NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE REYNALDO P HONRADO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASIG BRANCH 25 AND EVAN­GELINE S. YUIPCO, DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT, RESPO…

Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for
having admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is
written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before
the notary as admitted by the notary himself?

That question arises under the pleadings filed in the testate
case and in the certiorari case in the Court of Appeals which reveal the
following tangled strands of human relationship.

Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th
Infantry of the U. S. Army (Philippine Scouts), Fort McKinley, married Marcelina Salvador in 1923 (p. 150, Spec. Proc. No.
7816).  They were childless.  They reared a boy
named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his parents as shown in
his 1945 mar­riage contract with Nenita de Vera (p.
15, Rollo of
CA-G. R. No. 08654-R; p. 148, Rollo of Testate Case
showing that Agapito was 5 years old when Mauro
married Marcelina in 1923).

Mauro died in 1942.  Marcelina, as a veteran’s widow, became a pensioner of the
Federal Government.  That explains why on
her death she had accumulated some cash in two banks.

Agapito and Nenita
begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist and went
abroad.  Agapito
also became a soldier.  He was disabled
and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian in
1953 when he was declared an incompetent in Special Proceeding No. 1807 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch I (p. 16, Rollo of CA-G. R. No. 08654-R).

In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz wanted also to be his guardian in
another pro­ceeding.  Arsenia
tried to prove that Nenita was living separately from
Agapito and that she (Nenita)
admitted to Marcelina that she was unfaithful to Agapito (pp. 61-63, Record of testate case).

Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second
guardianship proceeding and confirmed Nenita’s
appointment as guardian of Agapito (p. 16, Rollo of CA case).  Agapito has been staying in a veteran’s hospital in San
Francisco or Palo Alto, California (p. 87, Record).

On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy,
who, when a few days old, was entrusted to Arsenia de
la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of Agapito) and who
was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. SP-08654-R).  Marilyn used the surname Suroza.  She stayed with Marcelina
but as not legally adopted by Agapito.  She married Oscar Medrano and is residing at 7666
J. B. Roxas Street, Makati,
apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668
J. B. Roxas Street.

Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73
years old.  That will, which is in
English, was thumbmarked by her.  She was illiterate.  Her letters in English to the Veterans
Administration were also thumbmarked by her (pp.
38-39, CA Rollo). 
In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her
estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.

Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at
the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City.  At the time of her death, she was a resident
of 7374 San Maximo Street, Olimpia,
Makati, Rizal.  She owned a 150-square meter lot and house in that place.  She acquired the lot in 1966 (p. 134, Record
of testate case).

On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje,
alleged to be a laundry woman of Marcelina (p. 97, CA
Rollo) and the executrix in her will (the al­ternate
executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar,
Marilyn’s husband), filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25, a
petition for the probate of Marcelina’s alleged
will.  The case was assigned to Judge
Reynaldo P. Honrado.

As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado
commissioned his deputy clerk of court, Evangeline S. Yuipco,
to hear the evidence. 
The transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at the hearing before
the deputy clerk of court are not in the record.

In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado
appointed Marina as administratrix.  On the following day, April 1, Judge Honrado issued two
orders directing the Merchants Banking Corporation and the Bank of
America to allow Marina to withdraw the sum of P10,000 from the savings accounts of Marcelina S. Suroza and Marilyn Suroza and
requiring Corazon Castro, the custodian of the passbooks, to deliver them to
Marina.

Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado
issued another order dated April 11, 1975, instructing a deputy sheriff to
eject the occu­pants of the testatrix’s house, among whom
was Nenita V. Suroza, and
to place Marina in possession thereof.

That order alerted Nenita to the
existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina’s estate. 
She and the other occupants of the decedent’ s
house filed on April 18 in the said proceeding a motion to set aside the order
of April 11 ejecting them.  They alleged
that the decedent’ s son Agapito
was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Aga­pito’s guardian
and that Marilyn was not Agapito’s daughter nor the
decedent’ s granddaughter (pp. 52-68, Record of testate case).  Later, they questioned the probate court’s
jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.

In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado
was already apprised that persons, other than Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina‘ s
estate, he issued on April 23 an order probating her supposed will wherein
Marilyn was the instituted heiress (pp. 74-77, Record).

On April 24, Nenita filed in the
testate case an omnibus petition “to set aside proceedings, admit
opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary
injunction”.  Nenita
in that motion reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and
attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by Marina
and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix
were procured by fraud or trick.

Nenita further alleged that the
institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition
of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act
as executrix (pp. 83-91, Record).

To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida
A. Peñaojas, the housemaid of Marcelina,
who swore that the alleged will was falsified (p. 109, Record).

Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment
order (filed on April 18) and
her omnibus motion to set aside the proceedings (filed on April 24), Nenita filed the next
day, April 25, an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of
administration.  In that opposition, Nenita assailed the due execution of the will and stated
the names and addresses of Marcelina’s intestate
heirs, her nieces and nephews (pp. 113-121, Record).  Nenita was not
aware of the decree of probate dated April 23, 1975.

To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio, Marcelina‘ s
niece, who swore that Marcelina never executed a will
(pp. 124-125, Record).

Marina in her answer to Nenita’s motion
to set aside the pro­ceedings admitted that Marilyn was not Marcelina‘ s
granddaughter but was the daughter of Agapito and Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito
was not Marcelina’s son but merely an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted (p. 143,
Record).

