ALFREDO B. BARAÑGAN, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE HERNANDO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte^[1] holding illegal the removal of
appellee Alfredo Barañgan from the office of the chief of police of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and ordering his reinstatement thereto with back
salaries.

From a stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, the lower
court culled the following material facts: On 17 July 1961, Barañgan was
appointed acting chief of police of San Nicolas by the then incumbent Mayor,
Dominador Madamba.  On 1 July 1963, he
was extended another appointment to the same position.  Said appointment was approved by the.  Commissioner of Civil Service on 24 March
1965, subject to the condition that the same would not extend beyond thirty
days from receipt of the confirmation in the office of the mayor.

On 30 April 1965, Barañgan’s service was terminated by appellant
new Mayor Vicente Hernando.  Having
passed the Civil Service Examination for Chiefs of Police on 20 December 1963,
Barañgan invoked his civil service eli­gibility and refused to vacate his
office.  He also immediately appealed to
the Commissioner of Civil Service.

Noting that Barañgan possessed the appropriate civil service
eligibility, the Commissioner sent his first indorsement to Mayor Hernando on
12 May 1965 reapproving Barañgan’s appointment “as provisional
under Section 24 (c) of Republic Act 2260 effective 1 July 1963, to 22 November
1963 and permanent effective 23 November 1963 under Section 24 (b) of said
law”, and advising the latter’s reinstatement in the service.  Another indorsement was forwarded to the
mayor on 20 April 1966 in response to Barañgan’s request for implementation of
the first one.  In the meantime, or on 5
April 1966, the mayor appointed Gregorio Damo, one of the appellants, as chief
of police.

On 12 May 1966, Barañgan importuned for a “definite and
final ruling” from the Commissioner. 
The latter accordingly issued his sixth indorsement on 9 January 1967
holding that Barañgan was a permanent chief of police,who could be dismissed
only in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 557, and, therefore,
could not be summarily discharged from service; and that Barañgan’s position
could not be considered vacant to which another person might be appointed
inasmuch as his removal was unlawful.

Subsequently, Barañgan himself demanded from the mayor and the
members of the municipal council of San Nicolas, the other appellants, his
reinstatement pursuant to the Commissioner’s sixth indorsement.  Having been rebuffed, he went to court on
special civil actions for quo warranto and mandamus.

On 22 November 1967, the lower court rendered judgment.  Sustaining the Commissioner’s alleged power
to qualify the nature of appointments submitted to him for approval, said court
held that with his reapproval of Barañgan’s appoint­ment as provisional,and
then as permanent, the same was no longer terminable at the pleasure of the
mayor, the appointing power; hence, Barañgan’s position was considered not
vacated by his purportedly unwarranted ouster and, for lack of a vacant
position to be filled up, Dames appointment thereto was deemed inexist­ent.  The defense of prescription of action for quo
warranto was brushed aside as already academic for the reason that the
recourse sought by Barañgan was also for mandamus and that he had allegedly
established a cogent right to it.  Re­instatement
With back salaries was ordered, as previously intimated.  From this decision, appeal was directly made
to us.

The decision should be reversed, as prayed for by
appellants.  The rule herein applicable
is well settled.  In the recent case of
Santos, et al. vs. Chico, et al.,^[2]
we stated the same, as follows:

“ – – – – – While the Civil Service Law (Re­public Act 2260)
recognizes three classes of civil service appointments, permanent, provisional
and temporary (section 24), each class with requisites of its own, the
determination of the kind of appoint­ment to be extended lies in the official
vested by law with appointing power (the Municipal Mayor in case of local
policemen) and not in the Commissioner of Civil Service.  The statute could be scanned in vain for any
authority on the part of the Commissioner to supersede the discretion of the
appointing officer on the nature or class of the appointment to be
extended.  All that the Commis­sioner is
empowered to do is to approve or reject the appointment, depending upon its
compliance with statutory requirements, and to review, correct or revise those
made by provincial, municipal or city executives (Republic Act 2260, section
20), in order to make them
conform thereto.

” In
the case before us, the act of the Civil Service Commissioner in approving as provisional
the temporary appointment made by the Municipal Mayor constitutes an
unwarranted invasion of the discretion of the appointing officer, and can not
be operative.  Otherwise, the
Commissioner would be exercising himself the power of appointment that the law
has lodged elsewhere; it would make him the arbiter of what kind of
appointments should be ex­tended in every case. 
Certainly, nothing in the Civil Service Law indicates a legislative
intent to this effect.

“It
follows that the appointment of petitioners must be regarded as temporary
as originally ex­tended, and should be deemed approved as such by the Civil
Service.  As a result, the petitioners
enjoy no fixed or protected tenure, and the appellee-res­pondent, Mayor Chico,
had the right to terminate their services at any time, this condition being
inherent in the temporary character of their appointment. “

We are of the belief that Barañgan’s reappointment is temporary
in charac­ter, the same kind of appointment originally extended to him by
former Mayor Madamba.  This inference
logically follows from his evident failure to prove, by submitting his case for
decision in the court a quo on the basis of an in­complete
stipulation of facts, the decisive fact that his reappointment is other­wise.  Other than his assertion, or rather vague
intimation, in his brief of his reappointment in the provisional capacity, the
record is bereft of any showing to this effect. 
On the contrary, the Civil Service Commissioner’s approval, under date
of 24 March 1965, of his second appointment by the former mayor, with the
stipulation that it should not extend beyond 30 days, is proof that the
appointment was temporary in character, for only then could that condition be
validly attached.  Such being the case,
Barañgan stands outside the protective mantle of a secured tenure and may be
summarily removed at the pleasure of the appointing power.  His civil service eligibility avails him
nothing at all.  As a temporary
appointee, he is not entitled to the protection afforded by Re­public Act No.
557, nor to the protection of security of tenure in office guaranteed by the
Constitution.^[3]  Neither can he derive comfort from the act of
the Commissioner of Civil Service reclassifying his second appointment as pro­visional,
and then as permanent.  This is an exercise in futility.  It is, in fact, an illegal act which
appellant Mayor Hernando may rightfully dis­regard (Santos vs. Chico, ante,)
for, as already ruled, to allow the Civil. 
Service Commissioner to qualify at his pleasure an appointment already
made is to permit him to assume the appointing power, contrary to law.  And shorn of any right to permanently occupy
the position in question, Barañgan may not compel said mayor to reinstate him thereto
by mandamus.  Certainly, the same mayor
may appoint another, as he has,
in fact, appointed appellant Damo, in his place.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed,
and the Commissioner of Civil Service ordered to act on the appointment of
appellant Damo.  Costs against appellee.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Sanchez, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Civil Case No. 4298.

^[2]
G. R. No. L-24155, 30 September 1968.

^[3]
Jimenea vs. Guanson, G. R. No. L-24795, 29 January 1968, and cases cited
therein.