ROMUALDO MONTESINO, JUSTINIANA MONTESINO, ODON MONTESINO, NARCISA MONTESINO AND BERNARDO MONTESINO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. EUSEBIO RULLAN AND ESPEDITO PISON, DEFENDANTS-APPE…
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Montesino versus Rullan
The Case
This is a case about land, a homestead patent, and the clock that runs against heirs who sleep on their rights. The Montesino plaintiffs sued Eusebio Rullan and Espedito Pison to annul and cancel two transfer certificates of title over a lot in Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and to compel the defendants to convey the land to them, with damages and costs. The plaintiffs claimed to be the heirs of Petra Limsiaco, the original homestead applicant, and they alleged that Rullan had fraudulently held himself out as her surviving spouse and sole heir. The case matters to a reviewee because it shows how the summary settlement of an estate under the Rules of Court starts a short prescriptive period, and how a plaintiff who comes to court too late loses even a sympathetic claim.
Procedural History
The plaintiffs commenced the action in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental on April 11, 1962, and later filed an amended complaint. After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. It held that Eugenio de la Cruz, whom the plaintiffs say was the true surviving spouse of Petra Limsiaco, had lost by prescription whatever rights he may have had in the lot, and that he therefore transmitted none to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court by writ of error, and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.
Facts
Petra Limsiaco filed an application for a homestead patent over Lot Number 894 of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, on or about May 13, 1939. She did not obtain the patent before her death, which occurred in October 1942 or September 1943. The Original Certificate of Title was not issued until July 8, 1954, and so it was placed in the name of the Heirs of Petra Limsiaco.
Soon thereafter, on September 2, 1954, Transfer Certificate of Title Number T-16421 was issued in favor of Eusebio Rullan, with whom Petra Limsiaco had apparently been living as husband and wife. This was done upon his filing of a deed entitled Declaration of Heirship, executed by him on August 31, 1954, adjudicating the lot to himself as her surviving spouse and only heir. On December 20, 1961, Rullan sold the property to Espedito Pison. The sale was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture on March 12, 1962, upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands, and Transfer Certificate of Title Number T-31734 was issued in the name of Pison on March 23, 1962, cancelling the earlier certificate.
The plaintiffs then sued on April 11, 1962. They alleged that they are the children of a first degree cousin of Petra Limsiaco and, as such, her heirs; that Rullan was neither her surviving spouse nor her heir; that he had acted fraudulently in claiming to be so related to the deceased and thus caused the title to be transferred to him; and that Pison was not a purchaser in good faith. In their amended complaint, they added that they had acquired the rights over the lot of Eugenio de la Cruz, whom they maintain is the true surviving spouse of Petra Limsiaco.
Issues
- Whether or not the plaintiffs' action to annul the transfer certificates of title and to recover the lot was filed within the period allowed by law for a person unduly deprived of a share in the estate of a deceased person.
- Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint on the ground that the rights of Eugenio de la Cruz, if any, had been lost by prescription and were never transmitted to the plaintiffs.
Applicable Provisions
Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, as applied by the Court, provides:
If it is made to appear at any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of the estate of a deceased person in accordance with the provisions of either of the two preceding sections, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or other person may compel the settlement of said estate in the court for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation.
This provision fixes the period within which an heir or other person unduly deprived of a lawful participation in the estate may act, and it is the measure the Court used to test the timeliness of the complaint.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the action was filed too late. Upon the extrajudicial adjudication of the lot to Eusebio Rullan as the alleged surviving spouse, Eugenio de la Cruz, assuming he was the legal spouse of Petra Limsiaco, or any heir or other person unduly deprived of a lawful participation in the estate, had two years under Section 4 of Rule 74, or four years as held in several decisions of the Court, from the summary settlement and distribution of the estate. That settlement took place upon the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Number T-16421 on September 2, 1954. The period therefore expired not later than September 2, 1958. The complaint, however, was not filed until April 11, 1962, several years after the expiration of the longest of the statutory periods of limitation of action.
On the second issue, the Court agreed with the trial court that whatever rights Eugenio de la Cruz may have had were lost by prescription, and that he transmitted none to the plaintiffs. Since the plaintiffs' claim rested on rights they had acquired from him, and those rights had already been extinguished by lapse of time, the complaint could not prosper.
Doctrine
An heir or other person unduly deprived of a lawful participation in the estate of a deceased person must enforce that right judicially within two years from the summary settlement and distribution of the estate under Section 4 of Rule 74, or within four years as held in the Court's decisions. The summary settlement and distribution is deemed to take place upon the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in favor of the person adjudicating the property to himself. Once that period lapses, the right is lost by prescription, and a person who later acquires that right from the original holder takes nothing, because the transferor had nothing left to transmit. A plaintiff who sues after the longest of these periods has no cause of action, regardless of the merits of the underlying claim of fraud.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
Remember This
Memorize the rule that the two year or four year period under Section 4 of Rule 74 runs from the summary settlement and distribution of the estate, which here meant the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in favor of the self-adjudicating heir. Examiners use this case to test prescription and laches in the extrajudicial settlement of estates, and to ask when the period begins to run against an heir who claims to have been unduly deprived of his share.