G.R. No. L-18040. August 31, 1962
SANTIAGO RICE MILL, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. SANTIAGO LABOR UNION ALIAS MAGAT LABOR UNION, RESPONDENT.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
of palay. This mill is owned and operated by King Hong Co., Inc., a corporation
organized under our laws, with principal office in Manila, and a branch office
at Santiago, Isabela, where the mill and warehouse were situated.
On June 21, 1952, the Santiago labor union, composed of workers of said rice
mill, filed before the Court of Industrial Relations a petition for overtime
pay, differential pay, vacation and sick leave pay, and other privileges for the
benefit of the workers, which was later amended on September 2, 1952. In the
amended petition, the union prayed for payment of P100,816.36 representing
overtime services allegedly rendered to the company; P19,350.00 representing
differential pay for services rendered during the nights, Sundays and legal
holidays; P3,360.00 representing differential pay under the Minimum Wage Law,
plus attorney’s fees and costs.
On October 27, 1952, the company filed its answer to the amended complaint
alleging, among others, that the court had no jurisdiction to arbitrate and pass
upon petitioners’ demand as the workers Involved had been fully paid for their
services, that the provisions of the Minimum Wage Law had been complied with;
and that vacation and sick leave with pay are being paid to permanent employees.
And on November 3, 1952, the union filed a motion praying for reinstatement of
workers that had been laid off, as well as for the punishment of the officials
of the company for contempt.
On September 19, 1958, after a protracted hearing during which scores of
witnesses and voluminous exhibits were presented, the court, thru Judge Emiliano
C. Tabigne, rendered decision dismissing the petition of the union for lack of
merit and want of jurisdiction; but, upon a motion for reconsideration, the
Court of Industrial Relations en banc, by a split decision of 3-2 vote,
issued a resolution reversing the decision of the trial judge. The dispositive
part of said resolution reads:
“WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the overtime claim of
both male and female claimants herein computed at their basis pay for each
period in question; the legal premium for night, Sunday and holiday work or
services rendered by the male claimants herein computed also on the proven basic
wage or salary at the time in question; to pay the overtime claim of their
drivers computed on their respective monthly salaries; to pay the differentials
due each of the women claimants on their wages from August 4, 1951 at the rate
of P2.00 daily and P3.00 daily from August 4, 1952; and to reinstate the
claimants both male and female, who have testified and proved their having been
illegally laid-off, with the right of respondents to deduct from the back wages
due each claimant any amount earned during the period of the illegal
dismissal.”
The company interposed the present petition for review.
Petitioner poses in this appeal the following issues: (1) the Court of
Industrial Relations erred in ruling that it has jurisdiction to act on the
claims herein despite the failure of the union to allege that the existing labor
dispute between the parties “is causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
or a possibility thereof is imminent or expected”; (2) the Court of Industrial
Relations erred in granting the claims of the union despite the overwhelming,
clear and convincing evidence presented by the company in said court and the
unreliability of the evidence presented by the union; and (3) the Court of
Industrial Relations erred in not finding that the claimants who had testified
were employed on the “pakiao” basis and therefore are not entitled to overtime
compensation or differential pay under the Minimum Wage Law.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that in H. E. Heacock Company vs.
National Labor Union,[1] this Court
ruled, that for the Court of Industrial Relations to have jurisdiction of any
labor dispute under Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, arising
from difference concerning wages, compensation, dismissals, lay-offs, suspensoin
of laborers, hours of labor, or conditions of employment, between the employers
and employees, besides other jurisdictional requirements that the law
prescribes, there must be an allegation by the complaining party that the
labor dispute is causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout or a possibility
thereof is imminent or expected from the violation or failure of the party
charged to comply with tha provisions of the law involved. Since there is no
such allegation in the petition filed herein by respondent union, the same lacks
an essential ingredient that may give the industrial court its jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the petition. Yet, said court, despite the absence of such
allegation, declared itself with jurisdiction to act on the present case.
