RINCONADA TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. CARLOS R. BUENVIAJE, IRIGA TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC., AND FRANCISCO IMPERIAL, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for certiorari and mandamus is
directed against the order of respondent judge dated January 23, 1978, denying petitioner’s right to
appeal from his previous orders dated September 16 and 29, 1977 ordering the
dismissal of Civil Cases No. IR-265 and IR-578 both entitled “Rinconada Telephone Co., Inc., Plaintiff v. Iriga Telephone Co., Inc., and Francisco Imperial,
Defendants.”

The record discloses the following factual backdrop:

For and in consideration of the sum of P12,500.00 in the form of
shares of stocks totalling 125 at P100.00 per share,
respondent Francisco Imperial, on July 30, 1971, orally conveyed to petitioner,
a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate a telephone
company in Iriga City issued to him by the defunct
Public Service Commission (now Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board).  After the agreement, petitioner
started to operate under the strength of said certificate.  It was only on October 14, 1971 that petitioner and respondent Imperial,
executed the deed of sale pursuant to their earlier agreement.^[1]
On September 21, 1972,
respondent Imperial again sold the same certificate to herein respondent Iriga Telephone Company, Inc. (ITELCO).  This second sale was approved by the then
Public Service Commission.  By reason of
the second sale, petitioner charged respondent Imperial of Estafa
before the then CFI (now RTC) of Manila.  Petitioner also filed with the then CFI of Iriga City two
(2) actions against respondent Imperial, one for breach of contract with
damages^[2],
docketed as Civil Cage IR No. 265, and the other, for annulment of Deed of Sale
with damages^[3],
docketed as Civil Case IR 578.  Both
cases were assigned to respondent judge and petitioner was represented by Atty.
Luciano Maggay.

Because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt,
respondent Imperial was absolved in the criminal case^[4].  He then moved for the dismissal of the civil
cases pending before respondent judge on the ground of res
judicata^[5].  Petitioner opposed the motion^[6]
but nevertheless respondent judge granted the same in two (2) orders dated
September 16 and 29, 1977^[7].  Petitioner, thru Atty. Benjamin Santos sought
reconsideration^[8]
but respondent judge refused to reconsider the orders of dismissal^[9].  Thus petitioner, thru the same counsel, filed
a notice of appeal and appeal bond. 
Respondent Imperial opposed the appeal because the same was filed out of time. 
Respondent judge in an order dated January 23, 1978 denied the notice of appeal.  In agreement with respondent Imperial, the
trial court said:

“x x x.  This is so for the order of dismissal dated
September 18, 1977 (sic) was shown to have been received by Atty. Luciano Maggay for Rinconada Telephone Co. on October 11, 1977, and 28 days
thereafter, or on November 8, 1978, Atty. Benjamin Santos, another counsel for
the same party filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by proper
order on January 23, 1978.  The aforesaid
latest order was received for Rinconada Telephone
Co., Inc. through Atty. Maggay, who has been shown in the records to be still a counsel of record for the same party on February 2, 1978. 
Since the notice of Appeal and Appeal
Bond appear to have been filed on April 19, 1978 and the Record on
Appeal only on June 7, 1978, and not on February 4, 1978, which was the last and 30th day reglementary
period for interposing the
contemplated.  x x
x.” (p. 58, Rollo)

Petitioner is now before Us claiming that respondent judge
gravely abuse his discretion in denying it the right to appeal.  Petitioner contends that it received court
processes thru Atty. Santos when the latter entered his appearance in both
cases by his filing of a notice of appearance and a motion for reconsideration of the orders of dismissal which he furnished the counsel of respondent
Imperial.  Specifically, it mentioned the
order of respondent judge sent to Atty. Benjamin Santos considering the motion
for reconsideration submitted for resolution^[10].  It expressed amazement over the act of
respondent judge in not sending to Atty. Santos a copy of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration knowing fully well that the period to appeal therefrom would lapse without the knowledge of Atty.
Santos, its new counsel.  While admitting
that its notice of appeal and appeal bond was filed out of time, petitioner
considers such fact as the result of the collusion between respondent judge and
respondent Imperial.

