CLEMENTE BRIÑAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, affirming the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, Branch I, which found the
accused Clemente Briñas guilty of the crime of DOUBLE HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE for the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo.

The information charged
the accused-appellant and others as follows:

“That on or about the 6th day of January, 1957, in the
Municipality of Tiaong, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdic­tion of this Hon. Court, the said accused Victor Milan, Clemente
Briñas and Hemogenes Buencamino, being then persons in charge of
passenger Train No. 522-6 of the Manila Railroad Company, then running
from Tagkawayan to San Pablo City, as
engine driver, conductor and assistant conductor, respectively, wilfully and
unlaw­fully drove and operated
the same in a negligent, careless and impru­dent manner,
without due regard to existing laws, regulations and ordinances, that although
there were passengers on board the passenger coach, they failed to provide lamps or
lights therein, and failed to take the
necessary precautions for the safety of passengers and to prevent accident to
persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness
and imprudence, that when said passenger Train No. 522-6 was passing the
railroad tracks in the Municipality of Tiaong, Quezon, two of its passengers,
Martina Bool, an old woman, and Emelita Gesmundo, a child about three years of age, fell from the passenger coach of the
said train, as a result of which, they were over run, causing their instant­aneous
death.”

The facts established by the prosecution and accepted by the
respondent court as basis for the decision are summarized as follows:

“The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that in the
afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanita Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the
railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool
and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo, who were bound for
Barrio Lusacan, Tiaong, same province. At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the old woman and
her granddaughter among the
passengers. At Hondagua the train’s
complement were relieved, with Victor Millan taking over as engineman, Clemente
Brinas as conductor, and Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant con­ductor. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag in Tiaong at
about 8:00 p.m. of that same night, the train slowed down and the
conductor shouted ‘Lusacan’, Lusacan’. Thereupon, the old woman walked towards the left front door facing the
direction of Tiaong, carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with the other. When Martina and Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly
picked up speed. As a result the old
woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no more. It took three minutes more before the train
stopped at the next barrio, Lusacan, and the victims were not among the
passengers who disembarked thereat.

“Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two
corpses were found along the railroad tracks at Barrio Lagalag. Re­pairing to the scene to investigate, they
found the lifeless body of a female child, about 2 feet from the railroad
tracks, sprawled to the ground with her belly down, the hand resting on the
forehead, and with the back portion of the head crushed. The
investigators also found the corpse of an old woman about 2 feet away from the
railroad tracks with the head and both legs severed and the left hand
missing. The head was located farther
west between the rails. An arm was
found midway from the body of the child to the body of the old woman. Blood, pieces of scattered brain and pieces
of clothes were at the scene. Later,
the bodies were identified as those of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Among the personal effects found on Martina
was a train ticket (Exhibit “B”).

On January 7, 1957, the bodies of the deceased were autopsied by
Dr. Pastor Huertas, the Municipal Health
Officer of Tiaong. Dr. Huertas
testified on the cause of death of the victims as follows:

“FISCAL YNGENTE:

“Q   What
could have caused the death of those women?

“A    Shock.

“Q   What
could have caused that shock?

“A    Traumatic
injury.

“Q   What
could have caused traumatic injury?

“A    The running over by the wheel of the
train.

“Q   With those injuries, has a person a
chance to survive?

“A    No
chance to survive.

“Q   What
would you say death would come?

“A    Instantaneous.

“Q   How
about the girl, the young girl about four years old, what could have caused the
death?

“A    Shock
too.

“Q
  What could have caused the shock?

“A    Compound
fracture of the skull and going out of the brain.

“Q   What
could have caused the fracture of the skull and the going out of the brain?

“A    That is the impact against a steel
object.”

(TSN.,
pp. 81-82, July 1, 1959)

The Court of First Instance of Quezon convicted
defendant-appellant Clemente Briñas for double homi­cide thru reckless
imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor Millan. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

“WHEREFORE, the court finds the defendant Clemente Briñas
guilty beyond doubt of the crime of double homicide thru reckless imprudence,
defined and punished under Article 305 in connection with Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentences him to suffer six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Martina Bool and
Emelita Gesmundo in the amounts of P6,000 and P3,000, respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the
costs.

“For lack of sufficient evidence against the defendant
Hermogenes Buencamino and on the ground of reason­able doubt in the case of
defendant Victor Millan, the court hereby acquits them of the crime charged in the information and their bail bonds declared cancelled.

“As to the responsibility of the Manila Railroad Company in this case, this will be the subject of court determination in another proceeding.”

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the lower court.

During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon, the heirs of
the deceased victims filed with the same court a separate civil action
for damages against the Manila
Railroad Company entitled “Civil Case No. 5978, Manaleyo Gesmundo,
et al., v. Manila Railroad Company”. The separate civil action was filed for the recovery of P30,350.00 from the Manila Railroad Company as damages resulting from
the accident.

