MITA PARDO DE TAVERA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PHILIPPINE TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, INC., FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR., MIGUEL CAÑIZARES, BERNARDO P. PARDO, RALPH NUBLA, MIDPANTAO ADIL, E…

Pardo de Tavera versus Philippine Tuberculosis Society

The Case

This is a civil action for damages and reinstatement brought by Doctor Mita Pardo de Tavera, a physician and recognized specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis, against the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, its past and present directors, and the officer appointed in her place. She had served as Executive Secretary of the Society until the Board of Directors declared her position vacant. She claimed that her removal was unlawful, that it violated the Society's Code of By-Laws, the Civil Code on human relations, and the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, and that the directors responsible should answer in damages. The case matters because it teaches two enduring lessons: how a court determines the true nature of an action from the allegations of the complaint, and why an officer who holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power may be separated without cause, notice, or hearing.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which rendered judgment holding that the suit was one for quo warranto, that it should have been filed within one year from the ouster, and that in any event the plaintiff was not illegally removed because she held her appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power. The trial court also refused to allow a collateral attack on the qualifications of the directors who voted for her removal. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and then appealed. The Court of Appeals, finding that the appeal raised no factual issues and involved only questions of law, certified the case to the Supreme Court, which decided it on the assignments of error raised by the appellant.

Facts

Doctor Pardo de Tavera had been in the continuous practice of medicine since 1945 and sat on the Board of Directors of the Society in representation of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. In August 1972 she was designated Acting Executive Secretary while the incumbent, Doctor Jose Y. Buktaw, was on leave. In the organizational meeting of April 25, 1973, upon the retirement of Doctor Buktaw, the Board appointed her Executive Secretary, and she was informed of the appointment in a letter dated April 27, 1973, which fixed her compensation and allowances but stated no term of office.

On May 29, 1974, the Board of Directors declared her position vacant and, in the same meeting, appointed Doctor Alberto Romulo to the position. She was not informed of any cause for her separation. She then sued the Society, the directors who voted for her removal, and Doctor Romulo, praying for damages, moral and exemplary, and for reinstatement with payment of salaries and benefits.

The defendants answered that the position was held at the pleasure of the Board under the Code of By-Laws, that the directors were qualified when elected, and that any challenge to their qualifications came too late and could not be raised collaterally. One director moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint was in truth a quo warranto proceeding and had prescribed after one year.

Issues

• Whether or not the action is one for quo warranto, governed by the one-year period counted from ouster, rather than an ordinary action for damages.
• Whether or not the plaintiff was illegally removed from her position as Executive Secretary in violation of the Code of By-Laws, the Civil Code, and the Constitution.
• Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the guaranty against removal without just cause and due process of law under the Civil Service Law.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7.02 of the Code of By-Laws of the Society, on tenure of office, provides:

Section 7.02. Tenure of Office. All executive officers of the Society except the Executive Secretary and the Auditor, shall be elected by the Board of Directors, for a term of one year, and shall hold office until their successors are elected and have qualified. The Executive Secretary, the Auditor and all other officers and employees of the Society shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board of Directors, unless their term of employment shall have been fixed in their contract of employment.

This is the provision that governs the tenure of the Executive Secretary and defeats the claim of unlawful removal.

Section 7.04 of the same Code, on removal of officers and employees, provides:

Section 7.04. Removal of Officers and Employees. All officers and employees shall be subject to suspension or removal for a sufficient cause at any time by affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the Board of Directors, except that employees appointed by the President alone or by the other officers alone at the pleasure of the officer appointing him.

This is the provision the petitioner invoked, but the Court held it inapplicable because her tenure was fixed by Section 7.02, not by the removal clause.

Section 7.01 of the same Code, on officers of the Society, provides:

Section 7.01. Officers of the Society. The executive officers of the Society shall be the President, a Vice-President, a Treasurer, who shall be elected by the Board of Directors, an Executive Secretary, and an Auditor, who shall be appointed by the Board of Directors, all of whom shall exercise the functions, powers and prerogatives generally vested upon such officers, the functions hereinafter set out for their respective offices and such other duties as from time to time may be prescribed by the Board of Directors. One person may hold more than one office except when the functions thereof are incompatible with each other.

This confirms that the Executive Secretary is an officer of the Society, appointed by the Board, and therefore subject to the tenure rule of Section 7.02.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the nature of an action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action, not by the defenses raised in the answer. Although the complaint sought reinstatement, the relief demanded does not characterize the action; what controls is the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled on the facts alleged. The Court observed that the action was brought not only against the officer appointed in her place but also against the Society and the past and present directors, and that Doctor Romulo was sued merely as the present occupant of the office. Since the respondents, except for one, were not actually holding the office in question, the suit could not be one for quo warranto, and the one-year period did not apply. The action, being one for injury to rights, had to be brought within four years under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. It was therefore timely.

On the second issue, the Court held that the action, though not barred, would not prosper. The Executive Secretary holds office at the pleasure of the Board of Directors unless a fixed term is stipulated in a contract of employment. The letter of appointment fixed compensation and allowances but no term, and the reference to a permanent appointment in the minutes merely distinguished it from an acting appointment. An appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power is in essence temporary, co-extensive with the desire of the Board. When the Board replaces the incumbent, there is no removal but only an expiration of term, and on expiration there is no need of prior notice, due hearing, or sufficient cause. The protection of the removal clause cannot therefore be claimed. The Court also held that the general provisions of the Civil Code on human relations and the constitutional principles on human dignity are mere guides for conduct in the absence of specific legal provisions, and must yield to the specific by-law governing her tenure, which she accepted upon appointment. The Board's act of declaring the position vacant was in accordance with the by-laws and met the standards of honesty and good faith, having arisen from the desire of the Board to reorganize itself.

On the third issue, the Court found it unnecessary to resolve whether the petitioner fell within the protective mantle of the Civil Service Law, because there was no removal in her case but merely an expiration of term under Section 7.02 of the Code of By-Laws.

Doctrine

• The nature of an action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action, not by the defenses set up in the answer; the relief demanded does not characterize the action where the facts alleged entitle the plaintiff to a different relief.
• A suit is not one for quo warranto where the respondents, except for the person appointed in the plaintiff's stead, are not actually holding the office in question; the one-year period for quo warranto does not apply, and the action for injury to rights prescribes in four years under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
• An officer who holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power holds an appointment temporary in essence, co-extensive with the desire of that power; when the appointing power replaces the incumbent, there is no removal but an expiration of term, requiring no notice, hearing, or cause.
• The general provisions of the Civil Code on human relations and the constitutional principles on human dignity are guides for conduct in the absence of specific legal provisions and definite contractual stipulations; a specific by-law governing tenure, accepted upon appointment, limits the officer's rights under them.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that the petitioner was not illegally removed or ousted from her position as Executive Secretary of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power is temporary in essence, so its termination is an expiration of term, not a removal, and needs no cause, notice, or hearing. Examiners use this case to test the complaint-allegations rule in characterizing an action, the distinction between removal and expiration of term, and the hierarchy between specific by-laws and the general human relations provisions of the Civil Code.