IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF JIMMY CHUA YANHO TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.  JIMMY CHUA YANHO, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOS…

Appeal taken by the Government from a decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila granting the petition for
naturalization filed by Jimmy Chua Yanho on April 6, 1960 (Civil Case No. 42905).

The petition alleged that appellee,
whose original name was Tan Tiap but was judicially
authorized to change it to Jimmy Chua Yanho, is a
citizen of the Republic of China, born in Chingkang,
China, on June 6, 1912; that he emigrated to the Philippines in August 1927, on
board the vessel “Hing An”; that he has continuously
resided in the Philippines for more than 32 years, and in the City of Manila
for more than one year immediately preceding the date of the petition; that he
is residing at No. 434 Rosario St., Manila, and is a businessman by profession,
being the owner-manager of the “East Asia Commercial” and “East
Asia Indentors“, from which he derives an
average annual income of approximately P20,000.00; that he is married to Aurae T. Mabanta, a Filipino,
with whom he has four children, all living at No. 157 D. Tuason
St., Quezon City; that all his children are enrolled
at the St. Stephen’s School in Manila; and that he possesses all the
qualifications to become a Filipino citizen and none of the disqualifications
prescribed by law.  Attached to the
petition was the affidavit of attesting witnesses Pio
Pedrosa, Rizal D. Pangilinan and Jose R. Filio, who
stated that they personally knew appellee since 1948
and that, to their knowledge, he has resided continuously in the Philippines
since said date.

After the requisite
publication of the petition and after due hearing, the trial court rendered the
appealed judgment.

In this appeal
the Government stresses two main points, namely:  that petitioner’s witnesses do not personally
know him to have been a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by law nor to be a person of good repute and morally irreproachable,
and that petitioner is disqualified
to be a Filipino citizen because during his period of residence in the
Philippines he has not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos.

In connection with the first point, the Government claims that
Mr. Pio Pedrosa, one of
petitioner’s witnesses, had occasion to observe him closely only “at least
for the past four years”.  This is not exactly true.  While said witness testified that he came to
know petitioner closely during the four years prior to the date when he
testified in court, it is likewise true that he testified that he knew
petitioner since before the war and that while his personal knowledge of him
was, at the beginning, casual or slight, their acquaintance became closer and
more intimate in the course of time; that, in fact, in 1957 when he (Pedrosa) became President of the Prudential Bank, he found
out that petitioner was one of the important clients of the bank.

As regards the other witness for the petitioner, Mr. Jose R. Filio,
the Government says nothing in its brief.

However, the Government’s contention that during petitioner’s
period of residence in the Philippines he had not evinced a sincere desire to
learn, embrace and practice the customs of the Filipinos, is well taken.

Petitioner does not deny that he resides at 434
Rosario St., Manila, while
his wife and children reside at 157 Demetrio Tuason St.
Quezon City.  To explain this obviously unusual situation,
petitioner claims that he had to live at 434 Ro­sario
St. Manila because that was
his place of business and he had to stay there most of the time in order to be
able to exercise a close supervision over his business. 
As another reason for his not living with his wife and children
at Quezon City, he points to traffic congestion and bad streets between the two cities,
these problems being often compounded by flood and lack of parking space in
downtown Manila – all these factors rendering it difficult for a businessman
like him to commute between the two cities.

We find petitioner’s
explanation to be utterly unsatisfactory. 
That it is strange and unusual for a father to live separately from his wife and children is something
that needs no demonstration.  Neither is
any argument necessary to show that such situation is contrary to, if not
destructive of one of the most important traits of the Filipino people – love
of family and abiding interest and concern for its members.  Indeed, We do not think any real Filipino
father would suffer living away from his wife and children simply for business
reasons, especially so if the distance between his place of business and the
residence of his wife and children is nothing more than that which separates
Manila from Demetrio Tuason
St. of Quezon City. 
That petitioner could consider occasional floods, traffic problems and
bad condition of streets between the two cities as good enough reason to live separately
from his family strengthens the Government’s view that he has not evinced any
real desire to embrace and practice Filipino customs.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed,
with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
and Castro, JJ.,
concur.