SPOUSES TITO AND PACITA ARBATIN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE S. JACINTO, JR. (IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 45, SAN JOSE, OCCIDENTAL MINDORO) A…

Arbatin versus Jacinto

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by the spouses Tito and Pacita Arbatin against Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr., in his capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and against the private respondent Yolanda Valdez-Paningbatan. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to nullify three orders of the trial court: the order of August 22, 2012, which directed them to reimburse the private respondent ten thousand pesos for her travel and food expenses and attorney's fees after they and their counsel failed to appear at a scheduled hearing despite notice; and the orders of October 17, 2012 and December 14, 2012, which denied their first and second motions for reconsideration. The case matters because it fixes the standard for grave abuse of discretion in certiorari, and it teaches when a court's sanction for a party's repeated non-appearance is a valid exercise of inherent power rather than a premature ruling on the merits or a denial of due process.

Procedural History

The private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. After pre-trial and several resettings, the trial court issued the order of August 22, 2012, imposing the reimbursement of expenses and attorney's fees on the petitioners. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its order of October 17, 2012. They filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the trial court likewise denied in its order of December 14, 2012. The petitioners then went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, asking that the three orders be set aside or nullified.

Facts

On January 22, 2009, the private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against the petitioners. Pre-trial was held on August 27, 2010, and the initial hearing was set for November 18 and 19, 2010. The parties agreed to attempt a compromise, so the initial hearing was reset by agreement to July 26, 2011. After an unsuccessful mediation and another resetting prayed for by both parties, the initial presentation of the private respondent's evidence was set for November 24, 2011. On that date, by agreement of counsel, the hearing was reset, for the last time, to March 5, 2012. Because the petitioners' counsel fell ill, the initial hearing was again moved to March 27, 2012.

On March 27, 2012, both parties moved for a resetting to May 9, 2012. On May 9, 2012, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear, and the hearing was reset to June 7, 2012. On June 7, 2012, the trial court reset, for the last time, the presentation of the private respondent's evidence to August 22, 2012.

On August 22, 2012, the petitioners and their counsel again did not appear. The trial court issued the first assailed order, noting the private respondent's travel and food expenses and attorney's fees and ordering the petitioners to reimburse her a total of ten thousand pesos, payable on or before the next setting. The trial court warned the petitioners' counsel to file the proper pleadings if he would be unavailable on any scheduled date, and reset the hearing to October 26, 2012. The petitioners' motion to reset the August 22, 2012 hearing, filed on August 8, 2012 on the ground of conflict of schedule, was declared moot and academic because the hearing had already been reset before the court received the motion. The petitioners' two motions for reconsideration were denied, and they came to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.
• Whether or not the order for reimbursement of travel and food expenses and attorney's fees was a premature ruling on the merits that deprived the petitioners of due process.
• Whether or not the order for reimbursement had legal and factual basis.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, under which the petition for certiorari was filed, provides the remedy invoked by the petitioners:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

This provision bears on the case because the petitioners must show grave abuse of discretion, not mere error, before the Court may annul the trial court's orders.

Rule 135, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court, on the inherent powers of courts, provides:

A court shall have power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

This provision bears on the case because the trial court relied on its inherent power to control its process and enforce order in imposing the sanction on the petitioners.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition is without merit. In a special action for certiorari, the burden is on the petitioners to prove not merely reversible error but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court found no such grave abuse here.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioners were not deprived of due process. Although the reason for counsel's absence may have been valid, counsel was remiss in assuming that his motion to reset would be granted as a matter of course. The grant of a motion for continuance is not a matter of right; it is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and parties asking for postponement must be prepared on the day of the hearing. The trial court was justified in imposing a sanction because the petitioners failed to appear not only on August 22, 2012 but also, without notice to the court or the other party, on May 9, 2012 and June 7, 2012. The imposition of a sanction for dragging the case for an undue length of time is among the inherent powers of courts, and it is not a premature ruling on the merits. The Court stressed that the most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard, and where the parties have been afforded an opportunity to participate but failed to do so, they cannot complain of deprivation of due process. The petitioners were given an opportunity to explain their side when the trial court scheduled a hearing on the first motion for reconsideration, but they did not attend despite notice in open court. A motion for reconsideration is curative of any alleged denial of due process, and the petitioners filed not one but two.

On the third issue, the Court upheld the order for reimbursement as having legal and factual basis, resting on the trial court's inherent power to enforce order in proceedings before it and to control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the burden is on the petitioner to prove grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not merely reversible error. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Second, the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right; it is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and parties asking for postponement have no right to assume that their motions will be granted. Third, the imposition of a sanction against a party for dragging the case for an undue length of time is among the inherent powers of courts, including the authority to enforce order in proceedings before it and to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. Fourth, due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard; if it is not availed of, it is deemed forfeited without violating the Bill of Rights. Fifth, a motion for reconsideration is curative of any alleged denial of due process, especially where the party was given a chance to be heard on it.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the orders of August 22, 2012, October 17, 2012, and December 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro were affirmed.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the grant of a motion for postponement is not a matter of right but lies in the sound discretion of the court, and a party who fails to appear after notice cannot claim a denial of due process. Examiners like to use this case on the standard of grave abuse of discretion in certiorari and on the inherent power of courts to impose sanctions for repeated non-appearance.