EVANGELINE L. DINAPOL, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ISMAEL O. BALDADO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 45, BAIS CITY, RESPONDENT.

In a sworn letter dated 26 August 1992 (Rollo, 2-3), complainant
charges the respondent Judge with grave abuse of discretion, ignorance of the
law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench in that notwithstanding the
fact that the spouses Crozoro Palermo and Jovy Palermo, accused in Criminal
Case No. 775-G for murder, had not yet been arrested pursuant to the warrant of
arrest he had issued on 3 March 1992 and were “freely roaming in the
municipality of Guihulngan,” said respondent Judge entertained a petition
for bail and set the same for hearing despite the vigorous opposition of the
complaining witness.

Complainant further alleges that the two accused have been
“seen conspicuously after the filing of the petition for bail inside the
chambers of this court [RTC] accompanied by a younger brother of a
congressman”; that it was the said congressman who supposedly “sponsored”
the appointment to the Judiciary of the respondent Judge; and that the accused
spouses are “relatives of the said congressman.”

The material operative
facts in this case, as disclosed by the
pleadings of the parties, are as follows:

The Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 775-G (Rollo,
31-32) was filed on 28 February 1992 by 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Diosdado Hermosa of Negros Oriental before the respondent Judge’s sala (Branch
45 of the Regional Trial Court
of Negros Oriental). No bail was
recommended for the provisional liberty of accused Crozoro Palermo and Jovy
Palermo.

On 3 March 1992, the respondent Judge issued a warrant for the
arrest of the accused.

On 9 March 1992, before the trial court could acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, accused filed through their counsel, the Paras
and Associates law office, a motion to grant and fix bail (Rollo, 52-53) which the respondent
Judge set for hearing on 24 April 1992.

On 10 April 1992, Evangeline  Dinapol,
the complaining witness and a sister of the victim in the murder case, filed a
vigorous opposition to the motion.

The accused did not appear on 24 April 1992. In view thereof, the respondent Judge issued
an order (a) denying the motion to grant bail on the ground that the court
“has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused,” (b)
ordering the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest and (c) directing the PNP
of Guihulngan “to exert utmost efforts for the arrest of the accused”
(Rollo, 58). The alias warrant of
arrest was then issued on 28 April 1992 (Rollo, 59). On that same date, however, the accused — this time through
Atty. Alfonso Briones — filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the 24 April 1992 Order on the
ground that “the accused are forthcoming, and are willing to voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the Court” (Rollo, 60). Acting thereon, and on the basis of Atty.
Briones’ confirmation of “the willingness of the accused to surrender to
the custody of the court as stated in said motion,” respondent Judge
issued an order on 4 May 1992 resetting the hearing of the motion to grant and
fix bail for 7 May 1992 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning, subject to the
condition that “the accused shall surrender to the custody of the
court.” Respondent Judge further directed the issuance of subpoenas to the
prosecution witnesses and warned the prosecution “that failure to present
evidence on said date without justifiable reason will be considered as lack of
strength of its evidence” (Rollo, 61).

Despite their commitment
and Atty. Briones’ confirmation on their behalf that they would
voluntarily surrender on 7 May 1992, the accused failed to appear on the set
date. While the prosecution was ready
with one witness, it did not present the latter as the accused were still at
large and not under the jurisdiction of
the court. Nevertheless, “in the
interest of substantial justice and to avoid delay in the administration of justice,”
the respondent Judge issued on the said date an order resetting, once again,
the hearing of the motion for 30 June and 1 and 3 July 1992. This extension
was, however, subjected to the condition that “on or before June
30, 1992, accused shall have voluntarily surrendered and submitted themselves
to the custody of this court [RTC]” (Rollo, 62).

On 19 June 1992, the subpoena and warrant server of the
Guihulngan Police Station, SPO1 Hindenburg Cabang, executed a return of service
of the 29 May 1992 warrant of arrest. He informed the trial court that the warrant had not been duly served as
the accused “are not found here in Guihulngan, Negros Oriental,” and
the information gathered that they were temporarily residing in Cebu City
proved to be false (Rollo, 65).

