HERNANDO LAYNO, DELFIN CUETO, ENRIQUE LAYNO, JR., AND YOUNG MEN LABOR UNION STEVEDORES, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SURIGAO …

Petition for a writ of certiorari
to annul and set aside a writ of preliminary injunction (Petition Annex “C”)
issued by the Court of First Instance of Surigao del
Sur, in its Civil Case No. 11 (New), at the instance
of private respondent Lianga Hay Logging Co., Inc.,
and enjoining the defendants (petitioners in this Court) Layno, Cueto and Young Men Labor
Union Stevedores (Petition, Annex “C”) to

“individually and as a group, and AM. their agents, laborers
or other men as groups of men having privity with
them, desist under penalty of the law, from threatening, preventing, interfering
or molesting in any manner whatsoever, the plaintiff and the Diatagon Arrastre Co., Inc., the
corporation which the latter has contracted to under take its work, in the
towing and loading of export lops and lumber of the said plaintiff, and or
unloading its cargoes, and particularly the towing and loading of 1,700,000
board feet of logs on the SS HOHNAN MARU. This order shall continue in full
force and effect with respect to other vessels which in the future may be
chartered by the said plaintiff for loading export logs or lumber until this
present case for injunction will have born finally determined by this
Court.”

The case started in the court
below with a complaint of the Lianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc., charging that defendants (petitioners in this Court), through threats-and
intimidation, demanded that the corporation cancel its existing stevedoring
contract with the Diatagon Arrastre Co., Inc., so that the men affiliated to the Young
Men Labor Union should undertake the loading of export logs and lumber of the
company on the SS “Hohnan Maru“, defendants further threatening to prevent the
plaintiff from exporting its logs, abetted by defendant Layno, town mayor, who threatened to use the town police in
favor of the Union, to the irreparable damage of plaintiff. The Diatagon Arrastre Co., Inc., employed workers affiliated with the Diatagon Arrastre Workers’
Union.

Answering the petition,
defendants alleged that the logging company “avails itself of services of
stevedores who are members of (a) company dominated union”; that as the permit
issued in favor of the Diatagon Arrastre Workers’ Union had already expired, defendant Delfin Cueto, as officer of the
Young Men Labor Union advised the Workers federation that “henceforth the
defendant legitimate labor organization (i.e. the Young Men Labor Union) would
Undertake the loading of the plaintiff’s logs on board any ship or vessel coming
to Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur; and averred “that
the defendants never committed any threats or intimidation or an unlawful acts
prior to the filling of the case”; that plaintiff Company discriminated against
members of the defendant labor union in regard to employment of laborers or
stevedores. Subsequently, defendants below filed an urgent motion to dissolve
the writ of preliminary injunction, alleging lack of jurisdiction in the issuing
court, that the case was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations, and that the procedure laid down in Section 9 (d) of
Republic Act No. 875 had not been followed.

After hearing “the evidence
calculated to bring the matter within the purview of Section 9, R. A. 875”, and
finding that there were existing contracts between the Lianga Bay Logging Company and the Diatagon Arrastre Company, Inc.,
and between the latter and the Diatagon Arrastre Workers’ Union, the court below declined to lift
the injunction “subject to better proof during the trial on the merits of this
case”. A motion to reconsider having been subsequently denied also, the
defendants resorted to this Supreme Court for relief.

The petition filed in this
Supreme Court raises the question of the validity of the injunction, it being
contended that the same was improper for lack of jurisdiction and non-observance
of the conditions prescribed by section 9 of the Industrial Peace Act (R. A. No.
875).

We find no merit in the petition.

A striking feature of this case
is that the record fails to show any demand whatever made by petitioners herein
on the employees regarding terms or conditions of work. The defendant’s answer
in the court below (Annex “B” of the petition), which formed the basis of its
motion to lift the preliminary injunction, averred merely a notice on the rival
Diatagon Arrastre Workers’
Union, that the petitioning Young Men Labor Union would henceforth take the work
of loading and unloading logs on the ships, but did not claim any demand or
notice being made on respondent Logging Company nor on the Diatagon Arrastre Company other
than that its members be substituted for those of the Union With which a
contract existed.

In other words, what the
petitioners herein asked was not a change in working terms or conditions, or the
representation of the employees, but that its members be hired as stevedores in
the place of the members of the Diatagon Arrastre Workers’ Union, which petitioners wanted discharged
notwithstanding the existing contracts of the Arrastre
Company with the latter union, as expressly found by the trial court. It is
difficult to see how such a demand can be considered a labor dispute as the same
is defined in section 2 of the Industrial Peace Act (Associated Flour Haulers
vs. Sullivan, 5 NYS 2nd, 982, 985; Lauf vs. E. G.
Shinner & Co., 82 Fed. 2d, 68; United Electrical
Coal Companies vs. Rice, 80 Fed. 2d, 1; Fitzgerald vs. Dillon, 92 Fed. Supp., 681). As pointed out in Donnelly Garment Co. vs.
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, 21 Fed. Supp. 807, the
definitions of “labor disputes” in the Act must be confined to cases involving
that exercise of freedom of action of employees dealt with by the declared
public policy of protecting employees in their freedom of association and in the
designation of bargaining representatives. In the present case, the Young Men
Labor Association made no demands for better terms or conditions of work; for
aught that appears of record it was satisfied with those already existing.
Neither did it seek the right to represent the workers already employed; on the
contrary, it wanted them discharged and replaced by its own members. Such being
the case, there is no controversy over terms, tenure or conditions of
employment, or over representation of employees that called for the application
of the Industrial Peace Act.

With regard to the alleged unfair
labor practice of discriminating in favor of workers affiliated to the Arrastre Workers Union, it stands to reason that a mere
charge or allegation to that effect does not suffice to oust the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance any more than a simple averment that “no labor
dispute exists” would suffice to confer it. There is total absence of evidence
that the acts complained of were actually committed, or that an unfair labor
practice charge has been made, or is actually pending, in the Court of
Industrial Relations. None of these requirements is shown by the petitioners; in
truth, it is averred by the respondents herein, and is not denied, that
petitioners submitted no evidence in the Court of First Instance to support
their motion to lift the injunction; and the allegation is confirmed by the
absence of any reference in the petition to evidence produced before the trial
court. The very same thing can be stated of the alleged expiration of the permit
of the Diatagon Arrastre
Workers’ Union, and that the latter was company
dominated: no proof was submitted to substantiate the charge.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
dismissed, with costs against petitioners. The writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for not having been issued, because of failure of petitioners to post the
requisite bond, no dissolution thereof is required.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.