G.R. No. L-14146. April 29, 1961
[WITH RESOLUTION OF June 30, 1961]
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
petition filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. This petition is
supported by the affidavits of Narciso Peña, a lawyer, and Ramon L. Echem, a
businessman.
After hearing, the court dismissed the petition holding that petitioner
failed to comply with all the statutory requirements necessary to qualify him.
to become a Filipino citizen. The grounds on which the trial court predicated
the dismissal of the petition are:
“(1) There is no proof showing the laws of China allowing Filipinos to be
citizens of the Republic of China;“(2) That his certificate (Exh. J) of arrival was not authentic, for if it
were so, the date and the month of his arrival should have been shown. Even the
applicant himself proved the very doubt of the court when, in answer to a
question propounded to him applicant said, ‘that the certificate (Exh. J) does
not reflect the true facts’. (See pp. 144-147 t.s.n.). Even the applicant
himself does not remember the date, although according to him, he thinks
it was on November, 1919 (p. 144, t.s.n.). The court takes judicial notice of
the fact that, records of arrival were burned during the last war ,and this fact
is substantiated by the very statement of. the applicant (t.s.n., p. 145). When
the applicant was asked about his landing certificate, he could not account for
it, hence the court rejected the admission of the certificate of arrival (Exh.
J) for it does not reflect the date and month of Ttis arrival and, the insertion
of the SS/Taiseng and the year appearing in the said certificate (Exh. J) does
not reflect from any authentic entries that the Immigration office had under its
control and possession, as correctly stated by the applicant himself.“(3) It is a fact that the applicant was permitted to use Ng Liam Keng with1
his alias name Jose Tangconkong in an order of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City (Judge Castelo), as shown in the order (Exh. D) dated October 18,
1948, yet in his income taxes (Exhs. 1, 2 and 3), for three, years he did not
use his real name Ng Liam Keng but only his alias name Jose Tangconkong, in open
violation of the order herein indicated. (See order of October 18, 1948). The
same thing holds true in his Residence Certificate marked as Exhibits R, R-1 and
R-2, except that for 1957. It is, however, clear from the testimony of Ills
witness lawyer, Mr. Narciso Peña, that even before the application for the use
of his alias name, said applicant never used his real name in transactions but
the alias name of Jose Tangconkong, It seems that, what impels him to apply for
citizenship was no other than to protect his interest (See deed of sale Exh. Q)
title into his name, when the acquisition of the same was made since 1943
(Japanese occupation). Naturally, once naturalized, the acquisition of the said
property could be legalized.“(4) There are nine children listed in the application. The first six
children carry the surname Ng but the remaining three children have the surname
of Tang, the discrepancies of their differences were never explained into the
records of the case, beside the last child listed as Tan Soat Ha has no birth
certificate and yet no explanation was offered by applicant. Let us take Ng Sing
Chin, the birth certificate shows that his name wag different from that shown in
Exhibit 1-1. While as regards Ng Soat Eng the data appearing in the application
is December 20th, was not the same as the one appearing in Exhibit I—3, which is
December 30th, and yet, no explanation was offered by the applicant to explain
the discrepancies.“(5) From the evidence disclosed, the applicant did not evince a sincero
desire to learn and embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals, as his
memory on historical facts in this country are completely ignored by
him.”
Petitioner has appealed and now contends that the lower court erred:
(1) In holding in effect that it was necessary to show that the laws of China
allow Filipinos to be citizens of the Republic of China;(2) In holding that petitioner-appellant’s certificate of arrival (Exh. J)
was not authentic just because it did not contain the date and the month of his
arrival in the Philippines;(3) In holding that because appellant used his alias name Jose
Tangconkong, instead of his real name Ng Liam Keng, appellant was impelled to
apply for citizenship only to protect his interests;(4) In holding against appellant his failure to explain why his first six
children carried the surname of “Ng” while the three younger children carried
the ssurname of “Tang”;(5) In holding that appellant did not evince a sincere desire to learn and
embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals just because he failed to
remember some historical facts regarding this country; and(6) In denying with prejudice appellant’s application for Filipino
citizenship when he has all tire qualifications and none of the
disqualifications therefor.
