THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARIANO AYOSO, TEODORICO VALENZUELA, ALFONSO DESOYO AND FELIPE DE LA CRUZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu setting aside the order of dismissal of the criminal
complaint for illegal cockfighting originally filed before the Municipal Court
of Bogo.

The facts of the case are substantially as follows:

On July 21, 1960, accused-appellants MARIANO AYOSO, ET AL., were
charged with the crime of ILLEGAL COCKFIGHTING before the Municipal Court of Bogo (docketed as Criminal Case No. 915), the details of
which are set out in a complaint which reads as follows:

“The undersigned, Chief of Police of Bogo,
Cebu, Philippines after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law, accuses MARIANO AYOSO, TEODORICO VALENZUELA, ALFONSO
DESOYO and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ of the
crime of ILLEGAL COCKFIGHTING, committed as follows:

“That on or about 2:45 o’clock in the afternoon, more or less
of July 21,1960 at the cockpit of Tan Sim, Poblacion, Bogo, Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously, unlawfully and knowingly with
unlawful purpose, indulge themselves in illegal cockfighting commonly known as
“Tara-Tari“, wherein money P25 is used as bet on a
day, Thursday, which is not permitted by law though the place is a licensed
cockpit.  This act is a gross violation
of Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 1.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.

“Bogo, Cebu, Philippines,
July 21, 1960

(Sgd.) ALFREDO L. ARNOCO Chief of Police Bogo, Cebu“

Against the said
complaint the accused filed a motion
to quash, claiming that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute an
offense because cockfighting is authorized in Bogo on
Thursdays under the provisions of Ordinance No. 18, Series of 1960, enacted and
approved by the Municipal Council of Bogo.

The Municipal Court of Bogo sustained the motion to quash and dismissed the
complaint in its order dated September 9, 1960.  The
prosecution seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which is hereunder quoted:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSI­DERATIONS, judgment is hereby
rendered (1) dec­laring Ordinance No. 18, Series of 1960, of the Municipality
of Bogo, Cebu ultra vires, and therefore null and void, (2) declaring
further the order issued by the Justice of the Peace Court of Bogo, dated September 9, 1960, dismissing the complaint in
Criminal Case No. 915, to be improper and without legal basis, (3) ordering the
remand to the Justice of the Peace Court of Bogo of
the records of Criminal Case No. 915, and (4) directing that said court proceed
to try the case on the merits.  No
pronouncement as to costs.”

From the above decision,
accused-appellants interposed the present appeal.

They assign two principal
errors allegedly committed by the lower court, to wit:

“The lower court erred in ruling that it (Court of First
Instance of Cebu) has appellate jurisdiction on the
subject matter and on the persons of defendants.

“The lower court erred in declaring Ordinance No. 18, series
of 1960 of the Muni­cipality of Bogo, Cebu, ultra vires and there­fore null and void.”

With respect to the first assignment of error, accused-appellants
contend that “since the law (Rule 123, Sec. 5) is specific x x x that from a judgment of the
Justice of the Peace or Municipal Courts only the convicted party may appeal, therefore, the law does not
allow any other party to make such an
appeal.” Thus, accused-appellants point out, “while in the
Justice of the Peace Courts only the
convicted party (emphasis
theirs) can appeal, in the Court of First Instance or courts of similar
jurisdiction, any party can appeal.  The
only restriction is that the defendant would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy.  x x x” (Rule 122, Sec. 1)

It should be noted that what was appealed to the Court of First
Instance was the order of the municipal court dismis­sing the complaint upon
appellants’ motion to quash before arraignment. 
The guilt or innocence of the accused was never in issue in that
appeal.  There could not possibly be any
question of “conviction” at that stage of the case so as to call for
the application of Section 5 of Rule 123. 
Appropriately, the Court of First Instance, as gleaned from the dispositive portion of the judgment, limited itself to the
determination of the validity of the questioned dismissal, without in any way
passing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused of the offense charged.

Furthermore, Rule 122,
Sec. 2 of the New Rules of Court provides:

“Who may appeal. – The People of the Philip­pines
cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.  In all other cases, either party may appeal
from a final judgment or ruling or from an
order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the
appellant.”

