MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

The company controverted
the claim on several grounds, namely, (1) the deceased contracted
tuberculosis not because of the nature of his employment but due to his
poor health and lack of care of his body; (2) the company has always
provided all means necessary to protect the health of its employees but
the deceased failed to avail of them (3) after separation from the
service an employee is no longer entitled to medical treatment; (4) an
employer is not an insurer of the life and health of its employees; (5)
the claim has already prescribed; (6) the company has already settled
in full whatever claim may be due the deceased; and (7) the claim
states no valid cause of action.

After
hearing on the merits, Juan N. Gerardo, hearing officer, rendered
decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit having found that
the deceased died of a cause independent of his employment and not
arising in the course thereof.

Claimants filed a petition for review with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, and on March 9,1961, Associate Commissioner Cesareo
Perez rendered decision reversing that of the hearing officer, holding
that the illness of the deceased was aggravated by the nature of his
work as train conductor, and so he ordered the company to pay the
claimants the sum of P3,455.71 as death benefits, to reimburse them the
sum of P200.00 for burial expenses, to pay the amount of P259.18 as
attorney’s fees, and pay the Commission the sum of P35.00 as fees
pursuant to law. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the
company interposed the present petition for review.

Domingo Punzal, husband and father respectively of the claimants, was employed by the Manila Railroad Company as brakeman from January 16, 1929 to September 30, 1929. He was dismissed from the service on January 1, 1931. Seven years later, or on January 1, 1936, he was reemployed as assistant train conductor who continued as such up to December 8, 1941. On April 1, 1946, he was reemployed as brakeman until September 15, 1948. From this date up to October 3, 1957,
when he died, he was employed as assistant train conductor. As
assistant train conductor his duties were to revise passenger tickets,
to attend to the signalling of the engine
man both while the train is in motion as well as when the train is to
depart; to see that the brakes are in good condition; to help the
passengers carry their luggages in boarding the train as well as in disembarking; to load and unload baggages
and merchandise in the freight train; and to travel by night under all
kinds of weather conditions. He was not given any pre-employment X-ray
examination and so he was presumed to be physically fit and free from
tuberculosis. On April 1, 1957,
he applied for optional retirement on the ground of physical disability
alleging that one of his lungs was afflicted with tuberculosis. He was
extended medical treatment by the company and in fact he was given
leave of absence without pay from June 2 to September 30, 1957. He was treated in the Quezon Institute on October 3, 1957 where he was found suffering moderately from tuberculosis, and on that same date he died.

From
the facts found by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner there is no
doubt that the deceased contracted tuberculosis during his employment
as train conductor in the Manila Railroad Company and that that
sickness was aggravated due to the nature of the work undertaken by him
which finally brought him to his grave. The record, however, shows that
the deceased died on October 3, 1957, and yet the present complaint was filed by his heirs only on September 28, 1959,
or more than 20 months from the death of the deceased. This is contrary
to what Section 24 of Act 3428 provides to the effect that no
compensation under the law shall prosper unless the claim for
compensation, in case of death, is made not later than 3 months after death.
In a recent case, this Court said: “This section establishes a
condition precedent to the maintenance of any compensation proceeding
under the Act. It requires previous notice of the injury or sickness as
well as previous claim for compensation within a period fixed in either
case. Non-compliance with that requirement bars recovery for
compensation” (Luzon Stevedoring Company vs. Hon. Cesareo
de Leon, et al., 106 Phil., 562). It is clear, therefore, that the
claimants failed to comply with the condition precedent for the filing
of their claim, and, hence, non-compliance therewith is a bar to
recovery of compensation.

It is, therefore, with regret that we have to reverse the decision of respondent Commission, without pronouncement as to costs.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.