ARSENIO DELA CRUZ, PEDRO SANGABOL AND LUCIA GUTIERREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. VIRGILIO D. POBRE YÑIGO WHO TOOK OVER AND REPLACED THE HON. FLORENDO P. AQUINO, JUDGE OF THE COURT O…

This is a petition for
review on certiorari to set aside the decision of Judge Florendo P. Aquino and the orders
of Judge Virgilio D. Pobre
of the respondent Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija sitting as a Cadastral Court in Cadastral Case No. 67 LRC CAD. REC. NO. 1556 entitled “In Re:  Petition for Continuation of Cadastral
Proceedings, Potenciano Reaño,
petitioner.”

The instant petition for
review is factually related to another petition in Dela
Cruz v. Reaño (34 SCRA 585) decided on August 31, 1970 bearing on the same issue and subject matter
and decided against herein private respondent.

The facts as set forth in
Dela Cruz v. Reaño docketed
as G.R. No. L-29792, and which are reiterated in the present petition are:

“Pursuant to Homestead
Patent No. V-31853 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, by authority of the President of the Philippines, on July 28, 1954, in accordance
with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1870 was issued in the name of Simeon Gutierrez by the Office of
the Register of Deeds for the Province
of Nueva Ecija
on August 18, 1956.  It covered Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of plan
H-105846 (hereinafter referred to simply as Lots 1, 2 and 3) – identical in
technical description and in area to Lots 1896, 1914 and 1913, respectively, of
the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (certificate issued by the Acting District Land
Officer of Nueva Ecija on
July 11, 1968 marked as Annex A-1 and appearing at p. 12 of the record).

“In the course of time Lots 1 and 2 were acquired by
petitioner Arsenio dela
Cruz in whose name Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-69521 was issued.  Dela Cruz also
acquired Lot 3-A of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69137, with an
area of 12,482 square meters, the same being a portion of Lot 3 (which
corresponds to Lot No. 1913 of the Sta.
Rosa Cadastre), Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-70380
having been issued in his name.

“On the other hand, petitioner Pedro Sangabol
acquired Lot No. 3-C of the aforesaid subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-69137, the same being a portion of 30.003 sq.m. of Lot No. 3, and as a result Transfer Certificate of Title
No. NT-69551 was issued in his name and that of his wife, Francisca del Rosario.

“It further appears that by virtue of a partition agreement
inscribed on June 16, 1967, Lot 3-B of same subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-69137 – the remaining portion of Lot 3 – was acquired by the other
petitioner, Lucia Gutierrez, to whom Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-70251
was issued.

“On May 16, 1966 – more than ten years after the issuance of Homestead Patent No.
V-31853 and a little less than ten years after the issuance
of Original Certificate of Title No. P-1870 – private respondent Potenciano Reaño filed in
Cadastral Case No. 67 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija a verified ‘Petition for Continuation of
Cadastral Proceedings’ (Italics supplied), alleging, substantially, that he was
the owner of a parcel of land covered by Plan Psu-66102 approved by the
Director of Lands on November 15, 1929, having acquired it from the previous
owner, Pedro Padilla, who subsequently allowed it to be subdivided into 30
cadastral lots with an aggregate area identical to that of the land described
in the aforesaid plan; that he had sufficient evidence to prove his title
thereto and, on the strength of said allegations, prayed for the lifting of the order of general default entered in said Cadastral Case No.
67, and that, after the proper proceedings, decision be rendered adjudicating
the aforesaid lots in his favor.

