TEOFILA RAMOS AND LEONILA ESTANISLAO, PETITIONERS, VS. FELICISIMO RAYMUNDO AND COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

This case is before us on review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 29097-R, affirming the order of the Court of First Instance
of Pasig dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case
No. 4869, Teofila Ramos et al., vs. Felicisimo Raymundo.

The complaint was for recovery of ownership and possession of two
(2) parcels of unregistered rice land with a combined area of 3,422 square
meters, situated in Morong, Rizal.  The plaintiffs’ claim was based on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the
previous owner, Dionisia Balajadia,
on July 15, 1957 and
registered under Act No. 3344 two days later, or on July 19, 1957.  These buyers could not take possession, for
when they tried to do so they found the defendant on the land, and the
defendant was also claiming ownership
thereof by virtue of another alleged deed of sale in his favor.

The defendant averred in his answer that he purchased the Land in
1948 from the same Dionisia Balajadia;
that since then his possession had been continuous; and that the plaintiffs
knew such facts before the sale was made to them in 1957.

The plaintiffs in turn filed a reply specifically denying the
defendant’s averments in his answer, among them that which imputed bad faith on
their part; and alleging that they had no knowledge of any encumbrance on the
land and that they believed all along that their vendor, Dionisia
Balajadia, was the owner since the tax declarations
were in her name.

Subsequently the plaintiffs filed an amended com­plaint to implead Dionisia Balajadia and her husband as additional defendants.  These spouses, however, did not file their
answer and hence were declared in default, after which the case was set for
trial, originally on April 24, 1959 and then, on the plaintiffs’ motion for
postponement, on May 15, 1959.  On this latter date neither the defendant nor
his counsel appeared, whereupon the plaintiffs were allowed to present their
evidence before the Clerk of Court as commissioner.

On May 23, 1959 the trial Court, Judge Felix R. Domingo
presiding, rendered judgment for the plaintiffs,
declaring them owners of the land in dispute and ordering the defendant to
deliver its possession to them, plus damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

On June 27, 1959
the defendant moved for reconsideration and new trial on the ground that the
decision was null and void and that his failure to appear was due to accident,
mistake and excusable negligence.  The
plaintiffs opposed the motion, but the court, this time with Judge Cecilia Muñoz Palma, presiding, set aside the decision and
thereafter set the case anew for hearing on various dates, to wit: December 17, 1959, January 28,
February 25 and March 3, 1960.  The first two scheduled hearings were not
held because the presiding Judge was absent. 
On February 25 the plaintiffs failed to appear, and the court thereupon
ordered the dis­missal of the complaint. 
A verified motion for reconsidera­tion was filed,
alleging that counsel’s failure to appear at the hearing was due to the fact
that he had to go to Cotabato
City in connection with another
case and was not able to return to Manila
on time.  The motion was denied, and the
plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered the judgment of affirmance which is now the sub­ject of review.

The pivotal question is whether the Appellate Court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in refusing relief to the plaintiffs.  Under ordinary circumstances the answer to
that question would be obvious: counsel’s absence from the trial for the reason
alleged by him would not be excusable. 
But justice and fair play call for equal treatment of the parties before
the law.  The defendant had been guilty
of similar negligence when he and his counsel did not show up at the hearing of
May 15, 1959.  The excuse then given – that the notice
thereof to counsel had been mislaid – was no more valid than that which caused
the plaintiffs’ counsel to miss the hearing on February 25, 1960. 
The court gave the defend­ant one chance to reopen the case – this after
a decision on the merits had been rendered on the basis of evidence adduced by
the plaintiffs.  The same treatment
should be accorded them, especially since the dismissal of their complaint is
for a purely procedural, not to say technical, reason.

The Court of Appeals, to be sure, did go superficially into the
merits of the case by considering the plaintiffs’ affidavit of merits and the
defendant’s counter-affidavit, restating the issue to be one of preference of
ownership between two vendees of the same property, and holding that although
the sale to the plaintiffs was registered whereas the sale to the
defendant was not, such registration did not necessarily entitle the former to
preference because it was done under Act No. 3344.

Two salient points,
however, mast be considered in this case: (1) the
alleged sale to the defendant in 1948 has yet to be proven.  It is to be noted that although he alleges in
his answer (paragraph 1 of the affirmative defenses) that there was such a
sale in 1948, he like­wise alleges in the very next paragraph that “the
documents evidencing said sales (sic) were executed by Dionisia Bala­jadia and acknowledged by her in 1957.” Strangely
enough, the precise dates of execution are not given, and copies of the
corresponding documents are not attached to the answer.  This point is quite significant, considering
that the sale in favor of the plaintiffs was also executed in 1957,
specifically on July 15, and that a copy thereof was attached to the
complaint.  (2) In view of the undisputed
registration of this latter transaction the question of good or bad faith is of
vital importance, and good faith on the part of the plaintiffs is not only
presumed under the law but speci­fically averred in their reply to the
defendant’s answer.  The finding of the
Court of Appeals in its decision, that “it is …probable that plaintiffs
did not buy the rice lands and register their purchase in good faith” is
at best conjectural, and in any event premature, since there has been no trial
and no evidence on the point has yet been taken.

In the interest of justice, overlooking the procedural neglect,
of which both counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendant had been
equally at fault in the court below we
are of the opinion that this case is one which should be heard and
decided on the merits.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, the order of the trial Court dismissing the com­plaint is set aside, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.  No
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,
did not take part.