It appears, however, that the second amended petition filed by the union
contains paragraphs 14 and 15 which we hereunder copy for ready reference:
“14. That to enable them to continue and prolong their illegal and wrongful
exploitation of their workers, respondents have unlawfully interfered with the
union activities of their workers to be investigated by the local constabulary
and securing false affidavits or sworn statements from them which were filed
with this Court, but even to that of maliciously prosecuting their leaders and
dismissing without just cause the workers who persist in their union activities
of demanding immediate amelioration of the working and living conditions of the
workers;“15. That to promote a more harmonious relations between respondents and
their workers, petitioner as the sale collective bargaining agent or
representative of the workers in respondent rice mill demands that close shop
agreement be executed by and between petitioner and respondents under the
supervision of this Court containing among others the following: Non-employment
in respondent rice mill of non-union workers and/or employees; free medical and
dental services for all workers; vacation and sick have with pay for all
workers; compulsory group insurance; correct and prompt payment of compensation
to injured workers; payment of wages and salaries on time and discontinuance of
practice of selling rice and other prime commodities on credit but at higher
price as substitute for paying wages and salaries on time; 50% premium for
overtime services; 100% premium for night, Sunday and legal holiday work; strict
compliance with the 8 Hour, Minimum and other labor laws; check-up for union
dues and fees; prohibition against dismissing workers and employees without
previous hearing and without just cause; and creation of an arbitration board to
settle differences between management and labor as well as pass upon propriety
of dismissing any worker and employee;”
The paragraphs abovequoted, it is true, do not allege in so many words that
the dispute or differences that had existed between the company and its workers
ig one that is likely to cause a strike or lockout or a possibility thereof is
imminent, but it can be clearly inferred that such dispute or differences are so
serious that the break between them or of their labor relationship is expected
or imminent considering the attitude of the company in interfering with the
union activities of its workers to the extent of securing false affidavits to
serve as basis of certain malicious prosecution against their leaders aside from
the tenacious refusal of the company to attend to their demands for improvement
of their working conditions as warranted by the 8-hour, minimum or other labor
laws. As a matter of fact, as the record seems to reveal, many of the workers
affiliated with the petitioning union were laid-off as a consequence of said
union activities thereby giving rise to the present petition for indemnity and
reinstatement. It is for this reason that the industrial court considered it to
be merely a matter of form to aver in a specific manner that the existing labor
dispute “is likely to cause a strike or lockout”, or that one is imminent or
expected, it being sufficient that from the factual allegations appearing in the
petition such is clearly deducible. (Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103). And,
as the industrial court has properly observed, “with the dismissal of the
members of herein petitioner, after they had tiled the original petition in
these cases and the service to respondent rice mill of the labor demands
(Exhibits ‘E’ or ‘G’), and which dismissal was made the subject of the complaint
and the motion for reinstatement with pay, it became unnecessary for
petitioner to still allege in the second amended petition that the labor dispute
complained of ‘is causing or is likely to cause’ a strike or lockout or a
possibility thereof was imminent or expected from the violation or failure of
the respondents to comply with the provisions of the 8-Hour, Minimum and other
labor laws, inasmuch as the workers had already been dismissed so that it was no
longer within their power to call and stage a strike and neither was there any
necessity for respondents to lockout any of them.”
Finally, we have the circumstance that while this case was pending trial
before the industrial court Republic Act No. 875, known as the Magna Carta of
Labor, was enacted on June 17, 1953, and before this case came to a decision,
several cases had been decided by this Court wherein it was laid down as a
constant and decisive ruling that where the employer-employee relationship is
still existing or is sought to be reestablished, as when there is a petition for
reinstatement, the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over the claim
if it arises out of, or is in connection with, the provisions of the Minimum the
time has come for the court to Mew the case in line charge of unfair labor
practice,[2] and so we may say that Wage
Law, or the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or involves a with the spirit of the new law,
since the transitory provision contained in the new Act does not require that
the pending cases be decided in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 103
(Section 27, Republic Act 875), even if it enjoins the judges to make every
attempt to help the parties reach a just and speedy solution by mutual
agreement, which is the main objective of the new Act. The industrial court,
therefore, did not err in assuming jurisdiction over the present case.
With regard to the second and third issues, we note that they merely involve
questions of fact which, under our law and jurisprudence, may not now be
inquired into in this appeal, unless it is shown that they are not supported by
substantial evidence. Here, it is true, there is an attempt to prove that such
is the case, by pointing out that the industrial court considered favorably the
claim of the union by relying merely on the evidence of the union and ignoring
the so-called overwhelming and convincing evidence of the employer. But such
attempt must fail, not only because of the careful and painstaking evaluation of
the evidence made by the court itself but also because of the refutation and
discussion made of such evidence by counsel for the union.
