JOSE MA. DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 3, MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from a resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing a
petition for the review of assessments made by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue against the petitioner imposing deficiency income
taxes on the petitioner for the years 1950 to 1953.

Petitioner seeks the review of the assessments made by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue of deficiency income taxes from the
years 1950 to 1953. Upon the filing of the petition the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue promptly presented a motion to
dismiss, in view of section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 providing that
appeals against assessments of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
shall be brought to the Court of Tax Appeals within 30 days. The Court
of Tax Appeals dismissed the petition, hence this appeal.

On June 25, 1955, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent income
tax assessment notices to the petitioner for deficiency taxes for the
years 1949 to 1953 inclusive (Annex “1”, Annex “1-A”, and Annex 1-B”,
attached to the motion to dismiss). On July 14, 1955 attorney for the
petitioner herein requested the Collector of Internal Revenue to
furnish him with the data used as a basis for the assessments, claiming
that the petitioner had been paying his taxes punctually (Annex “2”).
On August 4, 1955, the same attorney again asked for the investigation
of the case of the petitioner (Annex “3”). On August 27, 1955, the
Collector of Internal Revenue made a new assessment of the income tax
deficiencies during the years 1949 to 1953 inclusive (Annex “4”). On
August 4, 1955, counsel for petitioner again wrote a letter protesting
against the assessment for the years 1949 to 1951 on the ground that
the same were barred (Annex “5”). Answering said letter the Collector
of Internal Revenue made another assessment of the taxes for a period
of four years, from 1950 to 1953 inclusive (Annex “6”). On November 29,
1955, counsel for petitioner again replied to the assessment claiming
that the petitioner had disposed of his palay not at the best price
available in the Philippines but at prevailing prices in the vicinity
and that the prescriptive period of three years prevented the
reassessment of the taxes and that, therefore, the case for deficiency
income taxes should be dismissed (Annex “7”).

It appears that nothing was done between the date of the previous
letter of November 29, 1955 and January 30, 1957, when (at the latter
date) the Collector of Internal

Revenue wrote the counsel of the petitioner in the following terms:

“Mr. Oscar L. Uy
Suite 309, Samanillo Bldg.,
Escolta, Manila

“Sir:

“With
reference to our letter to you dated December 29, 1955, concerning the
deficiency income tax liabilities of your client, Dr. JOSE MA. DEL
ROSARIO, for the year 1950 to 1953, inclusive, I regret to inform you
that, in view of your consistent failure to submit the form for waiver
of the statute of limitations duly accomplished by your client, this
Office has finally decided to consider your request for reinvestigation
of the said case as abandoned.

“In view thereof, it is
requested that you urge your client to pay the amounts of P3,576.24,
P5,515.50, P7,429.50, P6,738.00 and P5,941.50, plus the penalties
incident to delinquency, to the City Treasurer of Manila or to the
Cashier, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Boom 114, Finance Building,
Manila, preferably to the latter, on or before February 28, 1957;
otherwise the collection thereof will have to be enforced by means of
the remedies provided for by law.

Subsequent letters demanding payment are dated November
7, 1957 (Annex “9”) and November 3, 1959 (Annex “10”). On November 24,
1959, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue again denied the petition
for reinvestigation of the case of petitioner (Annex “11”). On March 9,
1960, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue answering a letter of
counsel for the petitioner dated December 21, 1959, declared that there
was nothing new in the contentions of counsel for the petitioner and,
therefore, denied the request for reconsideration (Annex “12”).

On July 19, 1960, petitioner herein filed a petition with the Court
of Tax Appeals asking that the decision of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue dated March 5, 1960, ordering the petitioner to pay his
deficiency income taxes, be set aside and that the warrant of distraint
and levy issued be declared illegal. Upon the filing of the petition
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue presented a motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the same was filed out of time, alleging
that even if the period of three months required for the filing of
appeals from assessments of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the
Court of Tax Appeals be counted from December 7, 1959 to the date of
the petition, July 20, 1960, seven months and 18 days had actually
elapsed. The Court of Tax Appeals granted the motion to dismiss holding:

“While it is true that this Court had on several
occasions recognized the right of and encouraged tax-payers to exhaust
all possible administrative remedies before coming to it for the
purpose of expediency and to avoid unnecessary court expense on the
part of the litigants, this right is not without limit. Once the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has made clear to the taxpayer that
his decision subject of a series of requests for reconsideration is
final, as his letter of January 30, 1957 in the instant case,
subsequent requests for reconsideration thereof made pro forma and for
dilatory purposes should be ignored for the purpose of computing the
running of the thirty-day period prescribed under Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 1125. We cannot leave the running of the period of
appeal entirely at the discretion of the taxpayer.”

The order of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing the case should be
affirmed. A study of the various communications coursed between
petitioner and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue discloses that as
early as August 27, 1955, the Commissioner had already made a
reassessment. Another reassessment was made on November 15, 1955.
Although protest was made against this last assessment, it does not
appear that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was willing to cede to
the petitioner for reconsideration of the assessment. But certainly
when on January 30, 1957 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent
counsel for the petitioner the letter quoted above, requesting the
payment of the amounts stated therein, plus the penalties incident to
delinquency, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue made it plain to
counsel for petitioner that no further motions for reconsideration or
for reassessment was possible, especially because, as indicated in the
letter, counsel for petitioner had made no express waiver of the
statute of limitations. But even conceding that these could still be
subject to extension, at least the letter of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue dated March 9, 1960, declaring that the tax
liabilities of petitioner were collectible through the use of summary
methods provided in the tax code, should have been a warning that not
further extensions for the purpose of reconsidering the assessments
would be allowed. From that date, March 9, 1960 to July 19, 1960, more
than three months had elapsed. We, therefore, find that the Court of
Tax Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for review. The said
decision is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ. concur.