Thereupon, the Prosecution filed on 24 June 1992 a “Motion
Entreating Hon. Ismael O. Baldado to Consider whether or Not to Continue
Presiding Over the Above-Entitled Case” (Rollo, 67-70). It is alleged therein that the respondent
Judge had acted with patent bias and partiality in the accused’s favor as may
be gleaned from his (Judge’s) actuations as above-indicated, and from the fact
that “the two (2) accused x x x have even been seen conspicuously after
the filing of the petition for bail inside the Chambers of this Court [RTC]
accompanied by a younger brother of a congressman. Yet, up to now, said accused are unarrested (sic) and are known
to be roaming freely in Guihulngan, Negros Oriental.” The accused, through counsel, filed an opposition to this motion
(Rollo, 71); this was then followed by exchanges of pleadings.

In an order promulgated on 27 July 1992, respondent Judge
inhibited himself from the case and ordered the same forwarded to Branch 33 of
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental at Dumaguete City, presided over by
Judge Pacifico Bulado, for further disposition in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 2691 dated 18 March 1991 (Rollo, 90). However, in his Order of 7 August 1992, Judge Bulado also inhibited himself from
hearing the case since prosecution witness Alfredo Bulado is his first cousin
or a relative within the fourth civil degree; Judge Bulado decreed the return
of the case to the court of origin (Rollo, 92). On 25 August 1992, respondent Judge issued an order forwarding
the case to this Court for the appropriate action on his inhibition (Rollo,
94); the case was docketed as Administrative Matter No. 92-9864.

In his Comment (Rollo, 21-30), filed in compliance with the
Resolution of 13 October 1992 (Rollo, 20), respondent Judge maintains that he
had in fact denied in his 24 April 1992 Order the accused’s motion for bail
precisely because his court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons
of the accused. Moreover, he claims
that he ordered the issuance of an alias warrant for their arrest and acted
favorably on the motion to reconsider the said denial (by resetting the hearing
of the petition for bail) only to avoid what appeared to him as a
“‘pendulum’ of procedure or a ‘pingpong’ of actions by both parties with
the accused manifesting their willingness to surrender and submit to the
custody of the court and the prosecution objecting to the hearing of the
application for bail.” He avers further that he was “solely motivated
to resolve the issues with dispatch within the framework of procedural rules,
set the incident for hearing on condition that the accused shall have
voluntarily surrendered and submitted to the custody of the law on or before
date (sic) set for the
hearing.”

In the same vein, he asserts that he cannot be charged with
ignorance of the law because although he was “a working student in
college,” he has “consistently endeavored to achieve excellence, and
his academic efforts proved fruitful — ­graduated (sic) Cum Laude in both Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Laws at
Silliman University.” He has likewise “continued to work for such
excellence in his practice of law, and has applied with more vigor the quest
for the same upon his assumption to the bench.”

Finally, respondent Judge alleges that (a) there is no clear and
direct proof to support the allegation that both accused were in his chambers
for, as a matter of fact, the Prosecutor himself, in his Reply of 9 July 1992,
admits that the said allegation “is
not of our personal
knowledge“; (b) “not a single politician has made
interventions or at least insinuate (sic) to intervene, in any case pending
before him”; and (c) there are parties working “behind the scene of
this malicious charge” against whom he will, in due time, undertake legal
recourse.

He did not, however categorically deny the charge that the
accused were in his chambers after the motion for bail was filed, and the
allegation that a congressman
sponsored his appointment to the Judiciary.

On 14 January 1993, the complainant filed a Rejoinder [should be
Reply] to Comment (Rollo, 101-102).

On 1 February 1993, we required the parties to inform this Court
if they are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
(Rollo, 109).

On 19 February 1993, this Court received the 29 January 1993
letter of Glenn B. Litrada, youngest sister of both Liberty Litrada — the
victim in the murder case — and Evangeline Dinapol — the complainant in the
instant case — informing this Court that in view of the latter’s having been
pressured into signing an affidavit of desistance, she (Glenn) would be taking
over as the complainant in this case (Rollo,
110). Acting thereon, we required her to submit a copy of
the said affidavit of desistance (Rollo, 113).

