ELIZANE W. JENSSEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TERESITA A. WAQUEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
QUIJANO-PADILLA, J.:
The Antecedents
Initially, plaintiff-appellee filed a Complaint[3] for Revocation of Donation, Recovery of Possession and Damages against defendant-appellant. In the said Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that on March 17, 1997, she bought Lot No. 685 (subject property) of Sapi-an Cadastre, situated in Barangay Canduman, Mandaue City, Cebu, with an area of 9,100 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 01-1229,[4] from Daisy O. Villanueva as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.[5] After the sale, plaintiff-appellee requested defendant-appellant to facilitate the titling of the subject property in the former’s name. A few months later, defendant-appellant told plaintiff-appellee that the subject property cannot be titled in her name and upon the suggestion of the defendant-appellant the subject property was donated to the latter. Considering that they are sisters and out of pity, plaintiff-appellee acceded to defendant-appellant’s request and a Deed of Donation[6] was then executed by plaintiff-appellee covering the subject property in favor of the defendant-appellant. After the donation was made, defendant-appellant manifested acts of ingratitude. On June 26, 2008, defendant-appellant filed an allegedly malicious criminal case of Grave Threats against the plaintiff-appellee in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sigma, Capiz, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2952[7] and a criminal case of Other Forms of Trespass, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2953[8] against plaintiff-appellee’s brother and nephews, whom the plaintiff-appellee commissioned to fence her property, Lot No. 684, with an area of 56, 310 square meters and covered by Katibayan ng Original na Titulo Blg. P-19365, in order to be secured from trespassers. Aside from the filing of these allegedly malicious and unfounded cases, plaintiff-appellee discovered that defendant-appellant, with the use of a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA),[9] sold a portion of Lot No. 684 to the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) without her consent, knowledge and authority.[10] According to plaintiff-appellee, the said SPA was fake and a forged one for she did not execute nor sign the same as she was in Brazil at that time.[11] In this connection, plaintiff-appellee executed a Revocation of the Deed of Donation[12] dated August 12, 2008 in order to annul the donation made to defendant-appellant. And before filing the instant case, plaintiff-appellee exerted earnest efforts to settle this case amicably but all efforts were futile, thus, a certificate to file action[13] was issued by the barangay.[14]
In her Answer,[15] defendant-appellant admitted and acknowledged the existence of the Deed of Donation covering the subject property executed in her favor in consideration of the services rendered by defendant-appellant to her sister, the plaintiff-appellee. According to defendant-appellant, this donation was made by plaintiff-appellee because she had been administering the properties of the plaintiff-appellee for a long period of time without any compensation. Defendant-appellant denied any display of ingratitude committed by her towards her sister after the donation was made and in fact, they continued to be in good terms with each other. Defendant-appellant even helped in the titling of Lot No. 684 after the said donation. According to defendant-appellant, the filing of two criminal complaints against plaintiff-appellee and her brother and nephews cannot be considered acts of ingratitude as she was only protecting her rights and property from the unlawful acts of the plaintiff-appellee together with her brother and nephews. The case of Grave Threats allegedly stemmed out from the serious threats made by plaintiff-appellee to kill her when she refused to heed the plaintiff-appellee’s demand to return Lot No. 685 without any reason at all. On the other hand, the case of Other Forms of Trespass filed against her brother and nephews stemmed from the fact that despite the existence of boundaries already in place between Lot Nos. 684 and 685, plaintiff-appellee with the employment of her brother and nephews, forced their way into the property of defendant-appellant or Lot No. 685, without her consent. Defendant-appellant maintained that the transaction with TRANSCO was with the full knowledge and consent of the plaintiff-appellee and that the SPA was valid and binding during the time of her transaction with TRANSCO and that she did not go beyond her authority. Defendant-appellant insisted that this case be dismissed asserting that there is no legal ground to revoke the donation and that the instant case was prematurely filed as the plaintiff-appellee did not exhaust earnest efforts in the barangay level to settle their differences.[16]
Pre-trial conference was conducted and the parties submitted the following issues for resolution, to wit:
- whether or not the Deed of Donation can be revoked;
- whether or not the Deed of Donation dated October 19, 2005 was validly revoked in the Deed of Revocation dated August 12, 2008;
