ENRICA B. AGUIRRE AND NENITA A. DELA CRUZ, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE CANDIDO R. BELMONTE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 22, MALOLOS, BULACAN, RESPONDENT.

Aguirre versus Belmonte

The Case

This is an administrative matter brought by Enrica Aguirre and Nenita dela Cruz against Judge Candido Belmonte of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Malolos, Bulacan, for gross ignorance of the law, evident partiality, and dishonesty. The complainants were the offended parties in two murder cases arising from the ambush slaying of a municipal officer-in-charge and his driver. They challenged three orders of the respondent judge: the consolidation of the two cases in his branch, his grant of bail to the accused on his own motion, and his provisional dismissal of the cases. The case matters because it fixes the procedural discipline a judge must observe before granting bail in a capital offense.

Procedural History

The complainants filed a verified complaint before the Supreme Court on July 22, 1993. On September 15, 1993, the Court required the respondent to comment, and he submitted his answer dated November 26, 1993. On June 15, 1994, the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation. Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez submitted his memorandum dated August 5, 1994. The Court then resolved the administrative matter directly.

Facts

On March 2, 1988, Bernardo Aguirre, then Officer-in-Charge of San Jose del Monte, and his driver Avelino dela Cruz were ambushed and killed. Estelita Hipolito and ten others were indicted. After preliminary investigation, the municipal trial court found probable cause and ordered the arrest of all the accused with no bail fixed. The provincial prosecutor, on review, ordered their release for lack of probable cause, but the Department of Justice reversed and directed the filing of informations with no bail recommended.

Two informations for murder were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos and raffled to Branches 20 and 22, the latter presided over by the respondent. The case in Branch 22 bore the lower docket number, and the cases were consolidated there. In his order of June 18, 1991, the respondent directed the issuance of warrants of arrest and, at the same time and on his own motion, authorized the provisional release of the accused on bail of 100,000 pesos for every accused in each charge. The accused posted bail, were arraigned, and went to trial.

Because the state prosecutor repeatedly failed to appear, the respondent issued an order on August 18, 1992 for the provisional dismissal of the two cases, despite the presence of the private prosecutor and a witness then under cross-examination. The cases were later reinstated on motion of the prosecution. On reconsideration by the accused, the respondent issued an order dated December 15, 1992 holding that the dismissal was tantamount to an acquittal. The cases were eventually re-raffled to Branch 16 after the respondent inhibited himself.

Issues

• Whether or not the consolidation of the two murder cases in Branch 22 was proper.
• Whether or not the respondent judge acted correctly in granting bail to the accused on his own motion, without any motion, notice to the prosecution, or hearing.
• Whether or not the respondent judge may be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
• Whether or not the Court may pass upon the propriety of the order provisionally dismissing the cases.

Applicable Provisions

Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.

This is the fundamental rule on bail that the respondent violated.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

This provision makes bail discretionary in capital offenses and presupposes custody of the accused.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the consolidation was proper. It was Judge Amante Laforteza of Branch 20 who ordered the transfer of the case to Branch 22, which bore the lower docket number, pursuant to a motion of counsel for the accused.

On the second issue, the Court held that the complainants had valid cause to complain. The accused were charged with murder, a capital offense, so the grant of bail was a matter of discretion, and the court had to satisfy itself whether the evidence of guilt was strong. The Court held that a hearing is mandatory, and it quoted its earlier ruling:

It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused.

The respondent's reliance on the Lim case was misplaced, because that case concerned probable cause for the commencement of a criminal action, not the strength of evidence for bail. The Court also held that bail cannot be granted to an accused not yet in custody, and it quoted its earlier ruling:

It would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.

On the third issue, the Court held that the respondent's acts amounted to a whimsical and arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction calling for disciplinary action. A judge owes it to the public to know the law he is supposed to apply.

On the fourth issue, the Court declined to pass upon the correctness of the dismissal order, because the records did not show the reasons and the number of times the prosecutor was absent, and the motion for reconsideration was still pending before Branch 16.

Doctrine

In a capital offense, bail is discretionary, and the court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding to allow the prosecution to present evidence that the evidence of guilt is strong. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail violates due process and constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Bail cannot be authorized or posted before the accused is in the custody of the law by arrest or voluntary surrender. The prosecution is equally entitled to due process and must be consulted or heard.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law in granting bail without hearing and without custody, and imposed the corresponding disciplinary penalty.

Remember This

Memorize the rule that in a capital offense, a hearing is mandatory before bail is granted, and bail cannot be posted by one not yet in custody. Examiners use this case to test the procedural requirements for bail in capital offenses and the administrative liability of judges who ignore them.