“On November 16 of the same year, Judge Serafin
R. Cuevas, then presiding the lower court, rendered judgment adjudicating a
number of lots in favor of Potenciano Reano, among them being Lots 1896, 1913 and 1914 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.  On June 6, 1968, alleging that, pursuant to
said decision, the decree of registration as well as the corresponding original
certificates of title No. 3187 (for Cadastral Lot No. 1896); No. 3178 (for Id.
Lot No. 1913), and No. 3176 (for Id. Lot No. 1914) had been issued in his name,
said respondent filed an ex-parte motion with the
lower court praying for the issuance of a writ of possession directing any officer
of the law to place him in
physical possession of the lands covered by said titles.  This petition was heard and subsequently
granted ex-parte. 
It was only when the writ of possession issued on the 11th of the same
month was served upon petitioners that they learned of the proceedings
instituted by Reano and discovered that Cadastral Lots Nos. 1896, 1913 and 1914 –
which were already covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1870 issued since August 18, 1956 in the name of their
predecessor in interest, Simeon Gutierrez – were among those adjudicated to Reano.  Consequently,
they filed with the lower court a verified motion to set aside the writ of
possession, but the same was denied by the
respondent judge in his order of October
4, 1968.  Their motion for reconsideration filed
thereafter having been likewise denied by His Honor in an order of October 29,
of the same year, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari
x x x.”

From the above orders in L-29792, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction with this Court on November 12, 1968 praying for annulment of the writs of possession and the questioned orders.

As earlier stated, a
decision was promulgated on August 31, 1970 in Dela
Cruz v. Reano granting the writ of certiorari
and declaring as of no legal effect whatsoever and setting aside the writs of
possession issued by the respondent Judge in Cadastral Case No. 67, GLRO Record
No. 1556 in relation to Lots Nos. 1896, 1913 and 1914 of the Cadastral Survey
of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.

However, Reano continued the cadastral proceedings before Judge Florenzo Aquino who issued
another decision in the same cadastral proceedings earlier raised to the
Supreme Court, again adjudicating the same properties, Lots Nos. 1896,
1913 and 1914, to respondent Potenciano Reano.  The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, after affirming the order of general default heretofore
entered, the Court hereby adjudicates Lots Nos. 1836, 1837, 1839, 1840, 1841,
1842, 1849, 1850, 1851, 1852, 1867, 2427, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2503, 2519,
and 2521 of the Sta. Rosa Cadastre with all the improvements thereon, in favor
of ROSALINA Z. TIONGCO, Filipino citizen, single, and resident of 1635 Taft
Avenue, Manila; and Lots Nos. 1788, 1789, 1845, 1846, 1847, 1848, 1853, 1854,
1855, 1876, 2223, 2482, 1044, 1259, 1843,
1857, 1858, 1859, 1863, 1877, 1888, 1890, 1892, 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896,
1912, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 2224, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, and 2317 also
of the Sta. Rosa Cadastre with all the improvements thereon in favor of the
spouses POTENCIANO REAÑO and SALUD DE CASTRO, Filipinos, and residents of 9
Chico Street, United Parañaque Subdivision, Parañaque, Rizal.

The Court further orders the spouses Potenciano
Reaño and Salud de Castro
to pay and reimburse Hilarion Cajucom
and Conrado Talampas One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for every hectare of the 25
hectares, more or less and One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos for
every hectare of the 14 hectares, more or less, respectively, which they
occupied and improved, within a period of one (1) year from the date this
decision shall have become final and executory.

All homestead patents or
free patents covering areas in the premises in question issued by the Director
of Lands after January 18, 1934
are hereby declared null and void.

The writ of possession heretofore issued in favor of Rosalina Tiongco is hereby
ordered dissolved.

After this decision shall have become final and upon submission to
this Court proof of payment of all the real estate taxes due on the land, let
the corresponding decrees be issued in their favor.

The petitioners filed a
motion to set aside the decision alleging inter alia
that (1) the question of the validity of the titles of petitioners had already
been determined in Dela Cruz v. Reano (34 SCRA
585) and (2) consequently the said court had no jurisdiction to decide the
question of ownership of titled properties especially in this case where the
Supreme Court had already made a ruling adverse to the claim of Potenciano Reaño.

The lower court denied
the motion to set aside the decision. 
The dispositive portion of the order reads:

THE FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds no sufficient
reason for disturbing the Decision rendered in this case, except to modify it
as to remove the Lots covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. P-275,
P-241 and P-695 in the names of Mariano Juan (or Heirs of Mariano Juan), Simeon
Juan and Agustin Fiesta respectively, from those to be adjudicated to Potenciano Reaño, and denies the
Motions for Reconsideration and to Set Aside the Decision, in all other
respects.

The petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the respondent court as
follows:

WHEREFORE, counsel for Pontenciano Reaño is invited to come to this Court to locate and
identify the decisions referred to in his Manifestation, or, if he deems it
more convenient, to forward to this Court certified true copies of said
decisions, underlining pertinent parts.

On the Manifestation on Approval of Record on Appeal, having
reference to (1) the objections to the Record on Appeal, dated 16 January 1972,
and (2) Manifestation dated 15 February 1972 containing list of pleadings,
orders and decisions, sought to be incorporated into the Record on Appeal, this
Court DENIES the motions contained in those Manifestations.

On the Motion for Reconsideration filed for petitioners Arsenio de la Cruz, Pedro Sangabol
and Lucia Gutierrez dated 2 January 1973, which sought to have this Court
reverse its earlier ruling denying a Motion to Set Aside Decision filed by the
same petitioner and dated 25 January 1972,

“this Court hereby DENIES said motion
for lack of sufficient grounds for granting the same.  The opinion of this Court on the matter has
been fully expressed in its Order dated 26 October 1972; wherein it refused to change or set
aside the Decision of the Judge who heard and received the evidence in full,
except with respect to three lots mentioned in said order.”

The petitioners raised the denials to us praying that judgment be
entered annulling the respondent court’s decision insofar as Lots Nos. 1896,
1913, and 1914 are concerned.

The petitioners contend
that the decision of the lower court is null and void because:

“1.    The decision of this Honorable Court in G.R.
No. L-29792 is res adjudicata
and constitutes a bar to another decision on the same matter;

“2.    The
cadastral court cannot validly readjudicate a
property which is already
registered in the name of another;

“3.    The
Torrens System of Registration protects parties who deal
with registered properties;

“4.    The
procedure taken by the lower court violates all known procedures and derogates
on the due process clause.”

On the other hand,
private respondent Reaño submits that when the
petition in cadastral Case No. 67 was filed by the Director of Lands before the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
on January 14, 1934, the cadastral court acquired original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter in rem
to determine the nature and character of those lots, and until such time as the
cadastral proceedings are terminated and a determination of the character of
the lots in question are pronounced by final judgment, no disposition of the
lots or land in question may be entertained, much more approved, granted or amended in favor of
any individual.  Reano
states that to do so would violate the jurisdiction of the cadastral court.

The private respondent
disputes the res judicata
argument and contends that while there is identity of parties and identity of
subject matter as between L-29792 and the present petition, there is a great
difference insofar as their respective causes of action are concerned.  According to respondent Reaño,
the petition in L-29792 sought to nullify the writ of possession based on the November
16, 1966 decision of
the respondent court while the instant petition in L-39899 challenges the later
decision which adjudicated the disputed lots to the respondent.

We grant the petition.

It is quite clear that
the issues raised in this petition had already been resolved by this Court when
we granted the petition in L-29792.  What
the respondent court is trying to accomplish is to render inutile our decision
in L-29792 and to promulgate a judgment on the same facts and issues in the
case now before us, contrary to our earlier findings.

The private respondent
questions the title issued pursuant to a homestead patent by stating that the
cadastral court had earlier acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lots and no
other office or tribunal may entertain, much less approve a disposition of the
lots until the cadastral proceedings are terminated.  This was the exact issue resolved by this
Court in L-29792.  The then Presiding
Judge Serafin R. Cuevas adjudicated Lots 1896, 1913,
and 1914 to Reaño. 
Pursuant to the court’s decision, the decree of registration and
corresponding certificates of title were issued in favor of Reaño.  When Reaño sought
to enforce writs of possession granted ex parte to
him, the petitioners in the instant petition filed a motion to set aside the
writs.  A denial of this motion and of a
subsequent motion for reconsideration led to L-29792.  We ruled in L-29792:

“The issue arising from the above facts may be briefly stated
as follows:

“May a parcel of land already titled for more than ten years
in the name of a party by virtue of a Homestead Patent issued by the Government
in the ordinary course of administrative proceedings, be registered again in
the name of another party as a result of subsequent cadastral proceedings?

