacity as the daughter of the late Uga Campi, filed an amended complaint[9] before the court a quo for Declaration of Nullity of: Amicable Settlement; Declaration of Heirship with Sale; Absolute Deed of Sale; Transfer Certificate of Titles; Reconveyance, and Reinstatement of Title, Damages and Attorneys Fees against the Heirs of Paidu Dumacon. She also included her nephews and nieces (the heirs of Ukada Campi, namely: Alfonso Campi, Pilar Campi, Merlinda Campi, and Rowena Campi), the Land Bank of the Philippines and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cotabato as additional defendants.
On December 10, 2001, the court a quo admitted the amended complaint. Petitioners then filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint on March 21, 2002.
On December 30, 2002, pre-trial was terminated. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
After respondents rested their case, petitioners commenced the presentation of their evidence by presenting its first witness, Delia Dumacon-Hassan.
However, on July 1, 2008, and during the pendency of the trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Motion to Dismiss with Leave of Court.[10] Petitioners contend that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the case because the compromise agreement previously approved by the court in Civil Case No. 236 constitutes res judicata. Petitioners added that the filing of Civil Case No. 08-99 constitutes forum shopping on the part of respondents.
On August 4, 2009, the court a quo issued the first assailed Order denying petitioners’ motion for leave to admit motion to dismiss. The court a quo noted that since petitioners already started presenting their evidence, it will be in the interest of the earlier resolution of the case if the petitioners continue to present their defenses and the case be tried on the merits. The court a quo further held:
At the outset, defendants did not file any opposition to the motion of plaintiffs to admit amended complaint. On December 10, 2001, an order was issued admitting the amended complaint. Defendants’ then counsel Atty. Jorge Zerrudo filed motion of bill of particulars on January 4, 2002. When Atty. Danilo Balucanag counsel for the plaintiffs tendered to him a copy of the amended complaint with its amendments duly underlined, he was satisfied of plaintiff’s compliance of the rules. The motion became moot and academic and hence, was denied.
Defendants through Atty. Zerrudo filed answer to amended complaint on March 21, 2002. After pre-trial was conducted, pre-trial order was issued on September 30, 2002. Subsequently amended pre-trial order was issued on December 30, 2002.
The amended pre-trial order of December 3, 2002 controlled the subsequent course of action in this case. As provided under Section 7, last paragraph of Rule 18
the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of action unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. The parties did not seek any amendment thereof. Hence, trial shall be conducted or controlled by the aforesaid amended pre-trial order.
Defendants did not invoke affirmative defenses to be heard ahead of the evidence-in-chief of the plaintiffs. Hence, proceeding of the case was conducted without their affirmative defenses heard ahead of the evidence-in-chief of the plaintiffs.
Defendants had begun presenting evidence, after plaintiffs rested their evidence. Defendant Delia Hassan testified, albeit partially. It will be in the interest of the earlier resolution of the case if the defendants be allowed to continue to present their defenses. Obviously, whatever ruling that this Court may take in their motion to dismiss will still be subject to other remedies which will again prolong the litigation. The resolution of all the causes of actions raised by the plaintiffs may be held in abeyance as a consequence.
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The grounds cited by the defendants in their motion to dismiss are amply discussed in their answer to the amended complaint. Defendants entered into pre-trial. As a result thereof, a pre-trial order and amended pre-trial order were issued. Under the rules, the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of action of this case. Any of the parties may not deviate from what had been taken up during the pre-trial proceedings unless the pre-trial order is set aside for the purpose of preventing manifest injustice. However, this must be done before trial commence. The stage now of the proceeding is the reception of defendants’ evidence. Defendant Delia Hassan partially testified. The amended pre-trial order may not be set aside anymore.[11]
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the court a quo in the second assailed Resolution dated July 29, 2011.[12]
On January 27, 2011, petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration[13] raising substantially the same issues raised in the earlier motion for reconsideration.
On September 7, 2011, the court a quo issued the third assailed Order denying petitioners’ second motion for reconsideration with a finding among other things, that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, hence, no action can be taken therein. To add, the court a quo reiterated that it will serve the ends of justice if the petitioners shall be given time to completely present their side of the controversy in a full-blown trial.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issues:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners argue in the main that the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion for leave to admit motion to dismiss. Petitioners aver that the court a quo failed to address the grounds raised in the motion to dismiss thereby setting aside the more important issues of res judicata, forum shopping and lack of jurisdiction.
The Court’s Ruling:
The petition for certiorari is without merit.
