PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDWIN PADILLA Y SALES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
LAGURA-YAP, J.:
Accused Edwin Padilla stands charged of Homicide pursuant to an Information[2] dated April 16, 2002, the accusatory portion of which is as follows:
“That on or about January 22, 2002, in the City of Kabankalan, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with intent to kill, armed with an unlicensed firearm and a bladed weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hack ISABELO SALES y ENTIERRO, thereby inflicting injuries upon the body of the latter which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On May 14, 2002, the accused was arrested[3].
On July 31, 2002 accused Edwin Padilla was arraigned in the Ilonggo dialect, which he spoke and understood. He, with the assistance of his counsel, entered the plea of “not guilty” to the crime charged.[4]
Trial on the merits against accused Edwin Padilla, ensued after the pre-trial conference on November 20, 2002[5].
The accused posted bail for his temporary liberty on March 12, 2004[6].
Version of the Prosecution[7]
The evidence for the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. Isagani Ayala, Lolita Sales, Lilet Sales.
“The version of the prosecution of the events is as follows: on January 22, 2002 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening at Sitio Malinog, Brgy. Binicuil, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, accused Edwin Padilla shot victim Isabelo Sales who is his first cousin with an improvised shot gun hitting the latter at the left side of his body. Upon being hit, the victim walked towards his house. On reaching his house and seeing him with many wounds at the left portion of his body and full of blood, his wife, Lolita Sales, asked her husband what happened and he told her that the accused shot him. Thereafter, she embraced him and told him to just stay. She then went outside to look for a tricycle and she met Lony Cagvaleno and told him that her husband was shot. When she was about to run to the other house to look for a tricycle, she saw the accused carrying a long firearm called “sumpak” or homemade shotgun going towards their house. On arriving at her house, the accused shot the victim inside through the then open window of her house made of wood or “berha” with no screen. After shooting the victim inside the house, the latter went out of the house and pursued the accused who ran towards his house across the road and in front of the house of the victim. The accused then entered his house which is a compound then surrounded by a fence. Thereafter, the wife of the victim ran towards the house of Vicente Limaco, a former policeman for assistance, and the latter told her that he was already retired Kabankalan Police. Inside the compound where the house of the accused is located, accused attacked the victim who was already lying on the ground and his legs spread apart with a bolo by placing himself on top of the latter saying “you bitch you’re fighting back” and hacking him many times especially on the face. The victim died as a consequence.
Version of the Defense[8]
“Accused Edwin Padilla, forty four (44) years old, denies the accusation against him and claims that he killed the victim in self-defense. He testified that the victim is his first cousin, the latter’s father and his mother being siblings. Their houses are near each other separated only by a road. He was in the house of Atty. Novero near the rotunda in Brgy. Binicuil at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of January 22, 2002. He was residing in said house as it was entrusted to his care. He was intending to close its gate at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening but on his way he saw victim Isabelo Sales who was already inside the gate who suddenly without a word or greeting shot him with a short firearm but was not hit as the gun misfired. From inside the gate, persons outside could be seen even if the gate is closed. Upon hearing the click of the trigger, he ran inside the house to get his weapon, an improvised shot gun, he was using in guarding the house and returned after getting the same. The victim followed him inside the house and when he was at the door of the house he continued to pull the trigger of the firearm pointed at him. To defend himself, he fired at the victim who immediately ran and went home. After a while, he followed the victim to their house because the latter had the intention of shooting him. He reached near the window and the latter was visible from where he was then. The victim was doing something with his gun on the table. He intended to shoot the victim but regained control of himself and fired upward and went home but the victim followed him and entered the yard of their house. He entered their house and got a bolo he was using in cutting wood because he saw the victim carrying a bolo about 2 1/2 feet in length. He went out of the house because he was thinking that the victim would enter and his one month child, nephew, nieces, wife, and father were inside the house. When he was out of the house, the victim hacked but he was able to parry it wounding his hand cutting the bone and injuring his head. He then hacked the victim with his bolo which due to the force of his hacking (his bolo) flew away. Thereafter, he wrestled for the bolo of the victim and he was able to take hold of it and hacked the victim many times. He was brought to the hospital thereafter.
On September 27, 2006, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Edwin Padilla y Sales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide as charged, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of victim Isabelo Sales the amount of P50,000.00 by reason of his death, to pay P50,000.00 by way of actual damages, P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, P1,120,000.00 by way of loss of income and the costs.
SO ORDERED.”
On October 12, 2006, the accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration[9]. Subsequently, on October 18, 2006, the prosecution filed an Opposition to Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration[10].
