IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF LUIS UY TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. LUIS UY, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

This is a case of naturalization. A little after two years from the
promulgation of the decision granting Philippines citizenship to appellant Luis
Uy, he petitioned the trial court to allow him to take his oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen. He is now appealing from the order of said court dated
August 14, 1953, denying his petition. We are reproducing the said order which
contains not only the issue involved but also the facts of the case.

“This is an alternative petition filed by the applicant in the above-entitled
case, praying: (1) that an. order be issued by this couit allowing him to take
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen and ordering the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of naturalization in his favor; and (2) that in the
event his first prayer is denied, he be permitted to take his oath of allegiance
after the lapse of two years counted from the date of his return to the
Philippines from abroad, upon proper showing that he has complied with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 530.

“To this petition, the representative of the Government vigorously interposed
an objection for the reasons stated in the opposition filed on June 6 and July
29, 1953.

“It appears that on February 21, 1951 this court rendered the decision in the
above-entitled case granting Philippine citizenship to the herein movant,
subject, however, to the provisions of Republic Act No. 530. No appeal was taken
by the office of the Solicitor General from this decision. However, on April 6,
1952, the herein petitioner, without advising the court and the office of the
Solicitor General, left the Philippines for the United States en a dual purpose,
namely: (1) to submit himself to a medical check-up; and (2) to strengthen the
business ties of the Associated Trading Corporation, of which he was then, and
still is the general manager, with various suppliers in the United States.
According to the petitioner, his departure from the Philippines for abroad on
the date in question was vital and necessary as it concerned his life and
health. It was not for vacation or pleasure, he added. He had to submit himself
to a physical check-up in the hands of Dr. Frank Co Tui, world renowned gastric
ulcer specialist, as he was then suffering from a recurrent attacked of stomach
ulcer, which at one time or another his doctors strongly suspected may be
cancer, and while there in the United States he availed himself of the
opportunity of looking into the welfare and interest of the corporation of which
he is the general manager.

“The evidence introduced by the petitioner shows that he was suffering from
peptic ulcer, and that his personal physicians, Drs. Liboro and Rivera, had
advised him to make a trip to the United States for a thorough medical check-up.
In the early part of 1952, the Board of Directors of the Associated Trading
Corporation, of which he was the general manager, decided to send him to the
United States on a business trip. The evidence shows that the petitioner herein
grasped the opportunity to go to the United States; and while in New York
submitted himself to treatment under Dr. Frank Co Tui.

“The only question to be resolved by this court, therefore, is whether,
notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner has left the Philippines for the
United States on April 6, 1952, without having waited for the expiration of the
two-year period as required by Republic Act No. 530, he should be allowed to
take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen.

“It is the opinion of this court that the herein applicant has not complied
with section 1 of Republic Act No. 530. This court agrees with the contention of
the Solicitor General that section 1 of said Act requires no other
interpretation. It lays down categorically that within the intervening period of
two years from the promulgation of the decision granting the applicant’s
petition for citizenship, said applicant should not leave the Philippines. It
is, therefore, the duty of the court to enforce this law to the latter however
seemingly hard its effect may be.

“As to the second prayer of the petitioner, the court sees no justification
in granting the same, for the intention of the Legisla- ture in passing Republic
Act No. 530 is clear and explicit and the court, therefore, cannot give any
other interpretation.

“In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition to take the
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen by the herein applicant is hereby
denied.

“So ordered.

“Manila, Philippines, August 14, 1953.

 

(Sgd.) Julio Villamor
Judge“

Being a case of first impression, we have given the same very careful study
and consideration. We agree with the trial court that because of his absence
from the Philippines during the period of two years after the promulgation of
the decision granting him citizenship, petitioner has not complied with section
1 of Republic Act 530. For purposes of reference we are reproducing said section
1 of Republic Act 530, to wit:

“Section 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for
Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from
the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision
granting the application become executory until after two years from its
promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the
Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds that during
the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has
dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not
been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4)
or committed any act prejudicial to the interests of the nation or contrary to
any Government announced policies.”