- whether the prevailing parties are entitled to damages.[17]
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On February 3, 2009, the RTC ordered the relocation survey of the subject property in order to clarify the actual area thereof which is the subject matter of the Deed of Donation.[18] On April 21, 2009, Engineer Deny Celorico submitted his Commissioner’s Report.[19]
The evidence for the plaintiff-appellee, summarized by the RTC, is as follows:
“Engr. Deny Celorico testified on the result of the relocation survey he conducted over Lot 685. Said lot has an area of 4,701 square meters but it has no boundary marks with lot 684, the lot owned by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff Elizane W. Jenssen, testified by way of deposition on September 24, 2008 (Exh. P-1, p. 136). She alleged that on March 17, 1997, she bought a parcel of land from Daisy O. Villanueva denominated as Lot No. 685, Sigma Cadastre with an area of Nine Thousand One hundred (9,100) square meters situated at Poblacion, Sapian, Capiz (Exh. A, p 9). Since plaintiff was informed that the lot can not be titled in her name, plaintiff donated the same to the herein defendant who is her sister (Exh. B, p 10-11) on October 19, 2005. After the donation, defendant manifested act[s] of ingratitude by filing malicious criminal case of Grave Threats [against the plaintiff] (Exh. C, p 12) (Exh. C-1, p 13 – Affidavit of defendant) and Other Form of Trespass (Exh. D, p 15) against the plaintiff’s brother and nephews. Plaintiff further discovered that the defendant sold a portion of Lot 684 to the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) using a forged special power of attorney (Exh. E, p 19). On July 19, 2001, she was in Brazil and it would be impossible for her to sign said special power of attorney as evidenced by her passport (Exh. F, p 36) which was marked with a rubber stamp upon her arrival on April 18, 2001 (Exh. F-1) and her departure on May 14, 2001 (Exh. F-2). The defendant also threatened her to be killed and the incident was reported before the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Sapian, Capiz (Exh. G, p 37). On August 5, 2008, she reported to the police authorities (Exh. H, p. 38) that she noticed two unidentified persons observing her room in their house the day before. Because of the acts of ingratitude committed by the defendant, plaintiff executed a Deed of Revocation (Exh. I, pp. 21-22) annulling said donation to the defendant. They brought the matter to their barangay for possible settlement but they never reached to [sic] an agreement (Exh. J, p. 20).”[20]
The evidence for the defendant-appellant, also summarized by the RTC, is as follows:
“The defendant in her answer admitted and acknowledged the existence of the Deed of Donation covering Lot 685 executed by the plaintiff in her favor. The donation was in consideration of her services to the plaintiff as administrator over the latter’s property. The defendant testified that plaintiff sent to her by mail the Special Power of Attorney as evidence[d] by a mailing envelope (Exh. 8-8-A, pp. 94-95). The case she filed against the plaintiff for Grave Threats was dismissed while the case for Other Forms of Trespass[,] the accused were found guilty as per consolidated decision dated March 25, 2010 (Exh. 10, pp. 199-208). The case filed by her niece Nonalyn Waquez against the herein plaintiff and four other accused was also dismissed as per resolution dated July 15, 2010 (Exh. Q, pp. 213-222). On June 4, 2010, she again filed a case of Grave Threats against the plaintiff (Exh. S, p. 225). She acknowledged that she received the agricultural rentals and farm implement rentals of Luz Obligar, tenant of plaintiff, from the land of the plaintiff as evidenced by receipts (Exh. T-1 to T-16, pp. 229-237 as well as the rentals of tenant Carmelino Cerilo (Exh. U to U-11, pp. 238-249). The rentals of palay were ordered to be sold by plaintiff and to pay the taxes and other expenses.”[21]
On August 5, 2011, the RTC issued its Decision[22] in favor of plaintiff-appellee. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant:
- declaring the Deed of Donation of Lot 685 in favor of the defendant as hereby revoked and of no legal effect;
- ordering the defendant to reconvey/return the possession of Lot 685 in favor of the plaintiff, and
- ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.[23]
Aggrieved, defendant-appellant appealed before Us assigning the following errors:
I.
THE COURT A-QUO [SIC] ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIME OR THE ACT OF GRAVE THREATS WHICH WAS THE CRIME [SIC] FILED BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT (DONEE) AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE (DONOR) IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2952 HAS BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST THE DONEE, HERSELF, HENCE, THE DEED OF DONATION (EXHIBIT “B”) CANNOT BE REVOKED ON THE GROUND OF INGRATITUDE IN VIEW OF THE PROVISIONS OR [OF] PARAGRAPH (2) OF ARTICLE 765 OF THE CIVIL CODE.II.
THE COURT A-QUO [SIC] ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE THE AMOUNT OF P10,000.00 AS ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST OF LITIGATION.III.
