BERNABE MORTEL, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE VICENTE LEIDO, JR., RESPONDENT.

The Honorable Vicente P. Leido, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 43
of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Roxas, Occidental Mindoro, is the respondent in this
administrative case filed by Bernabe Mortel. The charges levelled against respondent judge are as follows:

1. Serious misconduct, ignorance of the law
and gross incompetence in issuing a decision after the filing of a petition for
certiorari and after a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Court of Appeals;

2. Undue
haste in deciding the case pending the petition for certiorari and
without any trial on the merits;

3. Serious misconduct, ignorance of the law
and gross incompetence in issuing a writ of execution and an alias writ of
execution in violation of the decision of the Court of Appeals which had become
final and executory ten (10) months prior to the issuance of the alias writ of
execution; and

4. Serious misconduct, ignorance of the law or
gross incompetence in approving the bailbond of Gary Atienza, using the same property
already used as bond in another case by another accused.

(Complainant’s
Memorandum, pp. 468, 473, Record)

The Court in its Resolution dated October 22, 1992 referred the
case to Justice Eduardo G.
Montenegro of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendation.

As culled from the records, the first, second, and third charges,
stemmed from Civil Case No. C-130 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Mindoro, (Branch 43, Roxas), presided over by respondent judge. The case was for damages and accounting
filed by Roxas College Inc., represented by Arnulfo Sison, against the Roxas
College Teachers and Employees Union, represented by Bernabe S. Mortel, Nelia
F. Mortel, and Reynaldo Rey.

The defendants in said case filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter which motion was denied
by respondent judge in his order dated July 16, 1990.

A motion for reconsideration was later denied by respondent on
November 15, 1990. Similarly treated on
January 22, 1991 was a second motion for reconsideration.

On March 4, 1991, defendants filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, later docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
24313, praying that the orders of respondent denying the motion to dismiss and
the first and second motions for reconsideration be annulled and set aside.

In a resolution promulgated March 21, 1991, the Court of Appeals
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent from conducting
further proceedings in Civil Case No. C-130 so as not to render moot and
academic the issues raised in the petition. Four days thereafter or on March 25, 1991, respondent rendered a
judgment on the pleadings in Civil Case No. C-130.

On June 21, 1991, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 24313, granting the
writ of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for, enjoining respondent from taking any further action on
Civil Case No. C-130 except for the purpose of dismissing the same. This decision became final and executory,
and judgment was entered on April 13, 1992. Six months later, on
December 14, 1992, respondent issued a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
C-130.

Complainant asserts that respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct, ignorance of the law, and gross incompetence for rendering a
judgment on the pleadings in Civil Case No. C-130, after the filing of the
petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA-G.R. SP No. 24313) and after
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and for issuing a writ of execution
in Civil Case No. C-130 after the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 24313 had become
final and executory.

With respect to the fourth charge,
complainant alleged that during the pendency of Civil Case No. C-130 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 24313, he received information that Arnulfo Sison and his son,
Ferdinand, wanted him killed; that on March 11, 1991, at around 8:30 in the
evening, a hired killer by the name of Gary Wilson Atienza entered the compound
of complainant’s residence and shot by mistake the brother-in-law of
complainant; that on July 1, 1991, Gary Atienza was captured by NBI agents in
Manila resulting in the filing against him of Criminal Case No. R-434, which
was assigned to respondent judge. Subsequently, Gary Atienza was released on bail, using as bond a
property covered by TCT No. T-7477 in the name of Perlita P. Sison. Later, complainant further alleged, he
discovered that TCT No. T-7477 was already used to bail out a certain Isagani
Gelindon in Criminal Case No. 418 for Murder. The bond of Gelindon was never cancelled before the same TCT No. T-7477
was used as bond for Gary Atienza.

Complainant also asserts that respondent guilty of serious
misconduct, ignorance of the law, and gross incompetence for approving the
property bond of Gary Atienza using the same property al­ready used as bond by
Galindon in another criminal case.

