MANUEL BERNABE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (3RD DIVISION), HON. NICASIO YATCO, PRES. JUDGE OF BRANCH V OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (QUEZON CITY) AND RESUR…

Bernabe versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is the case of Bernabe versus Court of Appeals. Manuel Bernabe was sued in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Quezon City, by Resurreccion Reyes, for herself and as guardian of her minor child, for the acknowledgment of the child as Bernabe's natural child, and for support and damages. Bernabe lost by default when neither he nor his counsel appeared at the hearing. He then tried to undo that judgment through a motion for new trial, and when that failed he attempted to appeal. The question that reaches us is procedural but decisive: when does the period to appeal begin to run, and what is the effect of a motion for new trial filed before the judgment becomes final? The case matters because it fixes the line between an interlocutory order, which cannot be appealed on its own, and a final order, which can, and it teaches that a motion for new trial suspends the period to appeal from the judgment itself.

Procedural History

Resurreccion Reyes filed her complaint against Manuel Bernabe in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting in Quezon City, and the case was docketed as Civil Case Number 5161. Bernabe moved to dismiss, and the motion was denied. After he filed his answer, the case was set for hearing. He did not appear. The trial court received the evidence of the plaintiff and rendered judgment against him. Bernabe then filed a motion to set aside the decision and for new trial, which the trial court denied. He moved for reconsideration of that denial, and that too was denied. He then filed his notice of appeal, his appeal bond, and his record on appeal, but the trial court disapproved the record on appeal on the ground that the appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary period. After reconsideration of that disapproval was denied, Bernabe went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus, to compel the trial court to give due course to his appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the decision had already become final and executory, and that the orders denying the motion for new trial and the motion for reconsideration were interlocutory and therefore not appealable. Bernabe then came to the Supreme Court by appeal by certiorari.

Facts

On the eighteenth of May, 1960, Resurreccion Reyes filed a complaint against Manuel Bernabe, in her own behalf and as guardian of her minor child, Nacito Reyes. She asked that the child be acknowledged as Bernabe's natural child, and she asked for support and damages. Bernabe moved to dismiss, and the motion was denied. He filed his answer, and the case was set for hearing on the thirteenth of October, 1960, with notice served on his counsel on the twenty-sixth of September, 1960.

Neither Bernabe nor his counsel appeared at that hearing. Bernabe had received, on the tenth of October, 1960, a copy of a motion filed by Reyes, dated the third of October, 1960, and set for hearing on the eighth of October, 1960, asking for a postponement. That motion was denied, but notice of the order of denial reached Bernabe only on the seventeenth of October, 1960, after the hearing had already taken place. The trial court proceeded, received the evidence of Reyes, and on the twenty-eighth of October, 1960, rendered its decision. It ordered Bernabe to acknowledge Nacito Reyes as his natural child, and sentenced him to pay a monthly alimony of one hundred pesos, three thousand pesos as moral damages, one thousand pesos as exemplary damages, five hundred pesos as attorney's fees, and the costs.

Bernabe received a copy of the decision on the seventh of November, 1960. Five days later, on the twelfth of November, 1960, he filed a motion to set aside the decision and for new trial, saying that his failure to appear had been due to his mistaken belief that the motion for postponement would be granted. That motion was denied by an order dated the twenty-fifth of November, 1960, of which he received notice the next day. On the fifth of December, 1960, he moved for reconsideration of that denial, and on the twenty-fourth of December, 1960, he received a copy of the order dated the tenth of December, 1960, denying it. On the third of January, 1961, he filed his notice of appeal, his appeal bond, and his record on appeal. On the seventh of January, 1961, the trial court disapproved the record on appeal because the appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary period.