THE COURT A-QUO [SIC] ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO RECONVEY/RETURN THE POSSESSION OF LOT 685 IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.IV.
THE COURT A-QUO [SIC] ERRED IN ORDERING THE REVOCATION OF THE DEED OF DONATION OF LOT 685 IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.V.
THE COURT A-QUO [SIC] ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE TO PROVE THAT SHE EXERTED EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARDS A COMPROMISE, THE PRESENT CASE BEING BETWEEN SISTERS (RULES 16, SECTION 1[J], 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE).VI.
THE COURT A-QUO [SIC] ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.[24]
The instant appeal lacks merit.
The foregoing issues being interrelated, they will be discussed jointly hereunder.
Trial Court’s Findings Of Facts Are Accorded Due Respect On Appeal
Defendant-appellant’s arguments rest on the oft-repeated pronouncement that the conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.[25]
The rule that the trial court’s findings of facts are accorded due respect on appeal is not without exceptions. It is not applicable where there are strong and cogent reasons as when the trial court’s findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment or when the trial court’s decision was attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.[26]
Unfortunately for the defendant-appellant, however, We have made a close hard look into the bases for the trial court’s decision and found none of the foregoing exceptions as obtaining herein to warrant a re-examination or reversal of the trial court’s finding.
We affirm the decision of the RTC based on the foregoing reasons:
First, the RTC was correct in holding that the crime of Grave Threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2952, filed by defendant-appellant against the plaintiff-appellee is an act of ingratitude which would merit the revocation of the donation.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.[27] On the part of the donor, it is an exercise of one’s generosity. However, on several occasions, instead of being accorded recognition and appreciation for this act of beneficence, the donor ends up as a victim of greed and ingratitude.[28] This was the fate that befell upon the plaintiff-appellee constraining her to cause the revocation of the donation that she made to her sister in 2005.
On this score, the trial court relying on the provisions of Article 765 of the New Civil Code, ruled in this wise:
“Art. 765 of the Civil Code states that the donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority;(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.
Clearly then, all crimes which offend the donor shows ingratitude and are causes for revocation. Hence, the crime of grave threats filed by the defendant against the plaintiff which offended the donor shows beyond cavil, an act of ingratitude which would merit the revocation of the donation. This case filed by the defendant against the plaintiff was eventually dismissed by the Court as shown by Defendant’s Exhibit ’10’.”[29]
Defendant-appellant is now before Us taking exception to the foregoing findings of trial court and contending that the same are not in accord with the law and evidence on record.
Anent the revocation of the deed of donation, defendant-appellant submits that paragraph (2) of Article 765 of the New Civil Code does not apply in this case because the acts of ingratitude referred to therein pertain to offenses imputed by the donee against the donor, unless the crime or act complained of has been committed against the donee himself/herself. Defendant-appellant argues that as the offense imputed to herein donor, the plaintiff-appellee – grave threats – is committed against the defendant-appellant as the donee, the same is not a ground for revocation.
We are not persuaded. It is worthy to note that the crime of Grave Threats filed by defendant-appellant against the plaintiff-appellee was dismissed by the MCTC in its Consolidated Decision[30] dated March 25, 2010, for insufficiency of evidence. The MCTC acquitted the plaintiff-appellee as the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the plaintiff-appellee beyond the point of moral certainty. This would only mean that the defendant-appellant failed to prove the act or crime which she imputed to have been committed against her by the donor, the plaintiff-appellee. Certainly, it can be said that the defendant-appellant’s act of filing the case of Grave Threats against the plaintiff-appellee, which was later dismissed, cannot be covered by the exception provided under the second paragraph of Article 765 of the New Civil Code. Hence, it is an act of ingratitude that warrants the revocation of the subject deed of donation.
Second, even assuming arguendo that the defendant-appellant’s act is covered by the exception provided under the second paragraph of Article 765, the defendant-appellant still committed another act of ingratitude falling under the first paragraph of the same Article.
As testified to by the plaintiff-appellee in her deposition,[31] the defendant-appellant, armed with a forged SPA, sold a portion of Lot No. 684 owned by plaintiff-appellee to TRANSCO without the plaintiff-appellee’s consent and knowledge. In fact, a case for Cancellation of Documents, Injunction, Preliminary Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Damages was filed by plaintiff-appellee against the defendant-appellant and TRANSCO, docketed as Civil Case No. M-08-0272-08.[32]
Verily, the act of defendant-appellant in entering into an unauthorized and unlawful transaction with TRANSCO covering the property of plaintiff-appellee (Lot No. 684) is an offense against the property of the donor as provided under the first paragraph of Article 765 of the New Civil Code.