For his part, respondent judge maintained that –

1.  He did not violate the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24313 dated March 25,
1991; that the subject resolution was sent by registered mail to him on March
25, 1991, and received by the Batangas City Sub. DC Post Office on March 27,
1991 and by the Post Office of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro on April 3, 1991. In short, respondent maintained he was
apprised of the said resolution only after he had rendered his decision in
Civil Case No. C-130 on March 25, 1991. Besides, respondent also asserted, the defendants in Civil Case No.
C-130 who were represented by counsel made no attempt to request the court to
suspend or hold in abeyance further proceedings pending resolution of the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.

2.  He cannot be held
administratively liable for any errors committed in deciding Civil Case No.
C-130. In the hearing held in open
court on January 22, 1991, defendants’ counsel conceded that the court has
jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit and requested 10 days within
which to file his comment or opposition to the plain­tiffs’ proposed motion for
judgment on the plead­ings. The motion
for judgment on the pleadings was filed by plaintiffs on the following day,
January 23, 1991. Following the filing
of the comment and manifestation of the defendants on March 19, 1991, the same
was granted, and on March 25,
1991, a decision was rendered. Any
errors committed by him, in evaluating the evidence in Civil Case No. C-130
respondent contended, constitute only errors of law for which he cannot be held
liable adminis­tratively.

3.  The issuance of a writ of
execution pursuant to a final and executory judgment is mandatory. Admittedly, a writ of execution was issued
in Civil Case No. C-130. This was due
to the decision dated March 25, 1991 becoming final and executory on November
21, 1991 because although counsel for the defendants filed a notice of appeal,
the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay docketing fees. The decision having become final and
executory, respondent thus concluded, it was ministerial on his part to issue
the corresponding writ of execution.

4.  The release on bail of
the accused Gary Atienza based on TCT 7477 was not anomalous. There was an attempt by Isagani Gelindon to
post the real property covered by TCT No. T-7477 in the name of Perlita Sison
as property bond for his provisional liberty but it did not push through. This is the reason why respondent judge did
not sign the order dated April 4, 1991. Stated differently, respondent contended, the property covered by TCT
7477 was never used as property bond for Gelindon.

In due time, the Investigating Justice submitted his well written
Report and Recommendation with the following apt observations and findings
which deserve to be quoted:

Respondent Judge’s explanation that he received the Court of
Appeals Resolution with restraining order, promulgated March 21, 1991, on April
3, 1991, days after he rendered judgment on the pleading on March 25, 1991
(Exhibit A-9, Record, p. 204) is amply established by evidence. The letter-envelope containing the resolution promulgated March 21, 1991,
xerox copy of which was presented in evidence as Exhibit 2 (Record, p. 273)
shows that it was registered at the Central Post Office, Manila, on March 25, 1991 (Exhibits 2-A and 2-B)
and received in Roxas, Oriental Mindoro
on April 3, 1991 (Exhibit 2-C). Charge No. 1, therefore, that respondent Judge proceeded
with Civil Case No. C-130 in violation of the restraining order is without
basis.

The second charge that respondent Judge is guilty of undue haste in
deciding Civil Case No. C-130 pending the petition for certiorari and
prohibition and without any trial on the
merits is likewise without merit.

There is no provision of the law or rules or precedent mandating
that upon the filing of a petition for certiorari or prohibition a Judge
should suspend further proceedings. On
the contrary, there is an authority to the effect that an application for certiorari
is an independent action, not a part of continuation of the trial which
resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. An independent action does not interrupt the
course of a cause unless there be a writ of injunction stopping it (Palomares,
et. al vs. Jimenez, et.al., 90 Phil. 773). There are of course decisions which say that upon filing of a petition
for certiorari or prohibition, the trial judge should suspend
proceedings out of respect to
the Court where the petition is filed and in order to give said Court
sufficient time to act on the petition. But it is doubtful whether the failure of a trial Judge to give time to the Court where the petition is filed
to act would give rise to an administrative liability.