Thus, in discussing the issues raised in connection with the evidence
submitted by both parties, the industrial court made the following comment:
“A check and comparison with the corresponding transcript of the stenographic
notes of the testimony of each of the witnesses referred to and relied on by the
decision reveals, however, that what appeared as seemingly inconsistent or
contradictory statements are due mainly to omissions of vital portions of the
pertinent testimony as reproduced in the said memorandum to probably support
counsel’s contention. This is specially, but not solely manifest in its
quotation of the alleged testimonies of witnesses Segundino S. Mailem during the
hearing on March 13, 1953; Anastacio Manafigan during the hearing on March 18
and 23, 1953; and Alfredo Taguba during the hearing on January 16, 1957. While
it is true, as usual and ordinary in any case, that inconsistencies and
contradictions also occurred in the testimonies of the witnesses of the
petitioner, it is also very evident that those contradictions and
inconsistencies are due only to lapse of memory specially since the facts they
were testifying to occurred some years before they were called to testify and
that most if not all said witnesses appeared from the manner they answered
questions as not only having also low degree of intelligence but also of not
having had the benefit of education. However, on the whole, their testimonies
have substantially supported the stand of petitioner on the main issues involved
in its different claims and inasmuch as the contradictions, which in most cases
were also rectified either directly or indirectly, referred to minor and most
often immaterial and collateral issues which could not and should not influence
the decision in these cases, we find the evidence of petitioner not only more
reliable and dependable than that of the respondents’ but also of having
sufficiently and substantially established and sustained its major claims. And
if the failure and refusal of respondents’ counsel to furnish petitioner’s
counsel with a copy of their aforesaid memorandum of September 2, 1957 and the
fact of its having misguided the aforesaid decision are taken into
consideration, indeed the said decision should be reversed by this Court en
banc on the ground that its findings of facts are not totally supported by
the evidence presented during the hearing of these cases.”
Again, with regard to the union’s claim that the company made its laborers
work 24 hours daily, including Sundays and holidays, during the period in
question, and not only for 8 hours daily, except Sundays and holidays, as
claimed by the company, the industrial court made the following evaluation of
the evidence:
“In the appreciation of the testimonies of said four witnesses, none of whom
was shown to have any interest at stake in these cases, we find no reason to
doubt their sincerity and truthfulness as none of them is party in these cases.
On the other hand, aside from the fact that all the witnesses presented by
respondents to support their claim that they operated their rice mill on
strictly 8 hours operation daily and only during ordinary work days by observing
operation hours of 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. are all
permanent employees who are under the control of respondents yet irreconciliable
contradictions in their respective testimonies on the important point of
respondents’ contention rendered their theory unreliable, unbelievable and
untenable. These fatal contradictions appeared in the testimonies of Antonio
Ricafrente (Hearing on June 20, 1955) and Tan Pieng (hearing on August 22, 1956)
who both testified that the operation of the rice mill was from 8:00 to 12:00 in
the morning and from 1:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon but were both contradicted by
Gregorio Caringo (hearing on June 17, 1955) and Primitivo Crystal (hearing on
July 6, 1955), both of whom testified on the other hand that the rice mill
actually operated from 7:00 to 11:00 in the morning and from 1:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon. Another witness of respondents, Anastacia Cortez Paseua, contradicted
the above four witnesses of respondents in their contention that the rice mill
operated and remained open up to 5:00 p.m., for according to her (hearing on
August 23, 1955) the rice mill operated up to 4:00 p.m. only and closed at said
time.“Such serious contradictions can only mean that respondents are not telling
the truth, for clearly they cannot be mistaken on such important parts of their
daily work. This is further strengthened by the testimony of Antonio Ricafrente,
one of the respondents’ machine tenders and aparatistas, who admitted (hearing
on July 6, 1955) that they were three machine tenders and aparatistas (Gregorio
Garingo, Cornelio Ramos and he) in said rice mill who each worked 8 hours daily
one after the other so that no two of them worked at the same time or turn, thus
unwittingly admitting that the rice mill actually operated during the period in
question the whole 24 hours daily which is the sum total of the 8 hours each of
them worked separately and at different periods.”
