ABBOTT LABORATORIES (PHILIPPINES), INC., AND JAIME C. VICTA, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ALBERT BOBADILLA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which set
aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision dismissing the complaint and instead entered
a new decision ordering the complainant’s reinstatement with full backwages from the date of his termination until his actual
reinstatement.

The antecedent facts as found by the Labor Arbiter and reiterated
in the NLRC decision are undisputed:

“Complainant Bobadilla started his
employment with respondent company sometime in May 1982.  After
undergoing training, in September, 1982, complainant was designated
professional medical representative (PMR)
and was assigned to cover the sales territory comprising of Sta. Cruz, Binondo and a part of Quiapo and Divisoria, of the Metro Manila district.  In connection with the respondent company’s
marketing and sales operations, it has been its policy and established practice
of undertaking employment movements and/or reassignments from one territorial
area to another as the exigencies of its operations require and to hire only
applicant salesmen, including professional medical representatives (PMRs) who are willing to take provincial assignments, at
least insofar as male applicants were concerned.  Likewise, respondent company had made
reassignments or transfers of sales personnel, which included PMRs, from one territorial area of responsibility to
another on a more or less regular basis.

“In complainant’s application for employment with respondent
company, he agreed to the following:  1)
that if employed, he will accept assignment in the provinces and/or cities
anywhere in the Philippines; 2) he is willing and can move into and live in the
territory assigned to him; and 3) that should any answer or statement in his
application for employment be found false or incorrect, he will be subject to
immediate dismissal, if then employed.

“On 22 July 1983,
respondent Victa called complainant to his office and
informed the latter that he was being transferred effective 1 August 1983 to the newly opened Cagayan territory comprising the provinces of Cagayan, Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela.  The transfer order was made formal in a memorandum
dated 29 July 1983.  Among the reasons given for complainant’s
selection as PMR for the Cagayan territory
were:  ‘The territory required a
veteran and seasoned PMR who can operate immediately with minimum training and
supervision.  Likewise,
a PMR who can immediately exploit the vast business potential of the area.

“In a letter dated 1 August 1983, which was received by Abbott
on 4 August 1983, complainant, thru his lawyer, objected to the transfer on the
grounds that it was not only a demotion but also personal and punitive in
nature without basis legally and factually.

“On 8 August 1983,
Victa issued another inter-office correspondence to
complainant, giving the latter up to 15
August 1983 within which to comply with the transfer order,
otherwise his name would be dropped from the payroll for having abandoned his
job.  When complainant failed to report
to his new assignment, Abbott assigned thereat Fausto
Antonio T. Tibi, another PED PMR who was priorly covering the provinces of Nueva
Ecija and Tarlac.

“Meanwhile, complainant filed applications for vacation leave
from 2 to 9 August 1983, and
then from 10 to 13 August 1983.  And on 18 August 1983, he filed the present complaint.

“After due consideration of the evidence adduced by the
parties, the Arbiter below ruled for the respondent on the ground that the
complainant is guilty of gross insubordination.” (pp. 17-19, Rollo; pp. 1-3, NLRC decision)

On appeal, the respondent National Labor Relations Commission
reversed the Arbiter’s decision and held that herein petitioners had no valid and justifiable reason to dismiss the
complainant.  The National Labor
Relations Commission ordered the latter’s reinstatement with backwages.

A motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by the
petitioners was denied.

On September 8, 1986,
the petitioners filed their second motion for reconsideration which was not
favorably acted upon by respondent National Labor Relations Commission as the
record of the case had already been transmitted to the labor arbiter for the
execution of its decision.

On December 16, 1986,
the petitioners and the private respondent agreed before the labor arbiter that
the former would bring the case before this Court.

Hence, this present petition.

Petitioners assigned as errors the following:

“x x
x [R]espondent NLRC
acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in that —

a]  Respondent NLRC
disregarded settled law and altered the parties’ contract when it stated that
private respondent’s prior consent was necessary for the validity of his
transfer, rendering his consequent dismissal for insubordination illegal.

b]  Granting
arguendo that prior consent of an employee is
required for the validity of his transfer to another territory, private
respondent had explicitly given such prior consent as a condition for his
hiring and continued employment by petitioner Abbott.

c]  Respondent
NLRC abused its discretion when it declared private respondent’s dismissal
illegal despite his clear and wilfull
insubordination.” (pp. 7, 10 and 11, Rollo).

When asked to comment on the petition as counsel for NLRC, the
Solicitor General, assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Zoilo
A. Andin and Trial Attorney Alexander Q. Gesmundo, agreed with the petitioners’ stand that the
dismissal of the private respondent from his employment was for valid reasons.

The main issue in this case is whether or not Albert Bobadilla could be validly dismissed from his employment on
the ground of insubordination for refusing to accept his new assignment.