On October 26, 2006, the RTC issued an Order[11] denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
On November 3, 2006, the accused filed his Notice of Appeal[12]. Upon order of the lower court, he posted additional bail in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos P5,000.00 on September 29, 2006 for his provisional liberty during the pendency of his appeal.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
The following are the errors assigned by the accused-appellant in his Appellant’s Brief:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE DECEASED;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE ACCUSED TO PREVENT OR REPEL THE AGGRESSION OF THE DECEASED;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SEE THAT THERE WAS LACK OF PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED FROM THE VERY INCEPTION OF THE INCIDENT;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF HAVING ACTED UPON AN IMPULSE SO POWERFUL AS NATURALLY TO HAVE PRODUCED PASSION OR OBFUSCATION STATED IN ARTICLE 13 (6) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED ESCAPED; AND
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY WHICH IS NOT COMMENSURATE TO THE WRONG DONE.
The accused-appellant submits in his Brief that he should be acquitted on ground of self-defense claiming that the court a quo failed to consider the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and to consider the reasonable necessity of the means he employed to prevent or repel the aggression of the victim.
The Solicitor General posits in his Brief:
I.
APPELLANT’S PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE MUST FAIL.
II.
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD BE MODIFIED.
We affirm the conviction of the accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant admits having killed the victim Isabelo but asserts that he did so in self-defense.
It is a well settled rule that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim[13].
What are the elements of self-defense?
In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[14] Of the three elements, unlawful aggression by the victim is the condition sine qua non in self-defense. As oft-repeated by the Supreme Court, self-defense cannot exist without unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent or repel.[15] If no unlawful aggression is proved, then no self-defense maybe successfully pleaded[16]. By invoking self- defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded[17].
Here in the instant appealed case, the essential element of unlawful aggression is absent.
One. Based on the account of Lolita Sales (wife of the victim), it was accused-appellant who shot the victim. Lolita in particular testified that her husband (victim) arrived in their house, wounded and when she asked him, he told her that Edwin Padilla (accused-appellant) shot him[18]. When Lolita went out to look for a tricycle, she saw the accused-appellant going to their (Lolita) house, carrying a long firearm called “sumpak”, a homemade gun. Accused-appellant then shot her husband through an open window[19]. The Anatomical Sketch[20] confirms the presence of a gunshot wound (with gun pellets) on the left upper arm of the victim. These circumstances, to Our view, would render doubtful accused-appellant’s claim that the victim was the unlawful aggressor because it was he (accused-appellant) who shot the latter.
For want of the requisites of a dying declaration, this statement made by the victim to his wife maybe considered as part of res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, when the following concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances[21].
All the requisites of res gestae declaration are present in this case. There was a startling occurrence, i.e., the shooting. Immediately after, while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, he uttered the statement as to who had shot him, without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating the accused-appellant. Reverting to the issue at hand, We can deduce that the shooting by accused-appellant of the victim negates his claim that the latter was the unlawful aggressor.
Two. We agree with the lower court’s findings that accused-appellant intended to kill the victim, although We differ with its inference that the latter had shot the former with a handgun. Save from the self-serving statement of accused-appellant, there is no evidence to show the victim had a handgun. From what Lolita saw, it was accused-appellant who was carrying a firearm, which she described as a “sumpak” or a homemade shotgun[22]. Accused-appellant himself admitted to such fact that he had an improvised shotgun. Continuing with the account of the victim’s wife, (Lolita), We gather that the victim went out of his house after accused-appellant fired at him through the window. The victim followed accused-appellant who ran across the road, to his house. This is were Lilet (victim’s daughter) saw accused-appellant hacked her father. She said, “My father was lying down, he was on top of him with his legs spread apart and he was hacking the face of my father.”[23] She further said, “Yes, sir, when he was riding on top of my father he was saying (“)your bitch, your fighting back(”)”.[24] With Lilet’s testimony, We are all the more convinced that accused- appellant did not act in self-defense.
Three. The four hacking wounds, the stab wound, the gunshot wound sustained by the victim do not support the theory of self-defense. The Anatomical Report describes the following injuries found during the autopsy (1) Multiple hacked wounds on the head 6 cm. x 16 cm., (2) Stabbed wound at the base of the neck 3 cm. x 8 cm., (3) Gunshot wound at the left side of the body (with gun pellets), (4) Hacked wound at the back of the left portion of the head 6 cm. x 8 cm., (5) Hacked wound at the back of the right portion of the head 8 cm. X 10 cm., (6) Hacked wound at the base of the right shoulder 4 cm x 8 cm[25].