The accused-appellant alleges that the Court of Appeals made the
following errors in its decision:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING
PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNDER THE FACTS AS FOUND BY SAID COURT; and

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INCLUDING THE PAYMENT OF
DEATH INDEMNITY BY THE PETITIONER?APPELLANT, WITH SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT
IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY, AFTER THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED HAVE ALREADY COMMENCED A
SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES
AGAINST THE RAILROAD COMPANY ARISING FROM THE SAME MISHAP.

We see no error in the factual findings of the respondent court
and in the conclusion drawn from those
findings.

It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where the petitioner-appellant
was assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened its speed
and the conductor shouted
“Lusacan, Lusacan”, they stood up and proceeded to the nearest
exit. It is also undisputed that the
train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result “the old woman and the child
stumbled and they were seen no more.”

In finding
petitioner-appellant negligent, respondent Court of Appeals ruled that:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“The appellant’s announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a full three minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan
was reached. In making the erroneous
and premature announcement, appellant
was negligent. He ought to have known
that train passengers invariably prepare to alight upon notice from the
conductor that the destination was reached and that the train was about to
stop. Upon the facts, it was the
appellant’s neg­ligent act which led the victims to the door. Said acts virtually exposed the victims to
peril, for had not the appellant mistakenly made the announcement, the victims would be safely ensconced in their seats when the train
jerked while picking up speed. Although
it might be argued that the negligent act of the appellant was not the
immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury, for the train
jerked before the victims stumbled, yet in legal contemplation appellant’s
negligent act was the proximate cause of the injury. As this Court held in Tucker v. Milan, CA-G.R.
No. 7059-R, June 3, 1953: ‘The
proximate cause of the injury is not necessarily the immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury. It is only when the causes are independent of each other that the
nearest is to be charged with the disaster. So long as there is a natural, direct and continuous sequence between the
negligent act the injury (sic) that it can reasonably be said that but for the
act the injury could not have occurred, such negligent act is the proximate cause
of the injury, and whoever is
responsible therefore is liable for damages resulting there­from. One who negligently creates a dangerous
condition cannot escape liability for
the natural and probable
consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God
for which he is not responsible
intervenes to precipitate the loss.”

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common
carriers like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they
slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common experience
that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest
exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because
passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able to
disembark, there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.

It was negligence on the conductor’s part to announce the next
flag stop when said stop was still a full three minutes ahead. As the respondent Court of Appeals correctly
observed, “the appellant’s announcement was premature and erroneous.”

That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the
fact that immediately after the train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated
to full speed. Petitioner-appellant
failed to show any reason why the train
suddenly resumed its regular speed. The
announcement was made while the train was still at Barrio Lagalag.

The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature
and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant Briñas. This announcement prompted the two victims
to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in
their respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature and
erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is
direct and natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.

Petitioner-appellant also argues that it was negligence per se
for Martina Bool to go to the door of the coach while the train was still in
motion and that it was this negligence that was the proximate cause of their
deaths.

We have carefully examined the records and we agree with the
respondent court that the negligence of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and
erron­eously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the
deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal
liability.

With respect to the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that after the
heirs of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo had actually commenced the separate
civil action for damages in the same trial court during the pendency of the criminal
action, the said court had no more power to include any civil liability in its
judgment of conviction.

The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case
No. 5978 is culpa contractual, not an act or omission punishable by law. We also note from the appellant’s arguments
and from the title of the civil case that the party defendant is the Manila
Railroad Company and not petitioner-appellant Briñas. Culpa contractual and
an act or omission punishable by law
are two distinct sources of obligation.

The petitioner-appellant argues that since the information did
not allege the existence of any
kind of damages whatsoever coupled by the fact that no private prosecutors
appeared and the prosecution witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of
damages, the trial court erred in awarding death indemnity in its judgment of
conviction.

A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the criminal
action for double homi­cide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their
right to file an independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil
action against the Manila Railroad Company.

The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the
filing with it of the separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company,
it still awarded death indemnity in the judgment of conviction against the petitioner-appellant.

It is well-settled
that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items of damages may be recovered: (1) an
indemnity for the death of the victim; (2) an indemnity for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5)
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation,
and (6) interest in proper cases.

The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and interests are recoverable separately
from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death. This indemnity arising from the fact of death due to a
crime is fixed whereas the others are still subject to the determination of the court based on the evidence
presented. The fact that the witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of damages is of no moment because the death
indemnity fixed for death is separate and distinct from the other forms of
indemnity for damages.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modi­fied in that
the award for death indemnity is increased to P12,000.00 for the death of
Martina Bool instead of P6,000.00 and P12,000.00 for the death of Emelita
Gesmundo instead of P3,000.00, but de­leting the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency imposed by the lower court. The judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Relova, JJ.,
concur.