On 1 March 1993, respondent Judge filed a pleading, denominated
as his Supplementary Comments, wherein he exposes Atty. Jose Estacion, Jr. as “the man behind, the prime mover and
the active instigator, in the
filing of this case.” It appears that the respondent Judge, while still in
the private practice of law, represented Ruth Sison in an administrative case
(Adm. Matter No. RTJ-87-104) filed by her against Estacion who was then the
Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC at Dumaguete City. In this Court’s Resolution of 11 January
1990, Judge Estacion was ordered dismissed from the service “with
forfeiture of all salary, benefits and leave credits” (Rollo,
160-166). After the respondent Judge’s
appointment, Atty. Estacion’s group sought the former’s removal (Rollo, 167). The respondent Judge attached to his
Supplementary Comments the alleged true and correct copy of complainant
Evangeline Dinapol’s so-called affidavit of desistance (Rollo, 124).

Thereafter, in his 2 April 1993 compliance (with the Resolution
of 16 February 1993), respondent Judge manifested that he is submitting the
instant case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. Complainant, on the other hand, chose not to
submit her compliance.

In its 18 June 1993 Memorandum submitted in compliance with the
20 May 1993 Resolution of this Court directing it to evaluate the case and
submit its report and recommendation thereon, the Office of the Court
Administrator concludes that the respondent Judge has “committed a
jurisdictional lapse in the procedure he adopted in setting the case for
hearing the Motion to (sic) Bail filed by the counsel of the accused on the
mere allegation that the accused are forthcoming and are willing to voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court,” According to the said Office, it
is clear from Section 1, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court that an accused
can move for the granting of bail only if the court has acquired jurisdiction
over his person. It then recommends
that the respondent Judge “be sternly admonished with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar violation in the future will be dealt with
more severely.”

It is axiomatic that a court cannot entertain an accused’s motion
or petition for bail unless he is in the custody of the law. Bail is defined in Section 1, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Court as “the security given for the release
of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned
upon his appearance before any court as required under the conditions”
specified in Section 2 thereof. A
person is considered to be in the custody of the
law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest
issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under Section
5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court,
or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by surrendering to the proper authorities. Elsewise stated, the purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at
the trial (Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66
SCRA 38 [1975], citing Green vs.
Petit, Sheriff, 54
N.E. 2d 281). Accordingly, it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888 [1961], citing Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405; see also Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of
Quezon, 51 SCRA 369, [1973]). The right to bail is guaranteed by the
Constitution. Section 13, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:

“All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x.”

However, “only those persons who have
been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever
have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision” (Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira,
75 Phil. 634 [1945]). Thus, it logically follows that no
petition for bail can be validly entertained for as long as the petitioner is
NOT in the custody of the law.

Since the accused in Criminal Case No. 775-G were not arrested by virtue of both the original warrant
of arrest and the alias warrant of arrest, and did not voluntarily submit to
the jurisdiction of the trial court, they had no standing in court to file a
motion for bail. Nor did the court have
any business setting the same for hearing. By setting the said motion for hearing despite the fact that his court
had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, the
respondent Judge blatantly disregarded established rule and settled
jurisprudence. While he subsequently
rectified his error by denying the motion in his Order of 24 April 1992, he
nevertheless backtracked by granting the motion for reconsideration and setting
anew the hearing of the motion for bail this time with a warning to the
prosecution that its failure to
present evidence on the scheduled date “will be considered as lack of
strength of its evidence.” We find neither rhyme nor reason for this
warning because if there was any
party to be warned, it should have been the accused who had abused the
liberality of the respondent Judge and belittled the authority of the court. Worse, the respondent Judge still
accommodated the accused — who had already reneged on their commitment to
submit to the court’s jurisdiction — by resetting the hearing of the motion
for bail after they failed to appear a second time. These acts of the respondent Judge compounded his already
questionable disregard of the rule and doctrine aforecited. He opted to perpetuate his defiance thereto and experiment on
a new procedure which we cannot sanction. According to Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, a Judge violates
his duty as a minister of justice if he seeks to do what he may personally
consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general
law as he knows it to be binding on him.

Respondent Judge had likewise betrayed impropriety by his unusual
partiality in favor of one of the parties. It is to be observed that the former did not categorically deny the
accused’s reported visit to his chambers after the motion for bail was filed. Instead of simply stating in a few words
that the accused never saw him in his chambers, the respondent Judge labored
hard to discuss in detail his position
that “there is no clear and direct proof” to support the said
allegation. The Canons of Judicial
Ethics mandate that a judge’s official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and that his personal behavior, not only upon the
bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day
life, should be beyond reproach (Canon 3, Canons of Judicial Ethics).

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby meted a fine
of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and
is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and Vitug, JJ., concur.