The undue haste imputed by complainant to respondent Judge is not
amply substantiated by evidence. The
explanation of respondent Judge, embodied in his affidavit (Exhibit 1, Record,
p. 259) is not rebutted that in “the hearing held in open court on January 22,
1991, defendant’s (complainant herein) counsel conceded that the court has
jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit and requested a ten-day
period within which to file his comment or opposition to the plaintiffs’
proposed motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Motion for Judgment on the pleadings was filed by the plaintiffs on
the following day, January 23, 1991. After a Comment and Manifestation was filed by the defendants on March
19, 1991, undersigned granted the motion and on March 25, 1991, undersigned
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. C-130”. The explanation of respondent Judge is likewise not rebutted that
counsel for defendants in Civil Case No. C-130 made no attempt to request the
court to suspend or hold in abeyance further proceedings pending resolution of
the petition for certiorari and prohibition (Par. 11, id.). The rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 24313 reveals
that the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed on March 4,
1981. There is no showing when
respondent Judge received a copy of the petition inasmuch as the return cards
are not attached to the petition, only the registry receipts. The petition was not accompanied by a
certification that there is no similar petition involving the same subject
matter that has been previously filed, withdrawn or dismissed in the Supreme
Court or in the Court of Appeals. The
requirement was complied with by complainant’s counsel only on March 8, 1991. Assuming, therefore, that a copy of the
petition for certiorari and prohibition was received by respondent Judge
a few days after the filing of the petition on March 4, 1991, it would not be
reasonable in law to expect respondent Judge to immediately suspend further
proceedings on his own volition and without having received any restraining
order, on the basis of a defective petition.

Anent the third charge that respondent Judge is guilty of serious
misconduct, ignorance of the law and gross incompetence in issuing a writ of
execution and an alias writ of execution in violation of the decision of the
Court of Appeals which had become final and executory, the evidence on rebuttal
shows that on December 14, 1992, Clerk of Court Mariano S. Familara III issued
a writ of execution (Exhibit C-2, Record, pp. 424-425), citing as basis of the
issuance, a motion for execution filed July 16, 1992 and granted by the Court
in an Order dated October 20, 1992. Under date March 1, 1993, a motion for issuance of alias writ of
execution and appointment of a special sheriff was filed (Exhibit C-1, Record,
p. 426). A copy of the Order of
respondent Judge issued on March 16, 1993 granting the motion for issuance of
an alias writ of execution is marked in evidence as Exhibit F-Rebuttal (Record,
p. 452). It must be recalled that in
the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 24313 (Exhibit A-10, Record, p. 213), the Court
of Appeals enjoined respondent Judge from taking any further action on Civil
Case No. C-130 except for the purpose of dismissing it. The decision became final and executory on
February 17, 1992 and entry of judgment made on April 13, 1992 (Exhibit A-23, Record, p. 241). In granting the motion for execution filed
July 16, 1992 in his Order of October 20, 1992, and the motion for issuance of
an alias writ of execution on March 16, 1993, respondent Judge committed gross misconduct
warranting more than a reprimand. Respondent Judge’s explanation that defendants in Civil Case No. C-130,
through their former counsel, filed a notice of appeal which was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals for failure to pay docket fee, hence the decision became
final and executory and because the decision became final and executory, it
became ministerial on respondent Judge’s part to issue the corresponding writ
of execution deserves no consideration whatsoever. The final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP-No. 24313 which laid down the law in the case, enjoined respondent
Judge from taking any further action on the case except for the purpose of
dismissing it.