Interpreting the above reproduced legal provisions, we held in the case of
Johnny Chuasintek vs. Barcelona, G. R. No. L-5124, October 8, 1951,
that:

“The court believes that the intention of the law quoted above is to place an
applicant for Philippine citizenship on probation for two years from the date of
the promulgation of a final decision.”

The purpose is that during that period of probation the Government and the
community wherein an applicant for Philippine citizenship lives, be given an
opportunity to observe his conduct and behaviour and see whether or not he has
complied with the other requirements contained in section 1 of Republic Act 530.
Moreover, if he is absent from this jurisdiction, how could he comply with
requirement No. 2 to the effect that he has dedicated himself continuously to a
lawful calling or profession? Besides, as well observed by the Solicitor General
on page 7 of his brief:

“* * *. It is also the intention of Congress that the applicant be physically
present in the country during that period to see if he complies with the other
requirements of the statute, otherwise, if he were allowed to leave the country,
he may, while abroad commit acts inimical to the Philippines without the
Government knowing anything about the matter.”

It may be that this requirement of non-absence from the Philippines for a
period of two years does involve some sacrifice on the part of an applicant for
naturalization but one sincerely and earnestly interested in becoming a Filipino
citizen and enjoy its benefits should be ready to undergo said sacrifice for a
period which after all is not too long.

This requirement of non-absence for two years might possibly admit of some
exceptions. Like the case of John Doe Kwong Ng, case No. 10223 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, cited by counsel where petitioner therein was allowed
to take the oath of allegiance although during the two-year period he had gone
to Hongkong for an intelligence mission for the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, it might well be that during those two years, an applicant’s
absence is not on his own initiative but rather at the instance of the
Government in which case said Government may and should in justice and fairness,
waive strict compliance with the law about continuous presence in the country
for two years. We can also imagine a case where an applicant may have been
kidnapped or otherwise forcibly removed from the country for a short period, or
where an applicant is obliged to go and stay abroad, for sometime not too long,
to undergo an operation to save his life.

In the present case, however, there is reason to believe that petitioner’s
absence from the Philippines for about three months was not necessary to save
his life. He was never in a critical condition. As a matter of fact, he left the
Islands only about nine months after he had been advised by his doctors to go to
the United States for medical check-up and treatment, and during his stay in New
York City, according to the evidence, he saw Dr. Co Tui, the medical expert whom
he had gone to consult, only twice. According to the Solicitor General, before
and after his illness was diagnosed by Dr. Co Tui in July, 1951, appellant was
never bed-ridden, and he used to go to his office in the mornings and took a
rest in the afternoon. According to appellant himself, he had been sent by his
company to America in order to strengthen the ties between his company and some
business firms in the United States, and he merely grasped this opportunity to
have a check-up in America. In other words, business was the primary object of
his trip to the United States; medical check-up was only secondary.

We also agree with the trial court in its denial of the second prayer in the
appellant’s petition that in the event his prayer be denied, that he be
permitted to take his oath of allegiance after the lapse of two years from his
return to the Philippines upon proper showing that he had complied with the
provisions of Republic Act 530. We believe that by applicant’s failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act 530, particularly by absenting himself
from the Philippines during the two-year period, he had forfeited his right to
citizenship as granted by the decision of the trial court.

In answer to petitioner’s contention that to require him to file another
petition for naturalization and to undergo another trial, would be unfair and
unjust to him and on top of this, if he were to file another petition for
naturalization, an anomalous situation would be created whereby a judgment which
has long become final cannot be executed due to a technicality, it may be said
that as we have already stated, although a judgment granting naturalization may
have become final, nevertheless, appellant has forfeited his right to the
benefits under the same. In the second place, should the courts allow him to
file a new petition for naturalization, the same may not be a mere formality
wherein he would be required to again establish his right to naturalization
because in the meantime, he may have committed acts disqualifying him from
naturalization or the Government thru the Solicitor General may file opposition
to his application on the basis of evidence which were not available to him when
the first application for naturalization was filed, all this on the supposition
that the petitioner is entitled to file and prosecute a second application for
naturalization, a question which we do not deem necessary or proper now to
decide.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

Order affirmed.