As the lower court observed, the gravity of those wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to defend[26]. This observation finds jurisprudential support in the case of People v. Marciales[27] wherein the Supreme Court held that the nature, character, location and extent of the wounds suffered by the deceased belie any supposition that it was the deceased xxx who was the unlawful aggressor. Relying on the pronouncement it made in People v. Ganut,[28] the Supreme Court then reiterated that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the assailant (are) constantly and unremittingly considered… important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense. Judging by the nature of the hacking wounds suffered by the victim, We consider such injuries fatal because these were inflicted on the vital portion of the victim’s body, i.e., his head. As a matter of fact, per his Certificate of Death, the victim died because of these multiple hacked wounds, “hypovolemic shock due to severe hemorrhage due to multiple hacked wounds.”(Exhibit “D”).
Four. The testimonies of Lolita and Lilet are credible even if they are related to the victim. Their accounts of the incident were clear. Lolita testified that first, her husband arrived in their house wounded. When she asked him what happened, he told her that accused-appellant shot him. Accused-appellant then arrived, carrying a long firearm, a “sumpak” or a homemade shotgun. He shot the victim through the open window. The victim went out of their house and pursued accused-appellant who ran towards his house across the road. At this point, Lolita was candid to admit that she did not know what happened next because she ran towards the house of Limaco for assistance. What transpired in this part of the incident is provided by the testimony of Lilet who said she saw accused-appellant attack her father (victim) who lay on the ground, with his legs spread apart. Accused-appellant placed himself on top of the victim, hacking the latter many times especially on the face using a bolo. Lilet claimed she heard accused-appellant utter, “you bitch you’re fighting back”.
Both testimonies when taken together present a clear picture of what happened to the victim and how accused-appellant killed him. There is no reason to doubt the credibility of the accounts of Lolita and Lilet who spoke in a logical manner, the sequence of the events that led to the hacking and the killing of the victim. Anent their relationship to the victim, this does not erode or diminish the integrity of their testimonies. On many occasions, the Supreme Court held that relationship of the key prosecution witnesses to the victim does not necessarily disqualify him as biased and interested.[29] Oral declarations of interested witnesses are not necessarily biased and incredible. On the contrary, it would be be unnatural for such persons interested in vindicating the crime to impute the same to any person other than those responsible.[30] Given the relationship between the victim and accused-appellant as first degree cousins and neighbors too, it would be unnatural indeed for Lolita and Lilet to impute to the latter the crime of homicide if he did not in fact commit it. There is no evidence to show that there was bad blood between the victim’s family and accused-appellant that could have motivated mother and daughter (Lolita and Lilet) to fabricate the truth. All told, the lower court did not err in according weight and substance on the testimonies of Lolita an Lilet to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged, homicide.
Five. It is correct that the accused-appellant also sustained injuries: (1) Linear bone fracture fronto-parietal area; (2) Committed fracture distal third ulna left; (3) Laceration MU; (4) Linear bone fracture fronto-parietal area; (5) Comminuted fracture distal third ulna left; and (6) Laceration multiple head and (L) forearm.[31] These injuries he sustained during his encounter with the victim, that is, when he went to the house of the latter and fired a shot through the window and then the victim pursued him. Having engaged himself in a fight with the latter, accused- appellant who was armed with a homemade shotgun cannot invoke self-defense. As held by the Supreme Court in People v. Quinto[32], where the fight is agreed upon, each of the protagonists is at once assailant and assaulted, and neither can invoke the right of self-defense, because aggression which is an incident in the fight is bound to arise from one or the other of the combatants.
Accused-appellant therefore is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation. He could not have been confused of his criminal purpose when he hacked the victim. Excitement is the natural feeling of all persons engaged in a fight, especially those who had received a beating, and the impulse in that state is not considered in law so powerful as to produce obfuscation sufficient to mitigate liability.[33]
Last. We consider in Our review of the evidence, that what precipitated the incident was the physical intrusion of the victim in the place where accused-appellant lived. Whether the victim was armed with a short firearm or a bolo, it is not certain, which is why that We say unlawful aggression is not proven. Whether it was a gun that he fired or a bolo that he struck at accused-appellant, it is not also shown. Withal, the intrusion by itself constitutes sufficient provocation by the victim. This merits a mitigating circumstance in favor of accused-appellant. By provocation is understood any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting or irritating any one.[34] The word “sufficient” means adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity.[35]
The lower court then did not err when it considered that accused-appellant fled after the incident on January 22, 2002. The sequence of events after the killing supports the view of the lower court that he fled. The records indicate that accused-appellant was arrested on May 9, 2002 or about four months from the date of the incident on January 22, 2002. Further, accused-appellant was arrested at Brgy. Cabacungan, La Castellana, Negros Occidental which is a different place from Kabankalan City, where the killing took place[36]. Indeed, the lower court is correct to deduce that this actuation of accused-appellant betrays his claim of innocence. He could have related his story to the police immediately since he was hospitalized for four (4) days, from January 22-26, 2002[37]. He did not.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Article 64 thereof states the rules for the application of penalties, which contain three periods:
In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Article 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
Xxx xxx xxx xxx
2. When only mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. The maximum penalty shall be the minimum period of reclusion temporal which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day due to mitigating circumstance of immediate provocation by the victim.
