ROMEO M. BERNAL, JR., PETITIONER, VS. INMATES POST EXCHANGE (IPX), BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NBP RESERVATION, REP. BY RODOLFO ESQUITA AND ALFREDO MEMIJE, AND THE OFFICE OF THE OMBU…

Bernal versus Inmates Post Exchange

The Case

This is a petition for review filed by Romeo M. Bernal, Jr., an accountant of the Inmate Post Exchange of the Bureau of Corrections, against the Inmate Post Exchange and the Office of the Ombudsman. Bernal was found guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty and suspended for one month without pay. After he had already served that suspension, the Ombudsman, acting only on a motion for reconsideration filed by a co-respondent, modified its own decision and raised his penalty to one year without pay. The case matters because it fixes the limits of the Ombudsman's disciplinary power: the Ombudsman cannot motu proprio, meaning on its own initiative, reopen and increase a penalty that has already become final and executory.

Procedural History

The Inmate Post Exchange, through Rodolfo Esquita and Alfredo Memije, filed an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Dishonesty, and violation of Republic Act Number 6713 against Bernal and several co-respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman. On May 27, 2008, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding Bernal, Arnold Chua, and Superintendent Juanito Leopando guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty and imposing suspension of one month without pay. Cynthia Ines was found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and suspended for one year. Only Ines filed a motion for reconsideration.

In May 2010, Bernal received a special order from the Director of the Bureau of Corrections enforcing the decision, and he served his suspension in June 2010. On August 23, 2011, acting on Ines's motion, the Ombudsman denied that motion but modified its earlier decision, raising the penalty of Bernal, Chua, and Leopando to one year without pay for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Bernal's motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated March 20, 2012. He then filed this petition for review under Rule 43, attributing grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman.

Facts

Bernal served as accountant of the Inmate Post Exchange. An administrative complaint was lodged against him and several co-employees before the Office of the Ombudsman. On May 27, 2008, the Ombudsman found him guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty and suspended him for one month without pay.

That decision became final as to Bernal, and it was enforced. In May 2010 he received the special order of the Bureau of Corrections Director, and he served the one-month suspension in June 2010.

Only Ines, whose one-year suspension was appealable, filed a motion for reconsideration. On August 23, 2011, the Ombudsman denied her motion but, on its own, modified the May 27, 2008 decision and increased Bernal's penalty to one year without pay. Bernal's motion for reconsideration was denied on March 20, 2012, prompting this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when, despite the absence of a motion for reconsideration from Bernal, it modified its May 27, 2008 decision by increasing his penalty, which penalty had in the meantime been served in full.

Applicable Provisions

Section 12 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states the mandate of the Ombudsman:

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

This provision defines the protective role of the Ombudsman but, as the Court holds, confers no power to review its own final decisions on its own initiative.

Section 7 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, governs finality and execution of decisions:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the motion for reconsideration.

This is the decisive provision: because Bernal's suspension did not exceed one month, the decision against him was final, executory, and unappealable.

Ruling

The Court granted the petition. It held that the Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution, intended to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to carry out its mandate as protector of the people. Section 15 of Republic Act Number 6770 gives it full administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to determine and impose the appropriate penalty. But that power is not without limit. Nowhere in the Constitution or in the law is the Ombudsman vested with authority to review its decisions motu proprio.

Applying Section 7 of Rule III, the Court reasoned that the remedies of Bernal and Ines were different. Bernal's one-month suspension made the decision against him final, executory, and unappealable, while Ines's one-year suspension fell under the phrase in all other cases and was appealable under Rule 43. Since Bernal's penalty had become final and executory, the Ombudsman lost jurisdiction over the case. The Court invoked the rule on immutability of judgments: a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended, or modified, even to correct a perceived error of fact or law. The motion for reconsideration filed solely by Ines was not a supervening event, meaning a fact arising after finality, that could excuse the rule.

The Court also stressed due process. The modification without notice to or participation of Bernal was clearly unfair and prejudicial. The assailed orders were wholly void as to him, and a void judgment cannot attain finality.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, under Section 7 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, a decision imposing suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, is final, executory, and unappealable. Second, the Ombudsman has no authority to review its own decisions motu proprio; once a decision becomes final, the Ombudsman loses jurisdiction and may not increase the penalty. Third, the rule on immutability of judgments applies to quasi-judicial agencies, and a motion for reconsideration filed by one respondent does not reopen the final decision as to a co-respondent who did not appeal.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the orders of the Ombudsman increasing Bernal's penalty were annulled and set aside, and the May 27, 2008 decision as to him was reinstated and declared final and executory, the penalty therein having been duly served.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the Ombudsman cannot motu proprio modify a decision that has become final, and a one-month suspension is final, executory, and unappealable. Examiners use this case on the finality of Ombudsman decisions, the immutability of judgments in quasi-judicial bodies, and the limits of administrative disciplinary authority.