PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF LEYTE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A. CAVAL AND CIRILO M.…

Involved in this special
civil action is the unique situation, to use an
euphemistic phrase, of an alternative penal sanction of imprisonment imposed by
law but without a specification as to the term or duration thereof.

As a consequence of such
legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at bar seeks to set aside the decision of the
then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV,
dated September 8, 1976,^[1] penned by herein respondent judge and
granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction filed by herein private respondents and docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 5428, as well as his resolution of October 19, 1976^[2] denying the motions for reconsideration
filed by the parties therein.  Subject of
said decision were the issues on jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act
No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32 thereof.

In a complaint filed by
the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school
officials of Leyte,
were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for
violation of Republic Act No. 4670.  The
case was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975.  At
the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the accused therein,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. 
Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature
of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the offense.  The motion to quash was subsequently reduced
to writing on June 13, 1975.^[3] On August 21, 1975, the municipal court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.^[4] On September 2, 1975, private respondents
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid denial order on the
same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further allegation that the
facts charged do not constitute an
offense considering that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void
for being unconstitutional.  In an
undated order received by the counsel for private respondents on October
20, 1975, the motion
for reconsideration was denied.^[5]

On October
26, 1975, private
respondents filed a petition^[6] for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case
No. 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang
had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. 
Subsequently, an amended petition^[7] alleged the additional ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is
Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons:  (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual
punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely
left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative
department of the Government.

On March 30, 1976, having
been advised that the petition of herein private respondents was related to
Criminal Case No. 1978 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 442 previously
transferred from Branch VIII to Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Judge Fortunato
B. Cuna of the former branch transferred the said
petition to the latter branch for further proceedings and where it was
subsequently docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428.^[8] On
March 15, 1976,
the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of the said amended
petition^[9] but respondent judge denied the same in his
resolution of April 20, 1976.^[10] On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary
memorandum in answer to the amended petition.^[11]

On September 8, 1976,
respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged
decision holding in substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and
constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the former Municipal Court
of Hindang, Leyte only for
preliminary investigation.

As earlier stated, on September
25, 1976, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration.^[12] Likewise, private respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision but the same was limited only
to the portion thereof which sustains the validity of Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 4670.^[13] Respondent judge denied both motions for reconsideration in a resolution dated October
19, 1976.^[14]

The instant petition to
review the decision of respondent judge poses the following questions of
law:  (1) Whether the municipal and city
courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670; and (2) Whether
Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.

We shall resolve said
queries in inverse order, since prior determination of the constitutionality of
the assailed provision of the law involved is necessary for the adjudication of
the jurisdictional issue raised in this petition.

1.  The
disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:

“Sec. 32.  Penal Provision.
– A person who shall wilfully interfere with,
restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this
Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the
provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not
less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.” (Underscoring
supplied).

Two alternative and
distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit:  (a) a fine ranging from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment.  It is apparent that the law has no prescribed
period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment.  While a minimum and maximum amount for the
penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty
of imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase
“in the discretion of the court”.

Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what
Congress intended to be the duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative power, and that the absence of a provision on the specific
term of imprisonment constitutes that penalty into a cruel and unusual form of
punishment.  Hence, it is vigorously
asserted, said Section 32 is unconstitutional.

The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts
pertaining to the validity of legislation is that in the enactment of
legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created.  In every case where a question is raised as
to the constitutionality of an act, the court employs this doctrine in
scrutinizing the terms of the law.  In a
great volume of cases, the courts have enunciated the fundamental rule that there is a presumption in favor
of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.^[15]

It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on
the ground that the imposable but indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided
therein constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, in defiance of the express
mandate of the Constitution.  This
contention is inaccurate and should be
rejected.

We note with approval the
holding of respondent judge that –

“The rule is established beyond question that a punishment
authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature
of the offense unless it is a barbarous one
unknown to the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense
as to shock the moral sense of the community. 
Based on this principle, our Supreme Court has consistently overruled
contentions of the defense that the punishment of fine or imprisonment
authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual.  (Legarda vs.
Valdez, 1 Phil. 146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People vs. Estoista,
93 Phil 647; People vs. Tiu Ua,
96 Phil 738; People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299).  The language of our Supreme Court in the
first of the cases it decided after the last world war is appropriate here:

‘The Constitution directs that ‘Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.’ The prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply
to punishments which never existed in America, or which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at the
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like (15
Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561).  Fine and imprisonment would not thus be
within the prohibition.’  (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil 906).”^[16]

The question that should
be asked, further, is whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to the
form or nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and
the crime.

The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People
vs. Estoista,^[17]
where an “excessive” penalty was upheld as constitutional and was
imposed but with a recommendation for executive clemency, thus:

“x x x If
imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in
view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional
for this reason.  The constitutionality
of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. 
Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like
small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this
that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for
clemency or reduction of the penalty.  x x x“.

