RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. CONSUELO C. VILLAREAL, ISABEL C. VILLAREAL, FLAVIANO C. VILLAREAL, ALFREDO V. GOMEZ, AURORA V. GOMEZ AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Rizal Cement versus Villareal

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Rizal Cement Company against Consuelo Villareal, Isabel Villareal, Flaviano Villareal, Alfredo Gomez, and Aurora Gomez, together with the Court of Appeals. The private respondents applied to have two agricultural lots registered in their names under the Land Registration Act, and Rizal Cement opposed the application, claiming the same lots as part of a larger tract it says it has owned and possessed since 1911. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the rules a bar candidate must know on land registration: that the applicant bears the burden of proving ownership, that tax declarations and tax receipts are not proof of title, that a survey plan carries no adjudication of ownership, and that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence.

Procedural History

In December 1955 the private respondents filed an application for registration with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting in Pasig. Rizal Cement filed an opposition. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 28, 1965, amended on May 21, 1965, denying the application and ordering that a decree of registration issue in the name of Rizal Cement after the decision became final. The private respondents appealed to the then Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. Rizal Cement moved for reconsideration, and the appellate court denied the motion in its resolution of February 11, 1969. Rizal Cement then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, assigning as errors the appellate court's reliance on a 1924 deed of sale, its weighing of the evidence of possession, and its conclusion that the applicants and their predecessors had possessed the land adversely under claim of ownership for over thirty years.

Facts

The land applied for consists of two lots with a total area of 26,015 square meters. According to the evidence credited by the Court of Appeals, the lots originally belonged to Maria Certeza. Upon her death the property was involved in litigation between her grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza, and the lots were given to former Justice Mariano de Joya as his attorney's fees. De Joya sold them to Filomeno Sta. Ana, who in turn sold them to the spouses Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo in 1939. In November 1955 the spouses Cervo sold the lots to the private respondents by a duly notarized deed of sale. The spouses Cervo had the parcels surveyed in 1950 and again in 1955, and they declared the property for taxation in the name of the wife and paid the realty taxes.

Rizal Cement, on the other hand, claimed to own the lots as part of a larger tract it bought from Maria Certeza, and to have possessed the property continuously and adversely since 1911. Its principal documentary evidence were a survey plan covering a big tract surveyed in 1911 and approved in 1912, a sketch plan of the geographical position of the properties of Madrigal and Company, a tax declaration secured in 1949 consolidating all its lands in Darangan, a later tax declaration cancelling that one, and real estate tax receipts issued for Madrigal and Company. It presented no witness who was in actual possession of the land in question.

The Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of the applicants' witnesses. Santiago Picadizo, a tenant from the time of Maria Certeza up to the present, testified that the lots were given to Justice de Joya as attorney's fees, that he successively gave the owner's share of the harvests to Maria Certeza, and that no other person ever claimed ownership during the possession of the previous owners. Isaac Reyes testified that he had worked one half of the two parcels since 1934 and that no one other than Ignacia Guillermo claimed ownership. Valentin Marquez testified that he had lived in Darangan since 1910, that he bought a portion of his land from Maria Certeza in 1924 by an absolute deed of sale, and that during his stay the company did not take possession of the land, which remained with Maria Certeza until her death.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the 1924 deed of sale in favor of Apolonia Francisco and in treating it as having transferred rights over the lots down to the private respondents.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to the private respondents' evidence on the identity of their predecessors-in-interest, without drawing an adverse presumption from the failure to present former Justice de Joya and Gonzalo Certeza as witnesses.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the fact that the two lots were not listed in the inventory of Maria Certeza's properties, and in failing to rule that the applicants did not prove that the property in one exhibit was the same property in another.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in treating the evidence of Rizal Cement as weak without applying the doctrine that the burden is on the applicant to prove ownership absolutely and not merely preponderantly.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had an unbroken adverse possession under claim of ownership for over thirty years, despite the company's claim of possession since 1911.

Applicable Provisions

Article 531 of the New Civil Code, cited by the Court of Appeals in its discussion of possession, provides:

Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right or by the fact it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

This defines how possession is acquired, and it bears on the case because the Court of Appeals found that the private respondents held the land in the concept of an owner through material occupation and the acts of ownership done by them and their predecessors.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err in relying on the 1924 deed of sale. The appellate court had noted that if Rizal Cement really bought the lot from Maria Certeza in 1909 as claimed, it was never explained how Maria Certeza could still sell a portion of it to Apolonia Francisco in 1924 by a deed that is an ancient document, confirmed by the husband in his deposition.

On the second issue, the Court found no reversible error in the appellate court's weighing of the evidence. The Court stressed that Rizal Cement presented no witness in actual possession of the land in question, while the applicants' witnesses testified to the possession of Maria Certeza and her successors. The Court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases brought from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review of errors of law, and that the appellate court's findings of fact are conclusive except in six instances: when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; when the inference is manifestly absurd, mistaken, or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; when the findings of fact are conflicting; and when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. The Court found that none of these exceptions obtained.

On the third and fourth issues, the Court held that the applicant must prove ownership, and that the evidence of Rizal Cement was insufficient. The Court ruled that tax receipts, tax declarations, and survey plans are not conclusive and indisputable bases of ownership. Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title, and a mere tax declaration does not vest ownership on the declarant. Neither can a survey plan or technical description prepared at the instance of a party be considered in his favor, being self-serving. The Court quoted the appellate court's observation that the only documentary evidence the company could capitalize on was the notation in the applicants' plan that the lots were portions of a previous survey made in 1911 for the company, and that a survey plan merely delimits areas sought to be registered. The Court quoted with approval the rule that neither the plan nor its approval carried with it any adjudication of ownership, the Director of Lands through approval merely certifying that the survey was made in accordance with approved methods and regulations in force.

On the fifth issue, the Court upheld the appellate court's finding that the private respondents possessed the property in the concept of an owner. The Court quoted the appellate court's reasoning that the right to possess flows from ownership, that no person will suffer adverse possession by another of what belongs to him, and that had the company been the rightful owner it would not have allowed the tenants to cultivate the land and give the owner's share to the applicants and their predecessors, nor would it have failed to oppose the surveys made for the applicants' vendors in 1950 and 1955. The Court also noted that the applicants' vendors had mortgaged the two lots in 1952, an act of ownership, and that the senior deputy assessor of Rizal testified that his office refused to issue a tax declaration for the land covered by the company's plan because it had been in the possession of various persons in Darangan.

Doctrine

First, in a land registration case the burden is on the applicant to prove satisfactorily that he is the owner of the land applied for; it is not enough to show that the property does not belong to the oppositor, and the evidence must be absolute and not merely preponderant. Second, neither tax receipts nor a declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes sufficient evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty; they must be supported by other effective proofs. Third, a survey plan or technical description prepared at the instance of a party is self-serving and cannot be considered in his favor, and neither the plan nor its approval by the Director of Lands carries any adjudication of ownership. Fourth, possession in the concept of an owner, shown by material occupation and by the acts of ownership of the possessor and his predecessors, is a strong attribute of ownership that tips the scale in favor of the applicant. Fifth, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence, subject only to the recognized exceptions.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with costs against Rizal Cement Company.

Remember This

Memorize the line that tax receipts and tax declarations, standing alone, do not prove ownership, and that a survey plan approved by the Director of Lands adjudicates no title. Examiners use this case in land registration problems where an oppositor relies only on tax declarations and a survey plan, and in civil procedure questions on when the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.