VICTOR ELIPE, COMPLAINANT, VS. “HONESTO FABRE, DEPUTY SHERIFF, MTCC, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, RESPONDENT.

Elipe versus Fabre

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Victor Elipe against Honesto Fabre, the Deputy Sheriff of Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in the Cities of Cagayan de Oro City. The complaint charges the respondent with nonfeasance and incompetence in the performance of his duties as sheriff. The case matters because it fixes the standard of conduct for sheriffs in executing writs: a sheriff has no discretion to refuse or delay execution, and his failure to act diligently can make him administratively liable even without proof of intentional wrongdoing.

Procedural History

The administrative complaint was referred to Judge Antonio Orcullo of the Municipal Trial Court in the Cities, Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City. In a report dated November 15, 1993, the investigating judge found the charges to be true and recommended that the respondent be reprimanded and given a stern warning. The Office of the Court Administrator, in its memorandum dated August 29, 1994, concurred with the findings and recommended a fine of 1,000 pesos plus a stern warning. The matter then came before the Supreme Court as an administrative case, and the Court resolved it in a decision promulgated on February 13, 1995.

Facts

On June 19, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court in the Cities, Branch 3, at Cagayan de Oro City issued a writ of execution to enforce a barangay agreement in a case for collection of unpaid rentals and construction materials amounting to 100,000 pesos. On June 25, 1992, at nine o'clock in the morning, the respondent served the writ on the judgment debtors, Michael dela Cerna and his wife, but he was able to levy only upon a dilapidated vehicle and an old piano.

At ten o'clock in the evening of that same day, the judgment debtors surreptitiously removed several pieces of furniture from the house they rented. On June 26 and 30, and again on July 4, 11, 18 and 19, 1992, they removed appliances and other personal properties and destroyed building fixtures on the property owned by the complainant. On these occasions, according to the complainant, the respondent made no effort to prevent the judgment debtors from removing leviable properties, even though the complainant had told him of their activities.

The respondent denied the allegation. He claimed that he levied on several properties, but the bid price paid at public auction was only 10,000 pesos. He justified levying only on the personal properties found at the business establishment, and desisting from enforcing the writ as to properties on the second floor of the judgment debtors' residence, on two grounds: the judgment debtors refused to let him in, and he had no order from the court to force open the locked door. The records show that on July 10, 1992, the respondent sold personal properties of the judgment debtors to the complainant as the highest bidder for 10,000 pesos. On July 13, 1992, he levied on a parcel of land owned by the judgment debtors, which on August 14, 1992 was also sold to the complainant for 15,006 pesos. On December 17, 1992, other levied personal properties were sold, again to the complainant as the highest bidder, for 2,001 pesos. The result was that the judgment debt of 100,000 pesos was only partially satisfied, to the extent of 27,007 pesos.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent deputy sheriff is administratively liable for nonfeasance and incompetence in the performance of his duties in enforcing the writ of execution.
• Whether or not the respondent's failure to levy on properties that the judgment debtors carted away, and his failure to secure a special order to force open the locked premises, constitute inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.

Applicable Provisions

Section 46, paragraph (b), item (8) of the Civil Service Law provides:

Section 46. Discipline: General Provisions. - (a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. (b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action: . . . (8) Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.

This is the ground on which the Court held the respondent administratively liable.

Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as referred to in the memorandum of the Deputy Court Administrator, provides:

Section 14. Sale of property levied upon; when may be made. - The officer making the levy shall give notice of the sale in the manner prescribed in section fifteen of this rule, and shall sell the property levied upon, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the judgment and costs, at public auction, between the hours of nine in the morning and four in the afternoon of the day fixed in the notice, unless the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor agree in writing upon a different time.

This provision is the basis for the observation that a special order of the court is necessary to force or break open a closed door in order to levy on properties inside.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held the respondent administratively liable. The Court adopted the observation that when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate, and he has no discretion whether to execute it or not. The Court also relied on the rule in the Manual for Clerks of Court that a sheriff to whom a valid writ is delivered is liable to the person in whose favor the writ runs if he fails to make a levy on property owned by the judgment debtor within his jurisdiction and the judgment creditor is injured thereby, and that this liability does not depend on intentional wrong or negligent omission to seize the property.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent's conduct amounted to inefficiency and incompetence. It noted that the respondent knew a special court order was needed to force his way into the second floor where the judgment debtors resided, and that it was therefore his duty to see to it that such an order was secured from the court. Instead, he showed himself to be less than energetic and zealous in the performance of his duty, and his lackadaisical attitude betrayed his inefficiency and incompetence, which under the Civil Service Law is a ground for disciplinary action. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in Eduarte versus Ramos:

He is bound to discharge his duties with prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. The sheriff, an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in his behavior. Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law.

The Court also rejected the respondent's attack on the complainant's moral character, holding that it did not justify the non-performance of his duties.

Doctrine

A sheriff, upon receiving a valid writ of execution, must proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate. He has no discretion to decide whether to execute it or not. His failure to levy on property of the judgment debtor within his jurisdiction, resulting in injury to the judgment creditor, makes him liable even without proof of intentional wrong or negligent omission. If a special court order is needed to force open locked premises in order to levy, it is the sheriff's duty to secure that order from the court. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, as provided in Section 46, paragraph (b), item (8) of the Civil Service Law, is a ground for disciplinary action against a public officer or employee.

Disposition

The Court imposed a fine of 2,000 pesos on Deputy Sheriff Honesto Fabre, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any act calling for disciplinary action would be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law, and a sheriff has no discretion whether to execute a writ or not. Examiners like to use this case to test the administrative liability of sheriffs for nonfeasance and incompetence, and the rule that a sheriff must secure a special court order to force open locked premises rather than simply desist from enforcing the writ.