FORTUNATO F. HALILI (DECEASED), DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE HALILI TRANSIT (SUBS­TITUTED BY EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI), PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELAT…

On November 30, 1957, Fortunato F. Halili, doing bu­siness under the name and style of “Halili Transit”, and the Halili
Bus Drivers and Conductors Union (PTGWO) entered into a three-year Collective
Bargaining Agreement^[1]
by virtue of which the former recognized the latter as exclusive bargaining
agent of the drivers and conductors employed by Halili,
and according to which they both agreed to abide by the schedule of the hourly
regular and overtime rates of drivers and conductors set forth in Annex
“B” of the Agreement.

On August 20, 1958, the union filed with the Court of Industrial
Relations a petition docketed as Case No. 1099-V, which it subsequently amended
on December 9, 1958, charging violation by Halili of
Commonwealth Act No. 444 (the Eight-Hour Labor Law) in that he deducted from,
and did not include in, the hours of work of the drivers and conductors the
time consumed for filling gas or for tak­ing the bus from the
“car-barn” and vice-versa, the time for trip intervals when the bus
is waiting for passen­gers, and the time consumed on minor repairs of the en­gine
and other parts of the bus.  It therefore
prayed the court to fix the compensable hours of work of the dri­vers and
conductors, members of said union, according to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 444, and to order Halili to pay the drivers
and conductors the compensable hours of work previously rendered by them from October 1, 1956 up to the filing of
the petition.

Halili filed his amended answer on December 22, 1958.

After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations on August 7, 1961 rendered a decision^[2]
finding Halili guilty of having violated Commonwealth
Act No. 444.  It there­upon required the
Examining Division of the Court of In­dustrial Relations to compute the
compensable hours of work rendered by the drivers and conductors who were mem­bers
of the union, from October 1, 1956^[3]
until the date of the decision, at the rate of P0.60 for drivers and P0.50 for
conductors per hour, and the management of Ha­lili
Transit to facilitate the examination by giving ac­cess to the Court examiner
of all trip reports, time records, time books, payrolls, vouchers, ledgers,
journals and all other pertinent records for the speedy computation of the
compensable hours of work.

On August 14, 1961, Halili filed a
motion for clari­fication and for reception of additional evidence, where­in he
questioned the decision for not defining the compensable hours therein which
may be credited to the dri­vers and conductors, claiming that in said order the
court did not direct the Examining Division to determine the amount of
compensation actually received by the particu­lar employees on any particular
day, and contending further that the decision was not a judgment, because it
did not determine any right or duty.

 The Court of Industrial
Relations, on August 17, 1961,
issued an order wherein it clarified compensable hours as referring to work
rendered over eight hours and the computation based on the trip report per
hourly rate at P0.60 for drivers and P0.50 for conductors from Octo­ber 1, 1956 until the date of
the order.  It further sta­ted that the
complainants were working more than eight hours since they start from 5:30 A.M.
and stop at night, and declared that the judgment as to the liability of Halili was categorically concluded in the decision but the
amount of said liability could not be determined until after the Court Examiner
renders his report.

Acting on Halili’s motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Industrial Relations on April 6, 1962 entered a
resolution^[4] en
banc affirming the decision of August 7, 1961, but remanding the case to
the Court of Industrial Relations trial Judge for determination as to union mem­bership
of the claimants referred to in the decision be­cause:  “The determination of who are members of
the peti­tioner union, especially that the decision would cover a period from
October 1, 1956, is a judicial determination which entails the use of
discretion and can not be left to the determination by the Court Examiner, upon
the expediency of the examination of the books, records, pay­rolls, etc.”

No judicial determination of the membership of the union was
however made.  Neither did Halili appeal from the decision nor from the clarificatory resolution of the same dated August 17, 1961.  The resolution en banc on
motion for reconsideration dated April
6, 1962 was not appealed by Halili.

On April 7, 1965, the Court of Industrial relations issued an
order^[5]
directing the Court Examiner, assisted by a union representative, to
investigate and examine all trip reports, time records, time books, payrolls,
vou­chers, ledgers, journals, and all other pertinent records of Halili Transit, and compute the compensable hours of work
rendered by the drivers and conductors pursuant to the decision, dated August
7, 1961, for the period from January 1, 1961 up to the date of the order.

On April 14, 1965,
Halili moved for a reconsideration to aforementioned
order, and on April 24, 1965,
filed his memorandum in support thereof – on the ground that the same is
contrary to law, the facts and evidence. 
This motion was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations in its
resolution en banc^[6]
dated July 12, 1965.

The present appeal by certiorari was thereupon ta­ken by Halili from said resolution en banc of July 12, 1965 and the order of April 7, 1965.  Petitioner seeks to raise three issues:  (1) Whether or not the trial court erred in
holding him liable for the payment under Common­wealth Act No. 444 of the
compensable hours of work ren­dered by the drivers and conductors who are
members of respondent union; (2) Whether or not the decision dated August 7,
1961 is incomplete and interlocutory and therefore the respondent court erred
in enforcing it by enter­ing its order dated April 7, 1965 and promulgating its
resolution en banc dated July 12, 1965; and (3) Whether or not
the respondent court erred in directing its Exa­miner to examine and
investigate the records of petitio­ner Halili from
January 1, 1961 up to the present.

The first issue is not properly raised because peti­tioner stated
in his notice of appeal^[7]
that he was appeal­ing from the order dated April 7, 1965 and the resolution en
banc dated July 12, 1965, and also because the deci­sion of the Court of
Industrial Relations dated August 7, 1961 and its clarificatory
resolution of August 17, 1961 already became final and executory,
the petitioner not having appealed therefrom.