“The answer, We believe, must be in
the negative.

“In Manalo v. Lukban,
et al., Vol. 48, Phil. p. 973, We held that land granted by the Government to a
private individual who applied for it as a homestead, is considered no longer registerable within the meaning of the Land Registration
Act after the issuance of the homestead patent and the original certificate of
title issued in accordance therewith.

“In Pamintuan v. San Agustin, et
al., 43 Phil. 558, as well as in El Hogar Filipino v.
Olviga, 60 Phil., p. 17, We likewise held that in a
cadastral proceeding the Court has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed and registered in an earlier registration
case, and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void.

“Moreover, considering that the petitioners in both cases
before Us and their predecessors had been in possession of the land, first as
homesteaders and later, as absolute owners, for more than ten years before
respondent Reaño filed his application for
registration; that, as a result of the proceedings had in connection with their
Homestead application, the homestead patents and original certificates of title
mentioned heretofore were issued in their names, no further argument is needed
to show that said petitioners and their predecessors had acquired title to the
land by prescription.

“It being clear from the foregoing that the registration decreed
in the name of private respondent Reano of Lots 1896,
1914, 1913 and 1863 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija is null and void, the certificates of title
covering the same issued in his name must also be deemed null and void.  From this the inevitable conclusion is that
he had no right to the issuance of the writs of possession complained of.”

As a matter of fact, the cases filed with the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija in
L-29792 and in the instant petition, L-39899 are both petitions for the
continuation of one and the same cadastral proceeding.

When the respondent Judge
in this petition ruled that “all homestead patents and free patents
covering areas in the premises in question issued by the Director of Lands
after January 18, 1934 are hereby declared null and
void”, he was overruling the following findings of the Supreme Court in
L-29792:

“(1)         Pursuant
to Homestead Patent No. V-31853 granted on July 28, 1954, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1870
was issued in the name of Simeon Gutierrez on August 18, 1956, the same
covering Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Plan H-105846 which, beyond question,
correspond to Lots 1896, 1914 and 1913 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, respectively.

“As official duty is presumed to have been duly performed and
the Homestead Patent and Original Certificate of Title abovementioned are
entitled to full credit in the absence of clear proof that they were issued
illegally or through fraud, it can be safely said that prior to the issuance of
the aforesaid Homestead Patent, Simeon Gutierrez had filed the corresponding
homestead application; that, after the necessary survey had been made and
proper notice was served, the required investigation was conducted by the
State; that applicant Gutierrez was found to have been in possession of the property applied for and to have made
thereon the required cultivation.  That
Gutierrez had really been in possession of said land from the time of the
filing of his homestead application, and that his successors in interest had
continued such possession and are still enjoying the same, is further
demonstrated by these facts:  firstly,
respondent Reano had to file a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession to oust them and, in turn, to obtain possession
of Lots 1896, 1940 (should be 1914) and 1913; secondly, on May 16, 1966, Reano filed in Cadastral Case No. 67, a ‘Petition for
Continuation of Cadastral Proceedings’ and for the setting aside of the order
of general default already entered therein; all of which necessarily
means that Pedro Padilla, his alleged predecessors in interest, had not
claimed Lots 1896, 1914 and 1913 when the proceedings were started.

“(2)    It was only on May 16, 1966 or more than ten years
after the issuance of the Homestead Patent in favor of Simeon Gutierrez, and
nearly ten years after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-1870
that private respondent Reano filed a petition to
register in his name the same cadastral lots.”

