ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, AS COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION, PETITIONER, VS. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND RAFAEL SALAS, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESPONDENTS.

Noblejas versus Teehankee

The Case

This is Noblejas versus Teehankee, a petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction brought by Antonio Noblejas, the Commissioner of Land Registration, against the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Secretary. Noblejas was suspended by the President pending investigation of charges against him, and he asks the Supreme Court to restrain the investigation and to declare his suspension inoperative. He argues that because the law gives him the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he may be investigated and suspended only by the Supreme Court, in the same manner as a judge. The case matters because it draws the line between a grant of rank and privileges and a grant of judicial tenure, and because it confirms that the Supreme Court cannot be charged with the administrative supervision of executive officials without offending the separation of powers.

Procedural History

The case began as an original action in the Supreme Court, not as an appeal from any lower court. On the seventh of March, 1968, the Secretary of Justice sent Noblejas a letter requiring him to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles. Noblejas answered, taking the position that he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments, and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, and that the papers should therefore be submitted to the Supreme Court under the Judiciary Act and the Revised Rules of Court. On the seventeenth of March, 1968, he received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, suspending him upon a finding that a prima facie case existed against him for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest. The next day, the eighteenth of March, 1968, he filed this petition in the Supreme Court, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion and praying for restraining writs. The respondents admitted the facts but denied that the Commissioner exercises judicial functions or may be considered a Judge of First Instance, and invoked the separation of powers.

Facts

Antonio Noblejas was the duly appointed, confirmed, and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act Number 1151. Section 2 of that Act declares the Commissioner entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. The appropriation laws, in the item setting forth his salary, describe the position as one Land Registration Commissioner, with the rank and privileges of district judge.

In March 1968 the Secretary of Justice required him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles. Noblejas replied that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments, and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as such a judge, and that the papers should go to the Supreme Court.

On the seventeenth of March, 1968, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, suspended him upon receipt of the communication, pending investigation of the charges, on a finding that a prima facie case existed for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest. He then came to the Supreme Court, insisting that only that Court could investigate and suspend him.

Issues

• Whether or not the Commissioner of Land Registration may be investigated, suspended, and removed only by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by law of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
• Whether or not the resolution of consultas by the Commissioner of Land Registration is a judicial function that would place him within the Judiciary.
• Whether or not the investigation and suspension of the Commissioner under the Civil Service Law constitute abuse of discretion or acts in excess of jurisdiction.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Republic Act Number 1151, on the reference of doubtful matters to the Commissioner of Land Registration, provides:

Sec. 4. - Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. - When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.

This is the provision Noblejas invoked to claim that he exercises judicial functions, and the Court examined its text to show that his rulings bind only the Registers of Deeds.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Commissioner of Land Registration may not be investigated and suspended only by the Supreme Court. Section 67 of the Judiciary Act, which provides for the investigation, suspension, or removal of judges, speaks specifically of district judges, and it was nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a district judge or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all. The Court also warned that the petitioner's theory would extend the same right to a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had conferred the same privileges, including the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice, the Assistant Solicitors General, the City Fiscals of Quezon City and Manila, and the Securities and Exchange Commissioner. That would place upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining officials whose functions are plainly executive, and would curtail by mere implication the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials whom the Constitution places under his supervision and control. The Court added that where the legislative design is to make the procedure for judges applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language, as in the organic statutes of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Court of Tax Appeals, and the Commissioner of Public Service.

The Court went further and held that if the Legislature had really intended to include the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court within the general grant of privileges, that grant would be unconstitutional, for it would violate the separation of powers by charging the Court with administrative supervision over executive officials. It quoted with approval the rule of Justice Cardozo:

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.

On the second issue, the Court held that serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. By the specific text of Section 4, the Commissioner's decision is conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds alone, and not upon other parties, which identifies his resolutions with those of any other bureau director, whose rulings bind his subordinates alone. That they are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative, since any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding department head. Even granting that the resolution of consultas is a quasi judicial function, it is but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to them.

On the third issue, applying the principle that statutes should be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, the Court ruled that the grant of the same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed only upon its recommendation. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the Commissioner under the Civil Service Law were neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.

Doctrine

A grant of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance does not carry with it the judicial tenure of a judge, and does not entitle the officer to be investigated, suspended, or removed only by the Supreme Court. The power to investigate and suspend such an officer belongs to the Executive, under the Civil Service Law, because the Constitution places administrative officials who are presidential appointees under the President's supervision and control. The Supreme Court cannot be charged with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, and a statutory grant that would produce that result is read down, or else struck down, as violative of the separation of powers. The resolution of consultas by the Commissioner of Land Registration is administrative rather than judicial, because by the very text of Section 4 his decision is conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds alone.

Disposition

The writs of prohibition and injunction were denied and the petition was dismissed, with no costs, so the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Secretary prevailed and the suspension and investigation stood.

Remember This

Rank and privileges are not tenure: the grant of the privileges of a Judge of First Instance does not make an executive official a judge nor give the Supreme Court power to discipline him. Examiners use this case on the separation of powers, on the President's control over executive officials, and on the rule that a statute will be construed to avoid unconstitutionality.