TERESITA SAMSON-ORR, PETITIONER, VS. WILFREDO SAMSON, PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER, TEOFILO INOCENCIO, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TARLAC, RESPONDENTS.
DIMARANAN-VIDAL, J.:
THE ANTECEDENTS
Per the record, DARAB Case No. 7112 is an appeal interposed by the Petitioner from the Decision[6] of the DARAB Region III in DARAB Case No. III-T-1184-96 in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment[7] rendered in DARAB Case No. 868-T’95 in a Petition for Cancellation of Emancipation Patent No. 492115 with TCT No. 24710 Issued and Registered in the Name of Teresita Samson.
THE FACTS
As synthesized by the DAR Adjudication Board Region III:
For resolution is a petition for annulment of judgment filed by Teresita D. Samson-Orr (Teresita for brevity) against her brother Wilfredo D. Samson, Mr. Teofilo Q. Inocencio, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of DAR, Tarlac, Tarlac and the Register of Deeds of Tarlac involving the cancellation of Emancipation Patent (EP) No. 492115 with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24710 by virtue of a decision rendered by this Forum date May 12, 1995, and plaintiff alleged among others:
That plaintiff is an awardee of the Land Reform Program, P.D. No. 27, of a parcel of land situated at Talaga, Capas, Tarlac, and covered by TCT No. 24710 bearing EP No. 492115, xxx.
That said title is possessed by the plaintiff and the consideration of the transfer was already paid to the Land Bank of the Philippines; that recently, plaintiff discovered that her TCT No. 24710 bearing E. P. No. 492115 was cancelled by virtue of a decision of the Honorable Board dated May 12, 1995; that the said decision was rendered on a petition of the defendants, Wilfredo D. Samson and Teofilo Q. Inocencio, after the latter have processed a re-allocation of the farmholding to defendant, Wilfredo Samson, and the same was recommended by defendant, Teofilo Q. Inocencio, to DAR Regional Director, Antonio Nuesa; that defendants, Wilfredo D. Samson and Teofilo Q. Inocencio made it appear that plaintiff signed an affidavit of voluntary surrender in favor of the national government through the Samahang Nayon, Inc., at Talaga, Capas, Tarlac, which, affidavit, was falsified, for the plaintiff did not surrender nor signed an affidavit of surrender to the Samahang Nayon since the land is already owned by her and the landholding cannot be the object of surrender since the same is already titled to the plaintiff and could only be transferred upon proper conveyance procedures; that the signature of the plaintiff was also falsified in all the documents like the actual tiller’s deed of undertaking; that defendant, Wilfredo Samson, was in fact, was living with the plaintiff and after filing the petition for cancellation of the emancipation patent, the former hide from the plaintiff the service of summons issued by the Board thru maneuvers by letting her mother sign for and in behalf of the plaintiff as well as the receipt of the decision allegedly rendered which constitute an extrinsic fraud which leads to Board to render judgment on the petition; that the decision is void from the beginning for lack of due process and furthermore, the basis of which was through falsified documents and the plaintiff was prevented from contesting the said petition through extrinsic fraud. xxx
In answering the complaint, private defendant Wilfredo D. Samson (Wilfredo for brevity) averred that the defendant admits Paragraph 4 that TCT No. 24710 (EP No. 492115) was cancelled by virtue of a decision of this Board dated May 12, 1995 but the proceeding was with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff; that defendant admits paragraph 5 in so far as the allegation that the decision has been rendered by this Board in the petition of the former but denies that the documents forwarded to the Regional Director are falsified; that the plaintiff has no valid and legal ground to demand damages neither attorney’s fee; that the Board cannot take cognizance of the instant case for failure of the plaintiff to refer the matter before the BARC for mediation/conciliation as provided under the New DARAB Rules of Procedure; that defendant’s and plaintiff’s father Catalino Samson, was the transferee of tenancy right over the land in question from the former tenant, Fernando Dimatulac, but the plaintiff had fraudulently managed to have the Emancipation Patent issued in her favor; that when the defendant discovered the Emancipation Patent issued in favor of the plaintiff, the former together with their heirs, confronted the plaintiff and as a settlement the plaintiff agreed to transfer her right and ownership over the said landholding in favor of the defendant, provided that defendant should recognize the plaintiff as part owner thereof in a separate document; that to implement the said agreement/settlement, defendant, after the plaintiff had accomplished the necessary documents, filed a petition for cancellation of EP No. 492115 issued in her favor; that in recognition to plaintiff’s share in the said landholding as agreed upon in the settlement, the defendant and the plaintiff executed on July 24, 1997 an instrument entitled Memorandum of Agreement; that in the said Memorandum of Agreement, the plaintiff and the defendant acknowledged their common ownership over the land in question and in case the same is sold, 5% of the proceed (sic) will be given to their mother and 95% will be divided by