Petitioner argues that the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated August 7, 1961
is incomplete and interlocutory in nature and therefore said court erred in
issuing its enforcing order dated April
7, 1965 and promulgating its resolution en banc dated
July 12, 1965.

The word interlocutory is defined as “something in­tervening
between commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter
but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.”^[8]
As stated by Bouvier,^[9]
it is ”something which is done between the commencement and the end of a suit
or action which decides some point or matter which however, is not a final
decision of the matter in issue.”

The matter in issue in the main case below (Case No. 1099-V) is
whether or not petitioner Halili is guilty of
violating the Eight-Hour Labor Law (C.A. No. 444) in that he deducted from the
working hours of the drivers and con­ductors, members of respondent union, the
time spent for taking the buses from the car-barn and filling it with gas, oil
or water; the interval for waiting for passengers; and the repair of the engine
and other parts of the bus in case of breakdown.  The trial court found him guilty of the
charge and held him “liable categorically” for the compensable
hours and overtime pay from October 1, 1956 up to the present at the rate of
P0.60 for drivers and P0.50 for conductors per hour.  This finding of the trial court in its
decision of August 7, 1961 and affirmed in all respects ^_ except the
“x x x determination
as to the union membership of the claimants referred to in the decision x x x” – by the court en
banc in its resolution of April 6, 1962, is a finding of fact which is
final and conclu­sive and not subject to review, no appeal having been
interposed therein.

The decision, therefore, is a final adjudication on the main
issue submitted to the court, and cannot be con­sidered as interlocutory.  The main case is now at its execution stage
and what only remains to be threshed out is the precise compensable hours or
work rendered by, and the amount of compensation owing to, the drivers and con­ductors
who are members of the respondent union from Octo­ber 1, 1956 to date.

We must state, in this connection, that petitioner cannot adopt
inconsistent stands.  He cannot assail
the decision of August 7, 1961
finding him guilty of violat­ing the Eight-Hour Labor Law (C.A. No. 444) and at
the same time argue that said decision is incomplete and in­terlocutory.

Finally, it is petitioner’s stand that since the ap­pealed order
of respondent court, sustained by the as­sailed resolution en banc,
authorizes its Examiner to go over the records of Halili
Transit from January 1, 1961 up to the present, the examination may
unnecessarily co­ver the records of those drivers and conductors who, al­though
members of the respondent union as of January 1, 1961, were not members thereof
as of October 1, 1956 – in violation of the decision as modified which calls
for the judicial determination of respondent union’s membership.

In the first place, it was merely for the sake of convenience and
facility in the computation of compensa­ble hours of work that the respondent
court authorized its Examiner, first to go over the records of Halili Tran­sit from January 1, 1961 up to the present, and
later on to examine the records from October 1, 1956 up to the end of
1960.  It observed that the parties were
experiencing difficulty with respect to the records from October 1, 1956 up to 1960, whereas those from
1961 up to the present are more readily available because the law requires busi­ness
concerns to preserve and keep intact their records for five years.^[10]

In the second place, petitioner misconstrues the im­port of the
questioned order of the trial court dated April 7, 1965.  It
does not seek to implement the dispo­sitive portion
of the decision dated August 7, 1961
stan­ding by itself, but as modified by the resolution en banc of
April 6, 1962.  Said order merely directs the Court Examiner,
assisted by a union representative, to “compute the compensable hours of
work rendered by the drivers and conductors pursuant to the decision, dated
August 7, 1961, for the period from January 1, 1961, up to the present” and
directs the Chief of the Examining Division, “to submit a weekly report on
the examination.” The order does not require the computation of the
compensable hours of work rendered by the drivers and conductors “who
are members of the petitioner union.” Stated otherwise, the
determination of the union membership of the claimants – as ordered by the
resolution en banc dated April
6, 1962 – must still be done by the trial court, not by the
court Examiner.  There is still need for
respondent union to prove before the trial court the union membership of its
claimants.

Thus, for the purpose only of facilitating the dis­position of
this case, the Court of Industrial Relations must order its Examining Division
to start with the com­putation of the compensable hours of work rendered by,
and the corresponding compensation payable to, the dri­vers and conductors
admitted by both parties to be union members as of October 1, 1956, and then
later to proceed with those contended by the union to be such members but
disputed by Halili. 
At all events, however, the resolu­tion of the issue of their union
membership must be re­solved by the trial judge himself.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order and resolution en banc
are hereby affirmed and the Court of Industrial Relations is hereby enjoined to
make a judicial determination of the union membership of the claimants, while
the Examining Division of said court shall proceed with its computation of the
compensable hours of work rendered by, and the corresponding compensation
payable to, the drivers and conductors admitted by both parties to be union
members since October 1, 1956 and the contended by the union to be such members
but dispute by the employer.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex “A” to the Petition for Certiorari; Rollo
p. 30.

^[2] Rollo, p. 51.

^[3]
This, instead of November 30, 1957 which was the date of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, is the starting date of computation because in his answer
to the complaint against him by the union before the Public Service Commission
in Case No. 48603-C, Halili aver­red “that
effective last Monday, October 1, 1956, all drivers and conductors of
the respondent are on fixed salary basis, that is to say, conductors are paid
at the rate of P0.50 an hour, and drivers are paid at the rate of P0.60 an
hour, thereby making their wages in confirmity with
the order of this Ho­norable Commission and with Republic Act 602, known as the
Minimum Wage Law.” (Rollo, pp. 53-54,
under­scoring supplied)

^[4] Rollo, p. 58.

^[5] Rollo, p. 70.

^[6] Rollo, p. 83

^[7] See
Rollo, p. 84.

^[8]
Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 1951, p. 952.

^[9] Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd Revision, Vol. 1, p. 1651.

^[10] Rollo, pp. 70-71, Order of April 7, 1965.