PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AMELIA K. DEL ROSARIO AND DIONISIO CERBO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, AND GREGORIO OJOY, RES…

People versus Estenzo

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, brought by the People of the Philippines, through private prosecutor Amelia K. del Rosario, and by Dionisio Cerbo, against Judge Numeriano G. Estenzo of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and against the accused Gregorio Ojoy. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to nullify a trial court order that allowed the defense to substitute the live, oral direct testimony of its witnesses with previously prepared affidavits, subject only to cross-examination by the prosecution. The case matters because it fixes a constitutional and procedural baseline for every criminal trial: the testimony of a witness must be given orally in open court, and a trial judge may not invent his own procedure for presenting evidence, however well-meaning, when the Rules of Court speak in mandatory terms.

Procedural History

The setting is a criminal case for an offense charged against Gregorio Ojoy before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch Three. After the accused himself had testified in his defense, his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he would simply file their affidavits, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. The private prosecutor objected, but the respondent judge gave his conformity and issued the questioned order dated the thirtieth of July, nineteen hundred seventy-five, sustaining the procedure. The petitioners then went directly to the Supreme Court by certiorari and prohibition, contending that the order violated the rules requiring oral testimony in open court and that there was no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on the twenty-second of August, nineteen hundred seventy-five, enjoining the respondent judge from enforcing the questioned order, and thereafter decided the petition on the merits.

Facts

In the criminal case against Gregorio Ojoy, the accused took the witness stand and testified in his own defense. When it came time to present his remaining witnesses, his counsel proposed a shortcut. Instead of having each witness appear and answer questions on direct examination in open court, counsel would merely file their affidavits, and the prosecution would be allowed to cross-examine on the matters stated in the affidavits and on all other pertinent and material matters.

The private prosecutor, Attorney Amelia K. del Rosario, objected to the proposed procedure. Despite the objection, the respondent judge approved it and issued the order sustaining the filing of affidavits in lieu of direct oral testimony.

Taking the position that the order violated the rules on the examination of witnesses and amounted to a grave abuse of discretion, the petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which restrained the respondent judge and ultimately resolved the question of whether a trial court may adopt a procedure for presenting evidence other than the one specifically authorized by the Rules of Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing an order that allowed the defense to file the affidavits of its witnesses in lieu of their oral testimony on direct examination in open court, subject only to cross-examination.
• Whether or not the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial must be given orally in open court under the Rules of Court, such that a trial judge may not adopt any other procedure for the presentation of evidence.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Testimony to be given in open court. — The testimony of witnesses shall be given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation.

This is the core command the respondent judge disregarded, and it is the provision the Court quotes and enforces.

Section 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 2. Testimony in superior courts to be reduced to writing. — In superior courts the testimony of each witness shall be taken in shorthand or stenotype, the name, residence, and occupation of the witness being stated, and all questions put to the witness and his answers thereto being included. If a question put is objected to and the objection is ruled on, the nature of the objection and the ground on which it was sustained or overruled must be stated, or if a witness declines to answer a question put, the fact and the proceedings taken thereon shall be entered in the record. A transcript of the record made by the official stenographer or stenotypist and certified as correct by him shall be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings.

This provision presupposes a live witness whose questions and answers are recorded by the stenographer, which the affidavit procedure would circumvent.

Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number.

The Court cites this to show that the judge's power to weigh the manner of testifying can be exercised only if the witness actually testifies orally in open court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 and Section 1 of Rule 133 clearly require that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. The Court traced these provisions to their origins in the old rules and in earlier legislation, underscoring that the requirement is not a mere technicality but a settled and long-standing rule.

On the second issue, the Court explained the reasons behind the rule. The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. As the Court put it, the opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. There is also the advantage of the witness's personal appearance before the judge, which enables the trier of facts to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness's deportment while testifying. Only oral testimony lets the judge observe the witness's countenance, manner and expression, the promptness or evasiveness of the answers, and the physical condition that reveals capacity for accurate observation and memory. The Court noted that the great weight given to a trial judge's findings of fact rests precisely on his having had that opportunity.

The Court added that the rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of litigants and to secure the orderly dispatch of court business. A witness may testify only on facts he knows of his own knowledge, and leading questions are not allowed on direct examination except on preliminary matters or in the specified exceptional cases. These safeguards would be subverted if trial judges were allowed to adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court.

Doctrine

The testimony of a witness must be given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation, and in superior courts it must be taken in shorthand or stenotype with all questions and answers included. A trial judge has no authority to adopt a procedure for presenting evidence other than that specifically authorized by the Rules of Court. The filing of affidavits in lieu of direct oral testimony, even if subject to cross-examination, does not satisfy the rule, because the essential purpose of the requirement is to secure the adverse party's opportunity for cross-examination through the direct and personal putting of questions and the obtaining of immediate answers, and to allow the judge to observe the witness's deportment while testifying. The manner of testifying, which the court may consider in weighing evidence, can be assessed only when the witness testifies orally in open court.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was granted, the order of the respondent judge dated the thirtieth of July, nineteen hundred seventy-five was set aside, and the temporary restraining order issued on the twenty-second of August, nineteen hundred seventy-five was made permanent, without any pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court, and a judge may not replace it with affidavits, because confrontation exists for cross-examination and for the observation of the witness's deportment. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory nature of the rules on oral testimony, the limits of a trial judge's discretion in adopting innovative procedures, and the rationale behind the rule against affidavits in lieu of live direct examination.