the defendant and the plaintiff; that the plaintiff is estopped in claiming that the land in question as her sole ownership (sic); that their mother was authorized by the plaintiff to act on her behalf in the cancellation of her EP in favor of the defendant; that the plaintiff could no longer assail or question the decision of this Board dated May 12, 1995, as the same has not only become final but has already been executed and if ever there is still any legal ground for the plaintiff to question the said decision, it is no longer within the province of this Board but rather within the jurisdiction of the Court; that considering the land in question was formerly tenanted by the father of the defendant and the plaintiff and the EP issued in favor of the plaintiff has already been cancelled by virtue of a lawful order of this Board and in lieu thereof new EP in favor of the defendant was issued, plaintiff’s remedy is no longer for the annulment of the decision dated May 12, 1995 and the cancellation of the EP issued in favor of the defendant but for payment of her share in the said landholding as one of the heirs of the late Catalino Samson, the former tenant thereof, in accordance with the law on intestate sucession or in accordance with said Memorandum of Agreement, and as counterclaim of the defendant against plaintiff, the former repleads and reproduces the foregoing allegations that because of the baseless and unwarranted complaint of the plaintiff, the defendant had suffered sleepless nights, wounded feelings and besmirched reputation to which the defendant is entitled to be compensated for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of P40,000.00; that in order to protect his right and interest, the defendant was constrained to engage the service of counsel for fee in the amount of P10,000.00 plus P5,000.00 per hearing.[8]
On 29 September 1996, the Provincial Adjudicator of the DAR Adjudication Board Region III rendered a Decision[9] in DARAB CASE No. III-T-1184-96 entitled Teresita D. Samson-Orr, Plaintiff, versus Wilfredo D. Samson, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Teofilo Q. Innocencio, and the Register of Deeds of Tarlac in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, dismissing the complaint of the Plaintiff, herein Petitioner. The latter then filed an Appeal supra to the DARAB, Diliman, Quezon City which on 20 December 2004, rendered a Decision supra, affirming the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. The Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration supra, dated 14 January 2005 but the same was denied by the DARAB in a Resolution supra, dated 11 February 2005.
Hence, the instant appeal.
THE ISSUES
In her appeal, Petitioner interposes the following assignment of errors:
4.1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE BOARD GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO EXTRINSIC FRAUD COMMITTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE CANCELLATION OF THE EMANCIPATION PATENT ISSUED AND REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF PETITIONER IN THE PETITION FILED BY THE FORMER BEFORE THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATION BOARD, DOCKETED AS DARAB CASE NO. 868-T’95;
4.2. WHETHER OF NOT THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONER’S EMANICPATION PATENT IN DARAB CASE NO. 868-T’95 VIOLATED THE LATTER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.[10]
OUR RULING
The assignment of errors being intimately related will be jointly discussed.
In summary, Petitioner contends that there was extrinsic fraud in DARAB Case No. 868-T’95 because (1) she did not receive the summons, (2) if there was substituted service thereof, the same is invalid as her mother did not inform her of its receipt, and (3) even if the substituted service on 2 May 1995 was valid, she was however prevented from participating in the case by the premature issuance of the decision in DARAB Case No. 868-T’95 on 12 May 1995, the last day she could file her answer. She thus alleged that the foregoing irregularities denied her of due process.
Anent the allegation of the existence of extrinsic fraud, the Supreme Court in the case of Ramos et al. vs. Hon. Combong, et al.[11], ruled:
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.
Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.[12]
Verily, the existence of extrinsic fraud in DARAB Case No 868-T’95 was amply demonstrated: it is without doubt that the service of summons[13] in said case was served to FELISA SAMSON, the mother of the Petitioner and Respondent. It does not appear, however, that FELISA SAMSON was authorized by Petitioner to receive the summons for the case supra, not to mention that the former has an adverse interest over the land, subject matter thereof. In her Affidavit[14], FELISA SAMSON merely stated that she and the Respondent were authorized by the Petitioner to sign in the latter’s behalf relative to the transfer of ownership of the subject farmholding. Surely, said authority, is not tantamount to authority to receive the questioned summons. In Fernandez vs. Caluag[15], the Supreme Court held:
Likewise, the rule is that when a copy of the summons and of the complaint were served upon a person not authorized by the defendant to receive for him, the defendant may raise the legality of service which was erroneous for him, and if he is declared in default for failure to comply therewith he can appeal from the order declaring him in default.
