IN RE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION TO PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP OF CUAKI TAN SI. CUAKI TAN SI, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

This case is before us on appeal, taken by the Provincial Fiscal of
Davao, from a decision of the court of first instance of said province
granting the petition of appellee Cuaki Tan Si for naturalization as
citizen of the Philippines. Upon the filing of the printed record on
appeal and the service of notice requiring the submission of
appellant’s brief, the Solicitor General submitted a manifestation to
the effect that petitioner has, according to the evidence on record,
the requisite qualifications and none of the statutory
disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines, and that,
consequently, a withdrawal of the appeal was justified. On August 14,
1961, this Court resolved to consider said manifestation as appellant’s
brief, to hold its consideration in abeyance until the determination of
the case on the merits and to require the petitioner to file his brief
within the reglementary period, which he did.

At the outset, it should be noted that a naturalization case is not
an ordinary judicial contest, to be decided in favor of the party whose
claim is supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Indeed,
naturalization is not a matter of right, but one of privilege of the
most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting, as it does, public interest of the highest order, and which
may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law
therefor. Such conditions are of two
(2) kinds, namely: (1)
substantial; and (2) formal or procedural. Of the first class are the
possession of the qualifications and of none of the disqualifications
enumerated in sections, 2, 3 and 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended. To the second class belong, among others, the filing of a
declaration of intention (save in specified cases), and the need of two
(2) character witnesses.

With respect to the latter, section 7 of said Act, as amended, requires, in the language of this Court in Ong vs. Republic of the Philippines, (103 Phil., 964; 55 Off. Gaz. (18) 3290):

“1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;

2. That they are ‘credible persons’;

3. That they personally know the petitioner;

4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by law;

5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;

6. That they personally know him to be morally irreprochable;

7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines; and

8. That he ‘is not in any way disqualified under the provisions’ of the Naturalization Law.”

In this connection, we must bear in mind that petitioner herein
claims to be exempt from the requirement of filing a declaration of
intention, under section 6 of the aforementioned Act, upon the ground
that he has resided in the Philippines continuously since May 11, 1926,
or for over thirty (30) years prior to the filing of his petition
herein, on September 2,1958. Yet, one of his character witnesses,
namely Gregorio S. Romero, had known petitioner since 1937 only, or for
less than thirty (30) years.

Moreover, referring to the qualifications of the character witnesses, we, likewise, observed in the Ong Case (supra):

“* * * Within the purview of the Naturalization Law,
a ‘credible’ person is, to our mind, not only an individual who has not
been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and
has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose
‘affidavit’ or testimony is not incredible. What must be ‘credible’ is
not the declaration made, but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trust’ worthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner. Thus, in Cu vs. Republic, 89 Phil., 473 (decided on July 18, 1951), we declared that said affiants ‘are in a way insurers of the character of the candidate concerned.’ Indeed,
by their affidavits, they do not merely make the statements herein
contained. They also vouch for the applicant, attest to the merits of
his petition and sort of underwrite the same.”

As held in Lim Ching Tian vs. Republic of the Philippines, (111 Phil., 211) :

“The law requires that a vouching witness should
have actually known an applicant for whom he testified for the
requisite period prescribed therein to give him the necessary
competence to act as such. The reason behind this requirement is that a
vouching witness is in a way an insurer of the character of petitioner
because on his testimony the court is of necessity compelled to rely in
deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, imperative, that
he be competent and reliable. And he is only competent to testify on
his conduct, character and moral fitness if he has had the opportunity
to observe him personally, if not intimately, during the period he has
allegedly known him.”

Hence, the affidavit of the character witnesses, attesting to the
qualifications of the petitioner and to his lack of disqualifications,
must be attached to the petition (section 7 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended), thus becoming part and parcel thereof as a pleading.
As a consequence, the petition must be denied unless the material
statements in said affidavit are established on the witness stand by
the testimony of the respective affiants. The law thus, in effect,
requires that the character witnesses be, not mere ordinary
acquaintances of the applicant, but possessed of such intimate
knowledge of the latter as to be competent to testify, of their
personal knowledge, that he has each one of the requisite
qualifications and none of the statutory disqualifications.

The aforementioned Gregorio S. Romero expressed the belief that
petitioner is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude and is not suffering from any incurable disease.
Romero admitted, however, that he could not say whether or not
petitioner believes in the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assasination for the success and predominance of men’s ideas.

The other character witness, Celestino Ceniza, testified that he did
not know of any disqualification of the petitioner to become a citizen
of the Philippines, but there is every reason to believe that the
witness is not reasonably posted on the disqualifications under our
naturalization laws. In fact, upon being asked to be specific, he could
say no more than that applicant is neither a polygamist nor a believer
in polygamy, that he is not opposed to an organized government and that
he had never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
What is more, Ceniza was not certain about the political principles
embraced by petitioner. Although Ceniza would have us believe that
petitioner knows the basic principles of the Constitution, he (Ceniza)
appears to believe that those principles are limited to the
independence of the three (3) departments, particularly that of the
judiciary. Ceniza did not even know the names of some of petitioner’s
children, and had no idea whatsoever about his religion.

Petitioner’s character witnesses do not know him, therefore,
sufficiently to be in a position to assure us that he has every one of
the requisite qualifications and none of the aforementioned
disqualifications. They are not competent to vouch for his fitness to
become a member of our citizenry.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the petition
herein dismissed, with cost against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.