We are constrained to answer in the affirmative.

The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion, and promotion of employees
has been traditionally identified as a management
prerogative subject to limitations found in law, a collective bargaining
agreement, or general principles of fair play and justice.  This is a function associated with the
employer’s inherent right to control and manage effectively its
enterprise.  Even as the law is
solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an
employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives.  The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to
achieve its purpose cannot be denied. 
(See Dangan v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 127 SCRA 706).

As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee
is recognized as an employer’s exclusive right and the prerogative of management.

We agree with the Labor Arbiter’s conclusions that:

“Settled is the rule in this regard that an employer, except
when limited by special laws, has the right to regulate, according to his own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, which includes, among
others, hiring, work assignments, place and manner of work, working regulations and transfer of employees in accordance with his operational demands and
requirements.  This right flows from
ownership and from the established rule that labor law does not authorize the
substitution of judgment of the employer in the conduct of his business, unless
it is shown to be contrary to law, morals or public policy (NLU v. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corp., 2 SCRA 924, 931; and Republic Savings
Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 226, 235).

“x x x
Abbott, in accordance with the demands and requirements of its marketing and
sales operations, adopted a policy to hire only sales applicants who are
willing to accept assignments in the provinces anywhere in the Philippines, and
to move into and live in the territory assigned to them.

“The existence and implementation of this policy are clearly
discernible from the questions appearing in the application form under the
heading:  ‘TO BE FILLED BY SALES
APPLICANTS ONLY,’ and the fact that Abbott, depending upon the needs of its
marketing and sales operations, periodically made transfers or reassignments of
its sales people.

“Complainant was precisely hired because he manifested at the
outset as a job applicant his willingness to follow the conditions of his
employment.  In line with the policy, as
practiced, Abbot, thru Jaime Victa, issued an
inter-office correspondence transferring
complainant to a newly opened sales territory – the Cagayan
Region, comprising the provinces of Cagayan, Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela.  According
to respondents, complainant was selected as PMR for the region primarily
because he was a veteran and seasoned PMR who can operate immediately with
minimum training and supervision.

“That complainant is a veteran and seasoned PMR is
admitted.  In fact, it is even conceded
by respondents that complainant was the leader of his peers in PED, as
indicated in the letter dated 20
December 1982 of Jaime Victa to
complainant.  That the Cagayan Region is relatively inaccessible cannot be debated  That the
territory needed a responsible PMR who could work under the least supervision
is a judgment of respondents.  And that
this judgment was arrived at upon consultations among the PED Marketing Manager
Jaime Victa, the Director for Administration
Francisco Lim, and the General Manager A. C. Bout, has been proven by
respondents.

“It appearing, therefore, that the order to transfer
complainant is based upon a judgment of his employer Abbott, which judgment to
transfer is in line with a company practice which is not contrary to law,
morals or public policy, hence, beyond the competence of this office to question,
the refusal of complainant to obey the lawful order of Abbott is gross insubordination
– a valid cause for dismissal.

“Complainant asserted that the true reason for his transfer
was the personal ill motives on the part of respondent Victa
who resented the derogatory remarks attributed to him, as purportedly shown in Victa’s memoranda dated 20 December 1982 and 26 April 1983. 
However, a cursory reading of said memoranda in question will show that
the same were legitimately issued by Victa in the
exercise of his functions as PED Manager. 
And the fact that complainant never lifted a finger to
formally question said memoranda is a mute admission on his part that the
allegations therein are true.

“Complainant also alleged that his transfer was a
demotion.  However, no explanation was
given much less any evidence presented in support of the allegation.  On the other hand, it is clear that there was
no change in complainant’s position and salary, privileges and benefits he was
receiving while in Manila.  With respect to the sales commission, Abbott
claimed that had complainant accepted the assignment, he could have earned more
because the sales prospects in the Cagayan Territory,
which comprises Nueva Vizcaya,
Isabela and Cagayan Province
were much higher than the territory assigned to him in Manila.  Besides, the assignment offered an important
avenue for future promotion, respondent concluded.” (pp.
6-9, Labor Arbiter’s decision).

Therefore, Bobadilla had no valid
reason to disobey the order of transfer. 
He had tacitly given his consent thereto when he acceded to the
petitioners’ policy of hiring sales staff who are willing to be assigned
anywhere in the Philippines which is demanded by the petitioners’ business.

By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical
representative is expected to travel.  He
should anticipate reassignment according to the demands of their business.  It would be a poor drug corporation which
cannot even assign its representatives or detail men to new markets calling for
opening or expansion or to areas where the need for pushing its products is great.  More so if such
reassignments are part of the employment contract.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The questioned decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission is SET
ASIDE.  The decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated April 16, 1985 is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., no part.