Furthermore, the above mode of service resorted to, which is substituted[16], is not allowed under Section 1 of Rule IV of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure, which provides:
SECTION 1. Issuance of Summons, Time to Answer and Submission of Evidence. Upon the filing of the complaint or petition, the hour/time, day, month, and year when it was filed shall be stamped thereon. The corresponding summons and notice of hearing to the adverse party, attaching therewith a copy of such complaint or petition, affidavit and documentary evidence if any, shall be served by personal delivery or registered mail to the defendant or respondent within two (2) days therefrom. The summons and notice of hearing shall direct the defendant or respondent to file an answer to the complaint or petition and submit counter affidavit and other documentary evidence, if any, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt thereof furnishing a copy to the petitioner or the complainant. The summons shall also specify the date, time and place of the hearing and order the parties and their witnesses to appear at the scheduled date of hearing. The aforementioned affidavits and counter-affidavits of the witnesses shall take the place of their direct testimony. Failure of any party to submit his affidavits or counter affidavits as herein directed will be interpreted by the Adjudicator or Board as a waiver to present evidence or that he has more evidence to submit and the case could be considered submitted for decision.(Underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo, that substituted service of summons may be allowed in DARAB cases, the evidentiary records, however, do not show the return of the supposed officer serving the summons. Said return must be filed and should contain an explanation why the service of the summons and of the complaint was not made upon the Petitioner personally. In Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals[17], the Supreme Court elucidated on this requirement before substituted service may be considered valid, thus:
Well settled is the rule that summons must be served upon the defendant himself. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be resorted to and such impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.
It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, Petitioner’s mother, FELISA SAMSON, categorically declared the transfer obtained by Petitioner was fraudulent and she and Respondent confronted Petitioner regarding the same. Said statements reveal the adversity of the interest of FELISA SAMSON against herein Petitioner. Certainly, it will be in gross violation of the Petitioner’s right to due process if we allow the so-called substituted service in the Office a quo. Section 1, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure, provides:
Section 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. xxx
a.) xxx
b.) xxx
c.) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in suppletory character unless adopted herein or by resolution of the Board. However, due process shall be observed and followed in all instances. (Underscoring supplied)
To further bolster the foregoing finding of extrinsic fraud in the case at bar, is the fact that the Provincial Adjudicator set the case for hearing on 11 May 1995 and thereafter rendered a decision on the next day or on 12 May 1995, the ninth and tenth day, respectively, from 2 May 1995, the date of the summons. Petitioner, on the other hand, had ten (10) days within which to file her answer as provided for in Section 1, Rule VI of the DARAB Rules supra. Perforce, the date of the hearing and the rendition of the decision pre-empted the Petitioner from participating in the proceedings.
In sum, due process was denied the Petitioner when she was deprived of an opportunity to participate in DARAB Case No. 868-T’95 by the failure of the summons to reach her and by the premature setting of the hearing and rendition of decision. Due process as applied to administrative bodies has been underscored by the Supreme Court in the classic case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR[18], thus:
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, “the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.”
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, “the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.”
xxx xxx xxx
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.)Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. xxx (Underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and the Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjucation Board are CANCELLED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the DAR Region III and the Register of Deeds of Tarlac is hereby ordered to CANCEL Transfer Certificate No. 34113 bearing Emancipation Patent No. 684483 and REINSTATE Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24710 with Emancipation Patent No. 492115 in the name of the Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, (Chairman) and Lampas Peralta, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-15
[2] Id. pp. 18-23
[3] Id. pp. 35-36
[4] Id. p. 122 (Appeal Memorandum)
[5] Id. p. 24
[6] Id. p. 98-107
[7] Id. p. 37-41
[8] Id. p. 98-101
[9] Id. p. 98
[10] Rollo, p. 8
[11] G.R. No. 144273. October 20, 2005
[12] Alaban et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 156021. September 23, 2005
[13] Rollo, p. 109
[14] Rollo, p. 89, paragraph 5
[15] 3 SCRA 857
[16] Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
[17] G.R. No. 126947, July 15, 1999
[18] G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940.