Anent the fourth charge of serious misconduct, ignorance of the law
or gross incompetence in approving the bailbond of Gary Atienza using the same
property bond already used as bond in another case by another accused, the
charge is found not adequately established by the evidence. The explanation of respondent Judge stands
unrebutted that there was only an attempt by Isagani Gelindon to post the real
property covered by TCT No. T-7477 in the name of Perlita Sison as property
bond for his provisional liberty but the same did not push through (Par. 17,
respondent Judge’s Affidavit, Exhibit 1, Record, p. 259). The Order, dated April 4, 1991, appearing in
the record of Criminal Case No. R-118, a xerox copy of which was marked in
evidence as Exhibit 14 (Record, p. 292), indeed appears unsigned. Complainant presented in evidence a
purported copy of the Order dated April 4, 1991 bearing a signature purportedly
of respondent Judge (Exhibit A-21,
Record, pp. 237-238). This Investigator
was expecting that complain­ant would submit the document to a handwriting
expert for comparison of signature therein with genuine signatures of
respondent Judge, but no move was made by complainant in that direction. The testimony of respondent Judge that the
signature is not his should, therefore, be accepted in the absence of evidence
that the questioned signature is really that of respondent Judge. The certification Exhibit D-1-Rebuttal
(Record, p. 429) issued by Officer-in-Charge Arnaldo M. Moratin of the Office
of the Provin­cial Jail at Oriental Mindoro certifying that according to the
records of Orders of Release of said Office, Isagani Gelindon was released by
virtue of an Order issued by Judge Vicente P. Leido, Jr., dated April 4,1991,
does not belie the explanation of respondent judge or disprove his claim that
he did not sign the contemplated Order
dated April 4, 1991. All that the certification at the most confirms
is the existence of the Order dated April 4, 1991 purportedly signed by respondent Judge, which
respondent Judge claims to be spurious, but nonetheless was used in the release
of Isagani Gelindon.

(pp. 6-9, Report and
Recommendation)

Upon the above premises, Justice Montenegro recommended:

1. Respondent Judge be
absolved of Charges 1, 2 and 4;

2. On Charge No. 3, that respondent Judge be
found guilty of serious misconduct and fined the equivalent of his salary for
two (2) months with a warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

Upon a final decision of a higher court, like the Court of Appeals,
a trial judge no matter how much he differs with the views of the higher court,
has no alternative but to comply. This
is part of every Judge’s duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary (Canon
1, Code of Judicial Conduct) and the avoidance of impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities (Canon 2, id.).

(p. 9, Ibid.)

The Court has reviewed the record of this case and has thereby
satisfied itself that the findings of the Investigating Justice are in truth
adequately supported by the evidence and are in accord with applicable legal
principles. Said findings are,
therefore, hereby adopted as the Court’s own findings.

Indeed, respondent judge overstepped the limits of his authority
as a subordinate court. His is the duty
to execute, enforce, and implement the final decisions of a higher court.

The Investigating Justice gave one final observation on
respondent’s culpability, thus —

Charge No. 3 bears some similarity with the finding of serious
misconduct against Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-91-766
who was dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits. The difference lies, however, in the degree of disobedience. The respondent judge therein was shown,
among others, to have blatantly and continually disobeyed the lawful orders of
superior courts by issuing a series of orders which ran counter to the
directives of this Court and the final decision of the Supreme Court. Moreover, in an obvious display of gross
ignorance of the law, she cancelled the titles of the complainants, who were
not parties to the case, upon a mere motion, in a probate proceeding. Without necessarily downplaying herein
respondent judge’s own actuation, his is an isolated case of willful
disobedience of Our lawful order which does not merit so grave a penalty as was
meted out in the aforementioned case.

(p.
10, Ibid.)

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Vicente Leido, Jr. is hereby
found guilty of serious misconduct in office and is hereby FINED Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00). In addition, the
Court Resolved to CENSURE and to WARN him to exercise much greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge and that the same or a
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

A copy of this Resolution shall be spread in the personal record
of respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Quiason, Puno, and
Vitug, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., see concurring
opinion.

Feliciano, J., on leave.