E.C. DE LUNA CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 96, CHRI…

De Luna Construction versus Cajigal

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus brought by E.C. De Luna Construction Corporation against Judge Afable E. Cajigal, in his capacity as presiding judge of a branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and against the private respondents Christine Samson-Rodriguez and Geraldine Challa Rodriguez, the wife and child of the late Gerardo Rodriguez. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to annul the trial judge's orders refusing to admit its supersedeas bond and allowing the release of its bank deposits, and to compel the judge to stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal. The case matters because it fixes the character of the supersedeas bond in discretionary execution: the stay it purchases is a matter of judicial discretion, not a ministerial duty, and therefore cannot be commanded by mandamus.

Procedural History

The private respondents sued the petitioner and its driver, Romeo Castro, for damages arising from a vehicular accident that killed Gerardo Rodriguez. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ruled in favor of the private respondents. The defendants filed a notice of appeal, but the private respondents moved for execution pending appeal, and the trial court granted the motion in its order of May 5, 2005, requiring the private respondents to post a bond equal to certain of the awards. The defendants then sought to file a supersedeas bond to stop the execution; the trial court denied that motion in its order of August 8, 2005. On the same date, the trial court granted the private respondents' motion to order the Land Bank of the Philippines to release deposits held in the petitioner's name. The petitioner's consolidated motion for reconsideration was denied on August 24, 2005. The petitioner then went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court denied the petition.

Facts

On December 7, 2000, a car driven by Gerardo Rodriguez was hit by a truck owned by E.C. De Luna Construction Corporation and driven at the time by Romeo Castro. Gerardo died as a result of the accident. His wife and child, the private respondents, filed a complaint for damages, praying for actual and compensatory damages, indemnity, funeral and burial expenses, litigation expenses, and attorney's fees.

After trial, the court ruled in favor of the private respondents. The defendants filed a notice of appeal. In the meantime, on April 16, 2005, the private respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court granted it on May 5, 2005, finding that the appeal was intended merely to further delay the case, and holding that where the judgment creditor is clearly entitled to actual damages, those damages may be the subject of execution pending appeal, but not the awards for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The court required the private respondents to post a bond equal to the awards for indemnity for loss of net earning capacity, indemnity for death, and compensatory damages.

To prevent execution, the petitioner and Romeo Castro filed a motion to file a supersedeas bond on May 29, 2005. The trial court denied it on August 8, 2005. On June 16, 2005, the private respondents moved to order the Land Bank of the Philippines to release deposits held in the petitioner's name, and this too was granted on August 8, 2005. Reconsideration was denied on August 24, 2005, prompting the petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the petitioner's supersedeas bond, given that the Rules of Court allegedly mandate the stay of execution pending appeal upon the filing of a sufficient bond.
• Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in allowing execution pending appeal despite the pendency of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
• Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the motion for reconsideration on a technicality.
• Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the trial judge to admit the supersedeas bond and stay the execution.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Stay of discretionary execution.- Discretionary execution issued under the preceding section may be stayed upon approval by the proper court of a sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the party against whom it is directed, conditioned upon the performance of the judgment or order allowed to be executed in case it shall be finally sustained in whole or in part. The bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety.

This is the provision the petitioner invoked as imposing a ministerial duty, and the provision the Court read as permissive because it says the execution may be stayed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the stay of discretionary execution is not a ministerial duty. The rule says that execution may be stayed upon approval by the proper court of a sufficient supersedeas bond; it does not say shall. The Court quoted its settled doctrine on statutory construction:

It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word 'may' denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.

Approval of the bond therefore rests in the sound discretion of the court that issued the execution.

On the second issue, the Court held that no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the judge for allowing execution pending appeal, because the rules themselves allow it, and because the rules do not provide that the mere filing of a supersedeas bond is a ground to stay the execution. The cases the petitioner cited, Eternal Gardens Memorial Park versus Court of Appeals and Joy Mart Consolidated Corporation versus Court of Appeals, were not in point: one involved a certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals and the other a preliminary injunction filed there, and neither involved a motion for reconsideration filed before the same court.

On the third issue, the Court held that the complaint about the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration on a technicality is better threshed out with the merits of the case in the appeal, if the petitioner chooses to file one. Delay in acting on the notice of appeal, if there was any, would not affect the validity of the order granting execution pending appeal or the order denying the motion to admit the supersedeas bond.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that since the admission of a supersedeas bond is not a ministerial duty, it is not subject to a writ of mandamus. It is settled that a discretionary act cannot be controlled by a writ of mandamus.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, under Section 3 of Rule 39, the stay of a discretionary execution upon the filing of a supersedeas bond is permissive, not mandatory: the word may denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. Second, the mere filing of a supersedeas bond does not by itself stay execution pending appeal; the bond must be approved by the proper court, and approval is discretionary. Third, execution pending appeal being itself allowed by the rules, a judge who grants it does not thereby commit grave abuse of discretion. Fourth, mandamus will not lie to compel a discretionary act, and the admission of a supersedeas bond is such a discretionary act.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petitions for certiorari and mandamus, and the trial court's orders stood.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the stay of discretionary execution upon a supersedeas bond is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, because the rule says may and not shall. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between ministerial and discretionary duties, and to test when mandamus will not lie against a judge.