Issues

• Whether or not the decision of the trial court had already become final and executory when Bernabe filed his notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal.
• Whether or not the orders denying the motion for new trial and the motion for reconsideration were interlocutory and therefore not appealable on their own.
• Whether or not Bernabe had a valid ground to complain against the denial of his motion for new trial.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:

A judgment denying relief under Rule 38 is subject to appeal, and in the course thereof, a party may also assail the judgment on the merits, upon the ground that it is not supported by the evidence or it is contrary to law.

This provision explains why the cases relied upon by Bernabe, which concerned orders denying relief under Rule 38, are not in point, because those orders are expressly appealable while the order here is not.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the decision had not yet become final and executory when Bernabe filed his motion to set aside the decision and for new trial. That motion suspended the running of his period to appeal. Hence, when the motion was denied, his only remedy was to appeal from the decision itself, and as an incident of that appeal he could assail the order denying the new trial. The Court rejected the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, which had counted the days elapsed and concluded that forty-three days had passed, far in excess of the thirty-day period. That reasoning rested on a false premise, namely, that Bernabe had appealed from the decision of the twenty-eighth of October, 1960, when in truth he had appealed from the orders denying his motions.

On the second issue, the Court held that the orders denying the motion for new trial and the motion for reconsideration were interlocutory and not appealable on their own. The cases cited by Bernabe were not in point, because they referred to appeals from orders denying motions for relief under Rule 38, which are appealable by express provision of Section 2 of Rule 41. Relief under Rule 38 may be availed of only when the decision has already become final and executory, and only when a new trial is not available. Here, a new trial was still available, and the decision was not yet final when Bernabe filed his motion. The Court quoted its ruling in Samia versus Medina:

Between an order denying a motion for a new trial under section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Rule 37 of the Rules of Court), which this court has held to be interlocutory and hence unappealable (Co-Yengco vs. Reyes, 4 Phil. 709; Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. 34; Artadi & Co. vs. Chu Baco, 8 Phil. 677), and an order denying a motion for new trial under section 113 of the Code (Rule 38 of the Rules of Court), which this Court held to be final and therefore, appealable (Philippine Manufacturing Co. and Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabañgis, 49 Phil. 107; Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 47 Phil. 810; Pecson vs. Coronel, 43 Phil., 358; Gustilo vs. Sian, 53 Phil. 155) there is this fundamental difference: In the first case, since the judgment sought in the motion for new trial to be annulled is not final, the question of the denial of this motion may be raised on appeal from such judgment; in the second, since the judgment sought in the motion for a new trial to be annulled is already final, there is no other remedy than appeal from the order denying the motion, in order that the question as to its correctness can be raised.

On the third issue, the Court held that Bernabe had no valid ground to complain against the order denying his motion for new trial, because that motion was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court had not abused its discretion. Bernabe had no reasonable ground to assume that the motion for postponement would be granted, and, more importantly, no affidavit of merit had been attached to his motion, so there was no possible reason to expect that the result of the case would be otherwise if the motion were granted.

Doctrine

A motion for new trial filed before the judgment becomes final suspends the running of the period to appeal from the judgment. When the motion is denied, the losing party's remedy is to appeal from the judgment itself, and in that appeal he may also assail the order denying the new trial. An order denying a motion for new trial under Rule 37 is interlocutory and cannot be appealed on its own, because the judgment it seeks to annul is not yet final. By contrast, an order denying relief under Rule 38 is final and appealable, because relief under that rule is available only after the judgment has become final and executory, and only when a new trial is no longer available. A motion for new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the denial of such a motion will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. A motion for new trial grounded on mistake or excusable negligence must be accompanied by an affidavit of merit, without which there is no basis to expect that the result would be different if the motion were granted.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the order of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for mandamus, with costs against Manuel Bernabe.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is this: a motion for new trial filed before the judgment becomes final suspends the period to appeal, and the denial of that motion is interlocutory and cannot be appealed on its own. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between an order denying a motion for new trial under Rule 37, which is interlocutory, and an order denying relief under Rule 38, which is final and appealable, and to test the requirement of an affidavit of merit in a motion for new trial based on excusable negligence.