Petition for certiorari filed out of time
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court specifically provides the period when a petition for certiorari must be filed, thus:
Sec. 4. Where and when petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
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No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
In San Juan v. Cruz,[14] where the petitioners therein similarly filed a second motion for reconsideration from an interlocutory order, the Supreme Court explained that while the proscription against the filing of a second motion for reconsideration applies only to a final
resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one, it must be borne in mind that in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court there are only three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition for the nullification of a judgment, resolution or order, i.e., (1) the date when notice of the judgment, resolution or order was received;
(2) when a motion for a new trial or reconsideration of the judgment, order or resolution was submitted; and (3) when notice of the denial thereof was received by petitioner. The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is for the purpose of determining its timeliness, considering that a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be nullified. In the same case, the Supreme Court stressed that in a petition for certiorari, the sixty (60)-day period shall be reckoned from the trial court’s denial of the first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will ensue.
The foregoing is reiterated in PNB v. De Guzman,[15] that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned from the trial court’s denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
In the instant case however, records show that the court a quo issued the first assailed order denying the motion to admit motion to dismiss on August 4, 2009. On August 24, 2009, petitioners received a copy of the August 4, 2009 Order. On September 7, 2009, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration from the August 4, 2009
Order. On May 13, 2010, the court a quo issued the second assailed Order denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Petitioners received, on January 20, 2011, the May 13, 2010 Order of the court denying the motion for reconsideration of the August 4, 2009. Petitioners had 60 days from May 13, 2010 or until July 14, 2010 within which to file his petition for certiorari. However, petitioners filed their petition for certiorari with the court only on October 24, 2011. Hence, applying the ruling in San Juan and PNB, the petition for certiorari was evidently filed out of time, as its filing was reckoned from the denial of the last motion.
Petitioner failed to establish that the court a quo
committed grave abuse of discretion
Even assuming that the petition for certiorari was seasonably filed, We find that petitioners failed to establish that the court a quo committed an error so grave to warrant the remedy of certiorari.
We stress that the special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss, which includes the denial of a motion to admit a motion to dismiss. This is so because the order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done by the court before a case is finally decided on the merits. Therefore, the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.[16]
The general rule, therefore, is that the denial of a Motion to Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, the Supreme Court has recognized in NM Rothschild & Sons Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company[17] that when the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified.
In a special action for certiorari, the burden is on petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent.18 “By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”[19]
Motion to admit the motion to dismiss was belatedly filed.
Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.
Records show that on October 15, 2001, Buanay Campi, in her capacity as the daughter of the late Uga Campi, filed before the court a quo an amended complaint.[20] On December 10, 2001, the court a quo admitted the amended complaint and petitioners filed their Answer to
the amended complaint on March 21, 2002. We noted that the motion to admit motion to dismiss was then filed on July 1, 2008, or seven (7) years after the amended complaint was filed or 6 (six) years later after petitioners filed their amended answer.
We note furthermore that the motion was filed after the plaintiffs (herein respondents) already rested its case. In fact, the defendants (herein petitioners) already started presenting their evidence by presenting Delia Dumacon-Hassan as their first witness. The court a quo therefore cannot be faulted when it held that the motion to dismiss should be denied so as not to prolong the proceedings of the case. It added that it will be in the interest of the earlier resolution of the case if the petitioners continue to present their defenses in a full blown trial.
In Boston Equity Resources v, Court of Appeals,[21] where a similar motion was filed by petitioner six (6) years and five (5) months
after filing an amended answer and after petitioner has completed the presentation of its evidence, the Supreme Court ruled that –
A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts – acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the courts.
Even assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent’s motion to dismiss. It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued the questioned orders as respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed SIX YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE FILED HER AMENDED ANSWER. This circumstance alone already warranted the outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed in clear contravention of the express mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this provision, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before the filing of an answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.
More importantly, respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed after petitioner has completed the presentation of its evidence in the trial court, giving credence to petitioner’s and the trial court’s conclusion that the filing of the motion to dismiss was a mere ploy on the part of respondent to delay the prompt resolution of the case against her.
In view of the foregoing, the Court will no longer delve into and resolve the other issues raised in the petition. Besides, We agree with the court a quo that these matters will be best determined after a full blown trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Camello, J., Ch., and Inting, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 7
[2] Rollo, p. 57.
[3] Rollo, p. 60.
[4] Rollo, p. 290.
[5] Rollo, p. 60.
[6] Rollo, p. 64.
[7] Rollo, p. 72.
[8] Rollo, p. 84.
[9] Rollo, p. 85.
[10] Rollo, p. 98.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Rollo, p. 267.
[14] G.R. No. 167321, July 31, 2006.
[15] G.R. No. 182507, June 18, 2010.
[16] Boston Equity Resources, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013.
[17] G.R. No. 175799, November 28, 2011.
[18] DORELCO v. NLRC, G.R. No. 128389, November 25, 1999.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Rollo, p. 85.
[21] G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013.