The contention that the trial court erred in holding that it wag necessary
for petitioner to show that the laws of China allow Filipinos to be citizens of
that country is well taken for this Court has already held that such is not
necessary it being sufficient that he submit proof that he is a citizen of
Nationalist China.[1] Petitioner’s
contention that the lower court erred in holding that his certificate of arrival
Exhibit J was not authentic just because it does not contain the date and the
month of his arrival in the Philippines is likewise well-taken considering that
said certificate expressly states that he arrived in Manila in 1919 and the same
was issued by the Bureau of Immigration.
With regard, however, to the other errors assigned which in substance aim to
show that the lower court erred in dismissing the petition, suffice it for us to
state the following reasons in justification for such action.
To begin with, petitioner has shown a deficient knowledge in writing the
national language and in speaking and writing the English language. Thus, while
in his direct examination he testified in Tagalog, however, when tested as to
his knowledge to write said language he demonstrated a brazen inability to do so
as shown by the fact that when the court dictated to him during the trial a
sentence taken from an English magazine for him to translate and write in the
Tagalog dialect he was not able to make the translation, nor write it aa
required, which shows that he does not write such language as required by law.
The same shortcoming is evinced by him insofar as his knowledge of the English
language is concerned. In the first place, he testified in Tagalog when he could
have given his answers directly in English to obviate the use of an interpreter.
The most that he did to show his knowledge of that language is to write in
English the translation of the sentence, “Ako ay may asawa”, which he did
correctly by writing “I have a wife.” Such test is indeed insufficient to show
that he speaks and writes that language with such proficiency as required by
law. Much less can be said of his alleged knowledge of Spanish for the proof on
this matter is nil. In the circumstances, we hold that petitioner has failed to
show satisfactorily that he possesses the requisite language qualification.
We also find correct the observation of the lower court that petitioner
committed a violation of the Alias Law, or Commonwealth Act No. 142, for
his failure to use both his real name Ng Liam Keng and his authorized
alias Jose Tangconkong as expressly decreed in the order of the court. It
appears that, contrary to said order, and in violation of the spirit of the law,
he interchangeably used either name in some of his business transactions, and
not jointly as should have been done, thus giving rise to the suspicion that he
has done it imbued by an improper design.
Finally, petitioner’s two character witnesses have not satisfactorily
established that they know him sufficiently well during the requisite period the
law requires them to have known him to be able to act as such. The record shows
that witness Peña became acquainted with petitioner because he acted for a brief
period as his counsel and has gone to his store occasionally but has not been
able to point out specific dates of personal and social visits or contact which
would demonstrate their close association. To the same effect is the testimony
of witness Echem who apparently became acquainted with petitioner in view only
of the circumstance that they had been neighbors for about 5 years, or from 1940
to 1945. We cannot therefore affirm with a degree of certainty that said
witnesses can qualify as insurers of his moral character as is required in a
petition for naturalization.[2]
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
[1] Cu vs. Republic, 97 Phil., 746
61 Off. Gaz. No. 11, 5625.
[2] Pong
vs. Republic, L-9153, May 17, 1957; Young vs. Republic, L-11278,
May 19, 1958; Ong vs. Republic, 103 Phil., 964.
June 30, 1961
DE LEON, J.:
Before this Court is a “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” of our decision
affirming the dismissal “with prejudice” made by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal on the herein movant’s petition for naturalization. The motion prays that
the said decision be reconsidered in the sense that petitioner may, if he so
desires, file another application for naturalization in accordance with law,
provided that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
therefor.
Considering that the grounds relied upon in the motion appear to be valid and
meritorious, let the decision in Ng Liam Keng alias Jose Tangconkong
vs. Republic of the Philippines, G. R. No. L-14146, promulgated on April
29, 1961, be amended, so that the dispositive portion thereof shall read as
follows:
Wherefore, the decision of the lower court dismissing the petition for
naturalization is affirmed, but with the modification that the dismissal shall
be without prejudice, with costs against appellant.
Bengzon, C.J.,
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and
Natividad, JJ., concur.