That the penalty is
grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the
law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual.  The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it
cruel or unsual.^[18] In addition, what degree of disproportion
the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await appropriate determination in due time since, to the
credit of our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a penalty
for being “cruel and unusual” or “excessive”.

We turn now to the
argument of private respondents that the entire penal provision in question
should be invalidated as an “undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the
court as if the latter were the legislative department of the government”.

Petitioner counters that
the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine the
period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue
delegation of legislative power.  It is
contended that the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power is
concerned only with the delegation of power to make laws and not to interpret
the same.  It is also submitted that
Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the discretion, not to fix the period
of imprisonment, but to choose which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed.

Respondent judge
sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that “the principle of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the
length of sentence or amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing
persons convicted of crime.  In such instance,
the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt to use
legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the
administration of justice and the application of existing laws to the facts of
particular cases.”^[19] What respondent judge obviously overlooked
is his own reference to penalties “between
designated limits”.

In his commentary on the
Constitution of the United States, Corwin wrote:

“x x x At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the
development of the principle that legislative power cannot be delegated.  One
is the doctrine of separation of powers: 
Why go to the trouble of separating the three
powers of government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion? The
second is the concept of due process of laws which precludes the transfer of
regulatory functions to private persons. 
Lastly, there is the maxim of agency ‘Delegata
potestas non potest delegari‘.”^[20]

An apparent exception to
the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the
courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts.  It is clear, however, that when the courts
are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere
legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law
and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow.^[21]

So it was held by the
Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation of powers
is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or
the amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of
a crime.^[22]

In the case under
consideration, the respondent judge erronneously
assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the
legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or
period of imprisonment.  We cannot agree
with this postulate.  It is not for the
courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature.  What valid delegation
presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of
service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or
designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits will
constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion
into or assumption, of legislative power.

Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with
neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative
authority.  The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of
imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that
the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one
minute to the life span of the accused. 
Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. 
It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in
nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on
separation of powers as well as the non-delegability
of legislative powers.  This time, the
presumption of constitutionality has to yield.

On the foregoing
considerations, and by virtue of the separability
clause in Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.

It follows, therefore,
that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of imprisonment,
as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic.  It is, however, worth mentioning that the
suggested application of the so-called rule or principle of parallelism,
whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one
year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial acceptance.  A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an
alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or converted into a
prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and
independent penalty consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code.^[23] It is likewise declared a discrete principal
penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said Code.  There is no rule for transmutation of the
amount of a fine into a term of imprisonment. 
Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when imposed in
conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty.  In sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty
as imprisonment.  Neither is subordinate
to the other.^[24]

2.  It has been the
consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.^[25]

With the deletion by
invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section 32 of Republic Act No.
4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for violations of said law
should be limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the same to serve as the basis in determining which
court may properly exercise jurisdiction thereover.  When the complaint against private
respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act
No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by
a fine of not more than P3,000.00 fall under the
original jurisdiction of the former municipal courts.  Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against
herein private respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.

WHEREFORE, the
decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  Criminal
Case No. 555 filed against private
respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court
of Hindang, Leyte
for trial on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan,
C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 80-105.

^[2]
Ibid., 117-138.

^[3]
Ibid., 25-30.

^[4]
Ibid., 31.

^[5]
Ibid., 37-38.

^[6]
Ibid., 19-24.

^[7]
Ibid., 56-61.

^[8]
Ibid., 5.

^[9]
Ibid., 62-63.

^[10]
Ibid., 64-62.

^[11]
Ibid., 68-79.

^[12]
Ibid., 106-112.

^[13]
Ibid., 113-116.

^[14]
Ibid., 117-138.

^[15]
16 Am. Jur. 2d, 631.

^[16]
Rollo, 98-99.

^[17]
93 Phil. 647 (1953).

^[18]
24 C.J.S. 1187-1188.

^[19]
Rollo, 98.

^[20]
Cited in Bernas, The Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol II, 1988 Ed., 73.

^[21]
16 Am. Jur. 2d, 902.

^[22]
Ohio ex rel.
Lloyd vs. Dollison, 194 U.S.
445, cited in 16 Am. Jur. 2d, 903.

^[23]
People vs. Basalo, 101 Phil.
57 (1957).

^[24]
People vs. Crisostomo, 5
SCRA 1048 (1962); People vs. Ignacio, 13 SCRA 153 (1965).

^[25]
People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA
273 (1968); People vs. Mariano, et al., 71 SCRA 600 (1976); Lee, et al. vs.
Hon. Presiding Judge, etc., et
al., 145 SCRA 408 (1986).