The company, it is true, made an effort to prove that its rice mill operated
only 8 hours daily by presenting some books covering its purchases and sales and
income showing the volume of work done during the period in question from which
it draws the conclusion that having in mind such volume and the capacity of the
mill it could not have been possible for the company to operate the mill for 24
hours daily, as claimed. But the industrial court refuted such claim in the
following wise:
“* * * This finding also took into consideration respondents contention, as
sought to be proved by the books of purchases and sales as well as incomes of
the rice mill, that the rice mill did not need to operate 24 hours daily because
as its records show it did not have sufficient stock of palay, corn and peanuts
to mill if it were to operate that long with its milling capacity that has been
increased to 350-400 cavans of clean rice in 8 hours operation only. Precisely,
respondents’ own admission of having employed no less than 20 agents or buyers
of these cereals and their big warehouse aside from the warehouses of their
buyers wherein they stored said cereals which were all milled in said rice mill;
the unusually big hauling capacity of their trucks that hauled said cereals that
even went as far as some towns of Cagayan province; and the three high power
machines used to provide motive power to the rice cono, corn mill and peanut
sheller which have been mechanically installed so that the three can be pulled
by only one of said machines or engines, these facts only prove that the books
of the said rice mill did not really reflect the true and actual transactions of
respondents and at the same time pointed out the fact that all the equipment and
materials of respondent rice mill were all geared to a 24 hours operation daily.
As correctly observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Internal
Revenue vs. Aurelio P. Reyes, G. R. No. L-11534 & L-11558, promulgated
November 25, 1958: ‘Books of account do not prove per se that they are
veracious; in fact they may be more consistent than truthful.’ ”
And anent the claim of the company that the women winnowers were employed not
on the daily wage basis but on piece work, the same was likewise rejected by the
industrial court because it considered the evidence submitted by the union
overwhelming. The following is the observation of the industrial court:
“* * * On this point, the testimony of Mariano de la Cruz (hearing on January
17, 1957); Urbana Tapiador (hearing on February 13, 1957); Natividad Malgapo
(hearing on April 18, 1955); Maria Pasion (hearing on April 18, 1955); Segundino
S. Mailem (hearing on March 13, 1953 and on June 9, 1955); and of the women
claimants presented to prove and establish this claim of petitioner have
convincingly substantiated that these women were indeed employed on the daily
wage basis and not on the piece work as found by the decision. The very
contention of respondents that on the piece work basis each woman working 8
hours only could easily earn a minimum of P4.00 daily only gave credence to
petitioner’s claim that these women were paid on the daily wage since
respondents failed to show why they would prefer to pay on the piece work and
pay P4.00 for work that they could easily pay at P2.50 only, the rate they paid
the daily wage male workers at the time. Another piece of evidence against
respondents’ contention is their admission that to both the male daily wage
workers and said women winnowers, respondent rice mill issued a ‘chapa’ or badge
which is a piece of metal to indicate the wage or pay of their labor whereas in
the case of the piece work (‘pakiao’) male workers no such ‘chapa’ or badge was
ever issued. This only shows again that the women winnowers were employed and
paid under similar conditions and terms as the male daily wage
workers.”
Finally, with regard to the claim for reinstatement of the laborers who had
been laid-off, the industrial court found that their lay-off was caused not
because of the stoppage of work due to the installation of the company’s corn
mill but rather as a reprisal for their union activities in an effort to compel
them to desist therefrom and be more cooperative with the company.
The foregoing findings of fact, we repeat, cannot now be looked into
considering that they are supported by substantial evidence.
Wherefore, the resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
[1] 103 Phil., 600.
[2] Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., 108 Phil., 134; Board of Liquidators, et al vs.
CIR., et al., 108 Phil., 162; NASCO vs. CIR., et al., 107 Phil., 1007; Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Coto Labor Union, 105 Phil., 915; SMB Box Factory
Workers’ Union vs. Victoriano, 102 Phil., 646; Allied Worker’s Union vs.
Apostol, 102 Phil., 292, PAFLU vs. Tan, 99 Phil., 854.