In support thereof, We cite the full text of Tolentino’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence[33] on the Civil Code:
Offense Against Donor. – All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife of the donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The crimes against the person of the donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, and coercion; those against honor include offenses against chastity; and those against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Manresa 175-176]. (Emphasis supplied).
The afore-cited text likewise finds supports in Paras’ Civil Code of the Philippines,[34] thus:
“If the donee should commit some offense against the PERSON (not merely life), the HONOR, or the PROPERTY of the donor, or his wife or children under his parental authority:”
(a) “Offense” includes both crimes and non-crimes; no criminal conviction is required, and proof of the offense, by mere preponderance of evidence, in the suit for revocation would be sufficient.
Third, the defendant-appellant’s contention that the RTC erred in not dismissing the instant complaint for failure of the plaintiff-appellee to prove that she exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise, the present case being a case between sisters deserves scant consideration.
It has not escaped this Court’s attention that this is the only time the defendant-appellant raised this argument. The defendant-appellant never raised this issue before the lower court during trial. As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court, will not be permitted to change theory on appeal.[35]
As We have held in the past, points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage[36] because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[37]
Given the foregoing observations, this Court is given all the more reason to reject defendant-appellant’s theory, that the deed of donation in her favor was not validly revoked as she did not commit any acts of ingratitude, because the same is not only bereft of any sufficient substantiation but likewise illogical and unworthy of belief.
With the view We take of this case, defendant-appellant’s lament on the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in her favor, as her lament is based on the contention that plaintiff-appellee had no cause of action against her, must simply fall.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 5, 2011 of the RTC, Branch 21, Mambusao, Capiz in Civil Case No. M-08-0275-09 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
Ingles,* and Azcarraga-Jacob, JJ., concur.
* Acting Chairperson in lieu of J. Ramon Paul L. Hernando, per Office Order No. 19-14-GTI dated July 7, 2014.
[1] See Notice of Appeal, records, page 291.
[2] Penned by Judge Daniel Antonio Gerardo S. Amular, records, pages 280-287.
[3] Records, pages 1-6.
[4] Records, page 7.
[5] See Deed of Sale, records, page 9.
[6] Records, page 10.
[7] Records, page 12.
[8] Records, page 15.
[9] Records, page 19.
[10] See Grant of Right of Way, records, page 18.
[11] See Elizanne Jenssen’s passport (entry of arrival and departure), records, page 33.
[12] Records, pages 21-22.
[13] Records, page 20.
[14] See Complaint, supra at note 3.
[15] Records, pages 40-43.
[16] See Answer, supra.
[17] See Pre-trial Order, records, pages 82-85.
[18] Records, page 86.
[19] Records, pages 91-93.
[20] See pages 2-4 of RTC Decision, records, pages 281-283.
[21] See pages 4-5 of RTC Decision, records, pages 283-284.
[22] Supra, at note 2.
[23] See page 8 of RTC Decision, records, page 287.
[24] Rollo, pages 24-25.
[25] Capco v. Macasaet, G.R. No. 90888, September 13, 1990; Chase v. Buencamino,136 SCRA 605 (1985).
[26] Capco v. Macasaet, supra.
[27] Article 725, New Civil Code.
[28] Sps. Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105944, February 9, 1996.
[29] See page 7 of RTC Decision, records, page 286.
[30] Records, pages 196-205.
[31] See TSN – September 24, 2008, pages 13-14, records, pages 151-152.
[32] Records, pages 288-289.
[33] Vol. II, 1983 Ed., page 538.
[34] Vol. II, 2002 Ed., page 933.
[35] Maxicare v. Contreras, G.R. No. 194352, January 30, 2013; Del Rosario v. Bonga, G.R. No. 136308, January 23, 2001.
[36] Maxicare v. Contreras, supra; Del Rosario v. Bonga,supra; Mark Anthony Esteban, etc. v. Spouses Rodrigo C. Marcelo and Carmen T. Marcelo, G.R. No. 197725, July 31, 2013, citing Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, 618 SCRA 134, 145; Tay Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93640, January 7, 1994, 229 SCRA 151; Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 229 Phil. 588 (1986); Berin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57490, February 27, 1991, 194 SCRA 508 (1991).
[37] PRRM v. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010; Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108738, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 301; National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 60077, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 1.