REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY), PETITIONER, VS. HON. ENRIQUE MAGLANOC, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, COMMISSIO…

This is a petition of the Director of Forestry, on
behalf of the Republic, to annul two orders and one decision of the Quezon (Tayabas) Court of First Instance.

The first order (dated April 21, 1961) reads, “upon
a verified petition filed by Eustacio de los Reyes, with
notice to the Solicitor-General, and for the reasons therein
stated, and there being no opposition, the order of general
default and decision of this Court dated May 22, 1922,
declaring Lot No. 20 as public land, are hereby set aside in
so far as the movant and said lot are concerned; the answer
for Lot No. 20, Aurora Cadastre, filed by the movant is
admitted; and Deputy Clerk of Court, Eleno M. Joya authorized
to receive the evidence of the movant, and to submit same
thereafter to the Court”.

The decision dated May 26, 1961, rendered after submission of evidence, adjudicated Lot No. 20 to Eustacio de
los Reyes, on the basis of the following statement of facts:

“The evidence presented by the
movant in the hearing is to the effect
that Gregorio de los Reyes had been in
possession as owner of said lot No. 20
since the year 1912; that on or about
1917, Gregorio de los Reyes gave the
property to his son, the herein claimant Eustacio de los Reyes, who took
over the possession of the property;
that the property is a pasture land;
that the claimant is the actual occupant thereof; that the land is declared
for taxation purposes; that there is
no encumbrance affecting the land; that
the claimant’s possession of the said
lot and that of his predecessor in
interest has been continous, public,
open, peaceful, absolute, exclusive,
adverse to the whole world for more
than thirty years and in the concept
of owner.”

The second order (dated June 28, 1962), denies the
petition for relief from the above decision, and for re-opening of the case, which petition was presented by the
Bureau of Forestry in April, 1962.

Now this petition for certiorari filed before us
October 19, 1962, rests on the allegation that the respondent judge had abused his discretion in issuing the first
order of April 21, 1961, and the subsequent decision of May
26, 1961, and in refusing to set them aside despite the fact
that they had been obtained “by means of fraud, misrepresentation and deceit on the part of Eustacio de los Reyes”. Such
deception allegedly consisted of:

(a) Not having furnished a copy of the
petition to the Director of Forestry who had
the administrative jurisdiction, supervision
and control over the land in question, * * *

(b) By alleging that claimant-movant
was not able to file his claim and to present
evidence during the first cadastral hearing
of this lot in 1922, when in truth and in
fact, claimant-movant’ s predecessor-in-interest Gregorio de los Reyes, filed his
claim and presented evidence * * *.

(c) By alleging that his possession over
this property is in the concept of an owner,
when the same claimant-movant knows very well
that this particular property is the same
property leased to him by the herein petitioner-movant under Pasture Permit * * *

(d) Allegations that the land in question,
Lot No. 20, is uncontested when in truth and
in fact, claimant-movant and his counsel knows
that the entire lot has been leased to claimant-movant on December 20, 1956.

Required to answer this certiotari
petition, the respondents denied the allegations of fraud, offered some
explanations, and raised the defense that petitioner should have
appealed the order (June 28, 1962) denying his petition for relief and
reopening; that such order is now final; and that certiorari does not lie where the remedy by appeal has
been lost, because said remedy can not take the place of an
appeal.

We consider this defense to be meritorious. Time and
again we have dismissed petitions for certiorari to annul
decisions or orders which could have, but have not, been
appealed.

Indeed, the very reasons alleged in the petition for
relief submitted to the Quezon Court are the same reasons
now submitted in support of this special remedy. And to
pass on them now, would be a review of an order which has
already become final.

It
may be stated here that the petition to set aside in 1961 the decree of
the year 1922, could be, and was granted by the decision of May 1961,
under the benevolent terms of Republic Act No. 931. So, contrary to the
petitioner’s contention, it was unnecessary to furnish him copy of
Eustacio’s petition inasmuch as said Act only required service thereof
to the Solicitor-General, which had been admittedly made.

As to the other untrue manifestations—(b), (c),
and (d)—it is now too late to discuss them, because they
were the same reasons advanced before the Quezon (Tayabas)
court in the motion for relief, which were overruled by the
order of June 1962; and this was not appealed. Besides,
they run counter to the findings of fact made in the final
decision of May 26, above quoted.

This petition must, consequently be denied, as it is
denied. The injunction heretofore issued is dissolved.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.