And as the Court Of First Instance or Cebu correctly observed:

^“x x x
We believe that the provisions of Rule 118, Section 2 (now Rule 122, Sec. 2) are
applicable in all criminal cases irrespective of the courts where they maybe
pending.  That legal provision
constitutes no more than a mere enunciation of the principle of law that no
appeal may be interposed by the prosecution in a criminal case if such an
appeal shall thereby subject the accused to double jeopardy.  If we adopt the view espoused by the accused,
then there shall be no uniformity in the applicability of that legal principle
and we will be confronted with the absurd and curious situation that errors
committed by the Justice of the Peace Courts in their rulings and judgments in
criminal cases, which are not final in character, adverse to the state shall be
without remedy, while on the other hand errors of the same nature committed by
the Courts of First Instance are reviewable on appeal
to the appellate courts because they are not in violation of the constitutional
right of the accused against double jeopardy. 
Surely that could not be the intendment of the law.  There is a greater possibility of errors of
that nature in Justice of the Peace Courts, considering the very nature of the
composition of such courts, aside from the fact that there are a great many
more of such courts in the country than there are Courts of First
Instance.  x x x“

With respect to the
second assignment of error, suffice it to say that this Court, in deciding a
similar case, (Quim­sing v. Lachica,
et al. G. R. No. L-14683, May 30, 1961)
through Justice Concepcion (now Chief Justice), held:

x x x Thus, the
issue boils down to whether Republic Act No. 938, as amended, gives local
governments a blanket authority to permit cockfighting at any time and for as long as
said governments may wish it.

“Upon mature deliberation, we hold that the answer must be in
the negative.  To begin with, repeals and
even amendments by implica­tion are not favored, whereas an affirmative answer
would entail a vital amendment, amount­ing far all practical purposes, to a repeal, of
sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.  Secondly, grants of power to local governments
are to be construed strictly, and doubts in the interpretation thereof should be
resolved in favor of the national government and against the political
subdivisions concerned.  Thirdly, it is a
matter of common knowledge that cockfighting is one of the most wide-spread
vices of our population, and that the government has always shown a grave concern
over the need of effectively curbing its evil effects.  The theory of petitioner herein presupposes
that the Republic of the Philippines has completely reversed its position and
chosen instead, to place the matter entirely at the discretion of local
governments.  We should not, and cannot
adopt, such premise except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will
of Congress, which insofar as said premise is concerned is not manifest from
the language used in Republic Act No. 938, as amended.

“Lastly, ‘cockpits’
and ‘cockfighting’ are regulated separately by our laws.  Thus, Section 2243 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code empowers municipal councils ‘to regulate
cockpits’.  Yet, the authority of said
councils over ‘cockfighting‘ is found in sections 2285 and 2286 of said Code, not in said section 2243 (i).  Similarly,
Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code punishes, not illegal ‘cockpits’, but
‘illegal cockfighting’.  What is more,
participation in cockfights ‘on a day other than those permitted by
law’, is dealt with in said article separately from participation in cockfights
‘at a place other than a licensed cockpit‘.

“So too, the authority
of local governments, under Republic Act No. 938, as amended, to ‘regulate x x x the establishment, maintenance,
and operation of x x x cockpits‘ does not necessarily connote the power to
regulate ‘cockfighting‘, except insofar as the same must take place in a
duly licensed ‘cockpit’.  Again, the first
and second proviso in Section 1 of said Act, regulating the distance of
cockpits and places of amusements therein mentioned from ‘any public building,
schools, hospitals and churches’ and the third proviso of the same section,
prohibiting the admission of minors to some of those places of amusement,
suggest that the authority conferred in said provision may include the power to
determine the location of cockpits, conditions to be observed for the
protection of persons therein, the number of cockpits that may be established
in each municipality and/or by each operator, the minimum age of the individuals who may be admitted
therein, and other matters of similar nature – as distinguished from the days
on which cockfighting shall be held and the
frequency thereof.”

“In short, we are of the opinion that the city ordinances relied upon by petitioner herein authorizing
cockfighting on Thursdays, are invalid.”

The above pronouncement
of this Court was reiterated in the case of P.C. Chief v. Sabungan
Bagong Silang, Inc. et al.,
(G. R. No. L-22609, February 28, 1966) and echoed lately in the cases P.C. Chief
v. Judge of CFI of Rizal, et al., (G. R. No. L-22308, March 31, 1966) and Peralta, et al. v.
Hon. Pedro Bautista, et al., (G. R. Nos. L-22343-4, March 31, 1966).

At this point, it is
worthwhile to note that in 1963, there was presented in Congress a bill (H.B.
No. 7504, introduced by Congressman Albano) granting
municipal councils the power to authorize cockfighting on any day of the
week.  The bill, however, failed of
enactment.  Inferentially, this attempt
to expressly grant municipal councils the power to authorize cockfighting on
any day of the week militates against accused-appellants’ contention that under
the present provisions of law, such authority is already granted to municipal
councils.

In view of the
foregoing, the decision
appealed from is affirmed.  Costs against appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., took no part.