Judge Honrado in his order of July 17,
1975 dismissed Nenita’s counter-petition for the
issuance of letters of administration because of the nonappearance of her
counsel at the hearing.  She moved for
the reconsideration of that order.

In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all
pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza
reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it
is written in English which is not known to her (pp. 208-209, Record).

Judge Honrado in his order of June 8,
1976 “denied” the various incidents “raised” by Nenita (p. 284, Record).

Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the
will, Nenita “filed a case to annul” the
probate proceedings (p. 332, Record). That case, Civil Case No. 24276, Suroza vs. Paje and Honrado (p. 398, Record), was also assigned to Judge Honrado.  He
dismissed it in his order of February 16,
1977 (pp.398-402,
Record).

Judge Honrado in his order dated
December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to
Marilyn, and that the estate tax
had been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.

About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated Octo­ber
12, 1978, filed in this Court, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina.  The complainant reiterated her contention that the
testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English,
the language in which the will was written. 
(In the decree of probate Judge Honrado did
not make any finding that the will was written in a language known to the
testatrix.)

Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his know­ledge that the testatrix had
a son named Agapito (the testatrix’s supposed sole
compulsory and legal heir), who was preterited in the
will, did not take into account the consequences of such a pre­terition.

Nenita disclosed that she talked
several times with Judge Honrado and informed him
that the testatrix did not know the executrix Marina Paje, that the beneficiary’s
real name is Marilyn Sy and that she was not the next
of kin of the testatrix.

Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina
and her cohorts to withdraw from various banks the deposits of Marcelina.

She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco,
the deputy clerk of court, for not giving her access to the record of the
probate case by alleging that it was useless for Nenita
to oppose the probate since Judge Honrado would not
change his decision.  Nenita
also said that Evangeline insinuated that if she (Nenita)
had ten thousand pesos, the case might be decided in her favor.  Evangeline allegedly advised Nenita to desist from claiming the properties of the
testatrix because she (Nenita) had no rights thereto
and, should she persist, she might lose her pension from the Federal
Government.

Judge Honrado in his brief comment did
not deal specifically with the allegations
of the complaint.  He merely pointed to
the fact that Nenita did
not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion dated July 6,
1976 she asked for a thirty-day period
within which to vacate the house of the testatrix.

Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit
said that she never talked with Nenita and that the
latter did not mention Evangeline in her letter dated September 11, 1978 to
President Marcos.

Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita”s
imputation that she (Evangeline) prevented Nenita
from having access to the record of the testamentary proceeding.  Evangeline was not the custodian of the
record.  Evangeline “strongly,
vehemently and flatly denied” Nenita’s charge
that she (Evangeline) said that the sum of ten thousand pesos was needed in
order that Nenita could get a favorable
decision.  Evangeline also denied that
she has any knowledge of Nenita’s pension from the
Federal Government.

The 1978 complaint against Judge Honrado
was brought to the attention of this Court in the Court Administrator’s
memorandum of September 25, 1980.  The
case was referred to Justice Juan A.  Sison of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.  He submitted a report dated October 7, 1981.

On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in
the Court of Appeals against Judge Honrado a petition for certiorari and prohibition
wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings
in the probate case be declared void.

Attached to the petition
was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized
the will.  He swore that the testatrix
and the three attesting witnesses did not appear before him and that he
notarized the will “just to accommodate a brother-lawyer on the
condition” that said lawyer would bring to the notary the testatrix and
the wit­nesses but the lawyer never complied with his commitment.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita’s remedy was an appeal and her failure to do so did
not entitle her to resort to the
special civil action of certiorari (Suroza vs.
Honrado, CA-G. R. No. SP-08654, May 29, 1981).

Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado
filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to dismiss the administrative case for
having allegedly become moot and academic.

We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against res­pondent
judge for his improper disposition of the testate case which might have
resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedent’s legal heirs and not
the instituted heiress in the void will should have inherited the decedent’s
estate.

A judge may be criminally liable for knowingly rendering an un­just
judgment or interlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or
interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance (Arts. 204
to 206, Revised Penal Code).

Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court
of first instance for serious misconduct or inefficiency (Sec. 67, Judiciary Law). 
Misconduct implies malice or a wrongful intent, not a mere error of
judgment.  “For serious misconduct
to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts
complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or
were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules” (In re Im­peachment
of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214-215).

Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and
carelessness.  A judge would be
inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties
that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the
rendition of any public service (In re Climaco,
Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119).

In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting
that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by
an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will
is void.

In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English
was a language “understood and known” to the testatrix.  But in its concluding paragraph, it was
stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated into
Filipino language”.  (p. 16, Record of testate case).  That could only mean that the will was
written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it
is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a
language or dialect known to the testator. 
Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was
disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso,
52 Phil. 660).

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation
clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is
repeatedly referred to as the “testator” instead of “testatrix”.

Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have
noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there
was something ‘wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress
and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.

Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy
clerk of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not
presented as a witness.

In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should
have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he
could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction
of duty to be inexcusable.

WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case
of Marcelina S. Suroza, a
fine equivalent to his salary for one month is imposed on respondent judge (his
compulsory retirement falls on December 25, 1981).

The case against respondent Yuipco has
become moot and academic because she is no longer employed in the
judiciary.  Since September 1, 1980 she
has been assistant city fiscal of Surigao City.  She is beyond this Court’s disciplinary
jurisdiction (Peralta vs. Firme, Adm. Matter No.
2044-CFI, November 21, 1980, 101 SCRA 225).

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), De Castro, Ericta, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

Abad Santos, J., no part.