Apropos of the civil liability of accused-appellant, the lower court ordered him to pay P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 by reason of death of the victim, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P1,120,000.00 by way of loss of income.
We increase the amount of death indemnity to P75,000.00 and affirm the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, in line with the ruling in People v. Adriano Cabrillas and Benny Cabtalan[38].
No evidence was presented to prove actual damages incurred by the victims family. With this fact, the amount of temperate damages of P25,000.00 as imposed in People v. Adriano Cabrillas and Benny Cabtalan[39] can be properly included in the civil liablity of accused-appellant. Under Article 2224 of the New Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages maybe recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.
The award of P1,120,000.00 by way of loss of income, We cannot affirm. Indemnification for loss of earning capacity which partakes of the nature of actual damages must be duly proven by competent proof and the best obtainable evidence thereof[40]. No such proof was presented by Lolita who merely related the daily income of the victim as tricycle driver.
We apply the rule in People v. Torres, Sr.,[41] by imposing interest at 6% on the damages awarded reckoned from the date of the killing up to finality of the judgment. In addition, interest at 12% per annum shall be imposed on said damages from finality of the judgment until paid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 27, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 61, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental in
Criminal Case No. 2002-2950, convicting accused-appellant Edwin Padilla y Sales for the crime of homicide is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) The accused-appellant is hereby imposed with the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
(2) The accused-appellant is ordered to pay to the Heirs of the victim, death indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
(3) An interest of 6% on the damages awarded is imposed, reckoned from the date of the killing on January 22, 2002, up to the finality of the judgment. In addition, interest at 12% per annum shall be imposed on said damages from finality of the judgment until paid.
(4) The award of P1,120,000.00 as loss of income is DELETED for lack of basis.
With costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Delos Santos, and Lopez, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge Henry D. Arles.
[2] Records, p. 1
[3] Records, p. 23.
[4] See Order dated July 31, 2002, Records, p. 30.
[5] Records, pp. 39-40.
[6] Records, p. 81.
[7] Rollo, pp. 67-68, Decision, pp. 1-2.
[8] Supra.
[9] Records, pp. 175-183.
[10] Records, pp. 184-185.
[11] Records, p. 186.
[12] Records, p. 173.
[13] Belbis, Jr. v. People, 685 SCRA 518.
[14] People v. Del Castillo, 663 SCRA 226; People v. Fontanilla, 664 SCRA 150; People v. Laurio, 680 SCRA 560; People v. Artajo, 685 SCRA 653.
[15] People v. Gonzales, 672 SCRA 590.
[16] Josue v. People, 687 SCRA 675.
[17] People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Maray y Bolaqueña alias “Loloy,” G.R. No. 184050, May 8, 2009.
[18] TSN, February 5, 2004, p. 9.
[19] TSN, pp. 11-13.
[20] Exhibit “E”, records, p. 13.
[21] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 649-650; see People v. Guillermo, 420 SCRA 326, January 20, 2004; People v. Ignas, 412 SCRA 311; People v. Lobrigas, 442 SCRA 503 which are cited in Marturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006; see also People v. Salafranca, 666 SCRA 501.
[22] See TSN, February 5, 2004, pp. 11-12).
[23] TSN, March 3, 2004, p.7.
[24] Supra, TSN, p. 10.
[25] Records, p. 13, (Exh. E Anatomical Report).
[26] Rollo, p. 71; Decision p. 5.
[27] No. L-61961, October 18, 1988; 166 SCRA 436, 443.
[28] G.R. No. L-34517, November 2, 1982; 118 SCRA 35, 43.
[29] People v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 74953, June 30, 1987; 151 SCRA 670.
[30] People v. Bagsican, G.R. No. L-13486, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 400, 407 citing People v. Lardizabal, G.R. L-8894, May 11, 1956; see People v. Marciales 166 SCRA 436, 447.
[31] Records, (Exhibit “1” Medical Certificate), p.156.
[32] 55 Phil. 116.
[33] People v. De Guia, CA, 36 OG 1151.
[34] Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 1998, p. 260.
[35] People v. Nabora, 73 Phil. 434, 435.
[36] Records, p. 1, Information.
[37] Records, p. 156, Exhibit “1”.
[38] G.R. No. 175980, February 15, 2012.
[39] Supra.
[40] Jose v. Angeles, G.R. No. 187899, October 23, 2013.
[41] G.R. No. 190317, August 22, 2011.