The right of a client to terminate his relations with his counsel
is universally recognized (Enos v. Casting, 67 ALR
430).  Such termination may be with or
without cause (Aro v. Narawa,
L-24146, April 28, 1969, 21 SCRA 1160). 
The right of a client to terminate the authority of his counsel includes
the right to make a change or substitution at any stage of the proceedings.  To be valid, any such change or substitution
must be made:  a) upon written
application; b) with written consent of the client; c) upon written consent of
the attorney to be substituted; d) in case the consent of attorney to be
substituted cannot be obtained, there must be at least a proof of notice that
the motion for substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed
by the rules (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Undisputedly, there was no valid substitution in the cases at
bar.  Neither can it be said that Atty. Maggay formally withdrew as counsel for petitioner in the
cases.  Therefore, he continued to
represent petitioner and he remained the counsel of record and was for all
legal purposes, petitioners’ attorney upon whom respondent court’s processes
may be served.  When a party is
represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the counsel of record (Jalover v. Ytorriaga, L-35989,
October 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 100) at his given address in the absence of notice of
change of address (Lopez v. de los Reyes, L-23671,
January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 214).  Since he
was the last to appear before any application for substitution was filed, Atty.
Maggay remained responsible for the conduct of
petitioner’s cause (Olivares v. Leola, 97 Phil 352; Aban
v. Enage, L-30666, February 25, 1983, 120 SCRA 778).

Despite the filing of Atty. Santos of a motion for
reconsideration, copy of which he furnished the opposing counsel, Atty. Maggay is still considered counsel of record (Aban v. Galope, L-30666, February
25, 1983, 120 SCRA 778).  Not having formally
withdrawn as counsel, the order denying the notice of appeal and appeal bond
was deemed properly served upon Atty. Maggay.  Notice of the order to him was notice to
petitioner and for all legal intents and purposes, the date of his receipt is
considered the starting point from which the period to appeal prescribed by law
starts to run (Cubar v. Mendoza, L-55035, February
23, 1983, 120 SCRA 768; Baquiran v. Court of Appeals,
L-14551, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 873).

However, to the mind of the Court, there are circumstances
present in these cases which warrant a relaxation of the foregoing rule and
jurisprudence.  It cannot be denied that
respondent judge recognized Atty. Santos as petitioner’s new counsel.  This is apparent when the trial court sent
Atty. Santos a copy of the order considering the motion for reconsideration for
resolution and also when it referred to Attys. Maggay
and Raneses as petitioner’s former counsels and Atty.
Santos as the new counsel of petitioner in its order denying reconsideration.  Having acknowledged Atty. Santos as the new
counsel of petitioner, there is a clear case of negligence when said lawyer was
not furnished copy of the order denying reconsideration as a copy of the order
considering that motion for resolution was furnished to petitioner thru said
lawyer.

In view of respondent judge’s recognition of Atty. Santos as new
counsel for petitioner without even a valid substitution or withdrawal of
petitioner’s former counsel, said new counsel logically awaited for service to
him of any action taken on his motion for reconsideration.  Respondent judge’s sudden change of posture
in insisting that Atty. Maggay is the counsel of
record is, therefore, a whimsical and capricious exercise of discretion that
prevented petitioner and Atty. Santos from taking a timely appeal from said
order.  Clearly, respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying petitioner’s notice of appeal. 
While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even
meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses
that do not really impair the administration of justice especially when such
strict compliance was apparently relaxed by the trial court itself.  If the rules are intended to insure the
orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek
which is the protection of substantive right of the parties (Serina v. CA, G.R. No. 28661, February 21, 1989).  As was held in several cases:

“. . . Because there is no vested
right in technicalities, in meritorious cases, a liberal, not literal,
interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be
resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules which is the
proper and just determination of litigation. 
Litigations, should as much as possible, be decided on their merits and
not on technicality.  Dismissal of
appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted
to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their
very aims.  As has been the constant
rulings of this Court, every party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. . .
.” (Fonseca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No L-36035, August 30, 1988; Hernandez v. Quitain,
G.R. No. L-48457, November 29, 1988;
168 SCRA 99).

ACCORDINGLY, the writs prayed for are GRANTED.  Respondent trial court is hereby ordered to
allow the appeal of petitioner from the orders dismissing Civil Cases No.
IR-265 and IR-578.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

^[1]
p. 17, Rollo.

^[2]
p. 9, Ibid.

^[3]
p. 13, Ibid.

^[4]
p. 26, Ibid.

^[5]
p. 20, Ibid.

^[6]
p. 31, Ibid.

^[7]
pp. 34-40, Ibid.

^[8]
p. 43, Ibid.

^[9]
p. 55, lbid.

^[10]
p. 55, Ibid.