SPOUSES JAIME AND PURIFICACION MORTA, COMPLAINANTS VS. JUDGE ANTONIO C. BAGAGÑAN, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, GUINOBATAN, ALBAY; AND SHERIFF DANILO O. MATIAS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, B…

Morta versus Bagagñan

The Case

This is an administrative case brought by Spouses Jaime and Purificacion Morta against Judge Antonio Bagagñan of the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay, and Sheriff Danilo Matias of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay. The spouses charged the judge with gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, bias, and delay, and the sheriff with gross ignorance of the law, negligence, and connivance with the defendants in their civil cases for damages. The case matters because it fixes two working rules every judge and every sheriff must remember: a judge who leaves a pending motion unresolved beyond the reglementary period is administratively liable, and a sheriff who delays execution and fails to render periodic returns is likewise liable. Both rest on one time-honored principle: justice delayed is justice denied.

Procedural History

The spouses filed their administrative complaint with the Supreme Court, which referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation. The Office of the Court Administrator found the judge's explanation for not issuing a writ of possession sufficient, held that the delay in resolving the contempt motion was due to the need to clarify important matters, and recommended dismissal of the charges against him. It found the sheriff remiss, however, and recommended a fine of one thousand pesos with a warning. The Supreme Court, in this original administrative proceeding, modified those findings and recommended penalties, consistent with Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

Facts

The spouses were the plaintiffs in two civil cases for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction before the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay. On March 29, 1994, that court rendered judgment in their favor. It ordered the defendants not to molest them in their peaceful possession of the lands in San Rafael, Guinobatan, and condemned the defendants to pay damages and legal expenses in the amounts stated in the decision. The defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, which dismissed the cases on the ground that the claims were tenancy-related and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On petition for review, the Supreme Court, in a decision dated June 10, 1999, affirmed the Municipal Trial Court and set aside the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court.

Despite that final and executory decision, the spouses say the judge refused to issue a writ of possession in their favor. On June 6, 2000, they filed a motion to cite Jaime Occidental for contempt. More than a year passed, and the motion remained unresolved. As against the sheriff, they alleged that he failed to execute the writ in full and took a long time to submit his return of service.

The judge explained that he denied the writ of possession because, by the time the Supreme Court decided the civil cases, the spouses had already been ousted from the lots by virtue of a final decision in a DARAB case and a decision in another civil case in which he had ordered them to vacate. On the contempt motion, he said he had conducted an ocular inspection and a hearing as early as June 16, 2000, and that the hearing was deferred with the consent of counsel pending receipt of the sheriff's report in the other civil case. The sheriff admitted the delay, attributing it to heavy workload, and begged for compassion.

Issues

• Whether or not Judge Bagagñan is administratively liable for refusing to issue a writ of execution or possession in favor of the spouses.
• Whether or not Judge Bagagñan is administratively liable for undue delay in resolving the motion to cite a party for contempt.
• Whether or not Sheriff Matias is administratively liable for delay in the full implementation of the writ of execution and for failure to render the required periodic reports.

Applicable Provisions

Section 15, paragraph 1, of Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

This fixes the three-month period within which the judge should have resolved the pending motion.

Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.

This is the mandatory rule the sheriff violated when he filed his return only six months after receiving the writ and submitted no periodic reports in the meantime.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court agreed with the Office of the Court Administrator that the judge acted correctly in not issuing a writ of execution or possession. His action was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision affirming the Municipal Trial Court as to damages. The order directing the defendants not to molest the spouses in their peaceful possession had been rendered moot when the spouses were ousted by virtue of the final and executory judgments in the DARAB case and the other civil case. The Court held that execution of a final judgment may be refused when there has been a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the delay in resolving the contempt motion was an altogether different matter. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins trial judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases and motions within the required periods. The unexplained failure of judges to resolve motions within the reglementary period of ninety days renders them administratively liable. The ocular inspection served only to mitigate the infraction, not to absolve the judge from it. The absence of the sheriff's return on the writ of demolition was a valid reason to defer action at the outset, but not an excuse for prolonged inaction, especially since that writ had been fully executed as early as February 25, 1998, and the return made on March 17, 1998. The judge could have requested a copy of the report so that he could rule with dispatch.

On the third issue, the Court held the sheriff remiss in his duty to implement the writ fully. Those tasked to implement court orders must see to it that execution is carried out promptly, for a decision left unexecuted or delayed indefinitely because of the sheriff's inefficiency or negligence remains an empty victory for the prevailing party. A writ of execution was issued on November 22, 1999, but the sheriff's return was filed only on May 25, 2000, six months later, and no periodic report was submitted before then. Heavy workload cannot absolve him from administrative sanctions. The charge of connivance, however, was dismissed for lack of basis.

Doctrine

First, the unexplained failure of a judge to decide cases and resolve motions and incidents within the reglementary period of ninety days, fixed by the Constitution and the law, renders the judge administratively liable for undue delay. Second, execution of a final judgment may be refused when there has been a change in the situation of the parties that would make its execution inequitable. Third, a sheriff is administratively liable for simple neglect of duty when he fails to implement a writ promptly and to render the return and periodic reports required by Section 14 of Rule 39, which are mandatory. Fourth, any inordinate delay in the execution of judgment is deplorable and cannot be countenanced, because justice delayed is justice denied.

Disposition

Judge Bagagñan was found guilty of unreasonable delay and fined eleven thousand pesos with a stern warning, while Sheriff Matias was ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his one-month salary, also with a warning of stiffer sanctions for repetition.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the unexplained failure of judges to resolve motions within the ninety-day reglementary period renders them administratively liable, and a sheriff's delay in execution and failure to render periodic returns constitute simple neglect of duty. Examiners use this case for administrative liability of judges and sheriffs, and for the rule that execution may be refused when a change in the situation of the parties makes it inequitable.