The decision in L-29792
has long been final.  The dispositive portion of our decision in said petition cannot
be any clearer –

“WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari prayed for in the
above-entitled cases are granted and, as a consequence, the writs of possession
issued by the respondent judge in Cadastral Case No. 67, GLRO Record No. 1556
in relation to Lots Nos. 1896, 1914, 1913 and 1863 of the Cadastral Survey of
Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, are
hereby set aside and rendered of no legal effect whatsoever:  With costs against the private
respondent.”

The essential requisites
for the existence of res judicata
are:

“The essential requisites for the existence of res judicata
are:  (1) the former judgment must be
final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions:  (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of
subject matter; and (c) identity of cause of action.  – Ipekdjian
Merchandising Co., Inc., v. Court of Tax Appeals, 9 SCRA 72; Philippine
Farming Corporation, Ltd. v. Llanos, 14 SCRA 949; Abes
v. Rodil, 17 SCRA 822; Cruz v. Mossesgeld, 24 SCRA 1006.”

All of the above requisites are present in this action.

We reiterate what we
stated in Festin v. Faderanga
(111 SCRA 1):

“x x x The law as to this particular controversy has thus been
enunciated.  To repeat, the parties, now
petitioners and now respondents, who litigated the same matter in Faderanga, must abide by such judgment.  As categorically stated in Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons (116
Phil. 589 [1962]):  ‘It need not be stated that the
Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought
before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that
particular case.’ (Ibid, 594) This Court has likewise noted the amplitude of
its coverage.  What is express as well as
what is implied in a decision is included, to be implemented faithfully, no circumvention or evasion being allowed.  (Cf. Sanchez v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 27 SCRA 490.  The Sanchez
opinion cited People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494.  The Olarte opinion
in turn finds support in Fernando v. Crisostomo, 90
Phil. 595 [1951]; Padilla v. Paterno, 93 Phil. 884
[1953]; Samahang Magsasaka,
Inc. v. Chua Guan, 96 Phil. 974 [1955]; People v. Penuila,
103 Phil. 992 [1958], and Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, 107 Phil. 50 [1960]) Recently, in Bueno
Industrial and Development Corporation v. R.C. Aquino
Timber and Plywood Co., Inc., (99 SCRA 209) it was noted how steadfast this
Court has been in relying on such concept. 
(Cf. Libudan v. Gil, 45 SCRA 17; Palad v. Governor of Quezon Province, 46 SCRA 354; Rodriguez v. Director of
Prisons, 47 SCRA 153; Mangayao v. De Guzman, 55 SCRA
540; National Shipyard and Steel
Corporation v. CIR, 57 SCRA 642; Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union v. Lo Bu, 63
SCRA 313; National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna; 83 SCRA 607;
Villanueva v. WCC, 84 SCRA 423; Gokongwei, Jr. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 89 SCRA 336.)”

In Tugade v. Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226), we had occasion to remind all
lower courts and, in fact, all practitioners that when the Supreme Court has
rendered a decision, it is this Tribunal, not the trial
court or the appellate court, that speaks authoritatively.  We stated:

“x x Respondent Court of Appeals
really was devoid of any choice at all.  It could not have ruled in any other
way on the legal question raised.  This
Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. 
It is as simple as that.  There is
relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (34 SCRA 98). ‘The delicate
task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal
ordinance is committed to the
judiciary.  It thus discharges a role no
less crucial than that
appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law.  To
assure stability in legal relations
and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice.  It does so with finality, logically and
rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court.  What it says then should be definitive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial heirarchy.  They have
to defer and to submit.’ (The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 [1937] was cited) The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera
further emphasizes the point:  ‘Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion
of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words:  ‘Judge Gaudenio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by
tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on
what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy.  There is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their bearings.’ (Justice J.B.L. Reyes
spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila [Br. VI], 23 SCRA
948, 961).”

We agree with the
petitioners that under the circumstances of this petition, the payment of
lawyer’s fees are justified and which fees we award in the amount of P3,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the questioned
decision and orders of the respondent court are hereby nullified and set aside
insofar as Lots Nos. 1896, 1914 and 1913 are concerned.  The private respondent is also ordered to pay
P5,000.00 attorney’s fees and costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Relova, JJ., concur.