🎧 Case Brief Lecture

JULIO SALACUP, PETITIONER, VS. HON. TOMAS P. MADDELA, JR., AND FILIPINAS MILLS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. L-50471. June 29, 1979 June 29, 1979

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Salacup versus Maddela

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction. Julio Salacup, the petitioner, asks the Supreme Court to nullify two orders of Judge Tomas P. Maddela, Junior, who refused to dismiss a collection suit filed against Salacup by Filipinas Mills, Incorporated. Salacup had moved to dismiss on the ground that another action between the same parties, over the same contract, was already pending in the Court of First Instance of Isabela. The case matters because it fixes the moment when a civil action is "commenced" for purposes of the rule on a pending action, and it lays out the three requisites of that ground for dismissal.

Procedural History

Salacup first filed a complaint for recovery of overpayment against Filipinas Mills before the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch Three. Later, Filipinas Mills filed its own complaint for breach of contract and collection before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch Thirty-Four. Salacup moved to dismiss the Manila case on the ground of a pending action. The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated October 3, 1978, and later denied the motion for reconsideration on March 9, 1979. Unable to obtain reconsideration, Salacup filed this petition with the Supreme Court. The Court issued a temporary restraining order on May 16, 1979, enjoining the respondent judge from proceeding with or trying the Manila case.

Facts

On December 12, 1973, Filipinas Mills, Incorporated and Julio Salacup executed a contract. Filipinas Mills agreed to sell one rice thresher with complete accessories to Salacup, and the price was to be paid in palay. The parties disputed the price. Filipinas Mills claimed the purchase price was 1,500 cavans of palay at 50 kilos per sack at 1.10 pesos a kilo, or 82,500 pesos in all. Salacup asserted that the price was 45,000 pesos, payable in palay. The terms of payment were 200 cavans upon delivery but not later than January 15, 1974; 500 cavans on February 15, 1974; and 800 cavans on or before March 15, 1974.

On April 5, 1976, Salacup filed a complaint for recovery of overpayment before the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch Three. He averred that he had delivered 1,058 cavans valued at 51,557 pesos, that the price of the thresher was only 45,000 pesos, and that there was therefore an overpayment of 6,557 pesos.

On June 7, 1978, Filipinas Mills filed its own complaint for breach of contract and collection of the undelivered 442 cavans of palay or their value of 24,310 pesos before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch Thirty-Four. It asserted that Salacup had delivered only 1,058 cavans out of 1,500 cavans, leaving a balance of 442 cavans under the same contract. Salacup moved to dismiss on the ground that another action was pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. Filipinas Mills opposed the motion, arguing that the pendency of a case presupposes a valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint upon the defendant, and that no valid service had been made upon it.

Issues

  • Whether or not there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause in the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch Three, within the meaning of the rule on dismissal on that ground.
  • Whether or not the pendency of an action requires a valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint upon the defendant before it can be invoked as a ground for dismissal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, paragraph (e) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which the Court identifies as the ground for dismissal invoked, provides:

Within the time fixed by these rules, the defendant may move to dismiss the complaint on any of the following grounds: (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.

This is the provision under which Salacup sought dismissal of the Manila case.

Section 6 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which the Court quotes, provides:

A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.

This fixes the moment of commencement of an action, which the Court uses to determine which case was first pending.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that all the requisites of a pending action were present. The requisites are: first, identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; second, identity of rights asserted and prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and third, identity in both cases such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. On the parties, the Court found they were the same, for they were merely suing each other; although Ben Tan was not a party in the Manila case, he was made a party in the Isabela case as a representative of Filipinas Mills. On the rights asserted, the first case sought collection of the overpayment for the thresher, while the second sought the undelivered cavans of palay as part of the purchase price of the same thresher, so the relief was founded on the same facts. And on the third requisite, a judgment in the first case would be determinative of the rights of the parties and would be res judicata in the second.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the contention that a pending action presupposes a valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint. It relied on Section 6 of Rule 2, that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, and on the ruling in Pampanga Bus Company versus Ocfemia, that the rule on a pending action refers to another pending action, and an action starts only upon the filing of a complaint in court. The Court also cited Sotelo versus Dizon, that a civil action is deemed legally commenced from the date of the filing and docketing of the complaint with the clerk of court, without taking into account the issuance and service of the summons.

Applying these rules, the Court found that the Isabela case was filed on April 5, 1976, very much ahead of the Manila case filed on June 7, 1978. When the latter was filed, the former was already pending. It was an action between the same parties for the same cause which should bar the later case. The lower court therefore erred in not granting the motion to dismiss.

Doctrine

A motion to dismiss on the ground that another action is pending requires three requisites: identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; identity of rights asserted and prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and identity in both cases such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, and the pendency of an action does not depend on the service of summons and a copy of the complaint upon the defendant. The earlier-filed case is the pending case that bars the later one.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the orders of October 3, 1978 and March 9, 1979, and ordered the dismissal of the Manila case, without prejudice to such counterclaim as Filipinas Mills may wish to interpose in the Isabela case.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, so the earlier filing, not the service of summons, makes a case the pending action that bars a later one. Examiners like to use this case on the requisites of a pending action and on the question of when an action is deemed commenced.