INOCENCIO BASCO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE LEO H.RAPATALO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, AGOO, LA UNION, RESPONDENT.

Basco versus Rapatalo

The Case

This is an administrative case. Inocencio Basco, the father of a murder victim, filed a sworn letter-complaint against Judge Leo Rapatalo of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union. The charge is gross ignorance or willful disregard of established law for granting bail to an accused charged with murder without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing. The case matters because it gathers the Court's settled teaching on bail in capital offenses into one place: the grant of bail in such cases is discretionary, and that discretion can be exercised only after a hearing where the prosecution is given a real chance to show that the evidence of guilt is strong.

Procedural History

The complainant went directly to the Supreme Court by a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995, charging the respondent judge with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law. The respondent filed his comment dated October 16, 1995, explaining that he acted on the prosecutor's recommendation. The Supreme Court treated the letter as an administrative complaint against a judge of the Regional Trial Court and decided it in the exercise of its administrative supervision over judges. There was no intermediate appellate step; the matter reached the Court as an original administrative proceeding.

Facts

An information for murder was filed against Roger Morente and two others. Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing was first set for May 31, 1995, but the respondent judge was on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995, and then to June 22, 1995. On June 22, the bail hearing did not take place; instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. The petition was again not heard because the prosecution's witnesses had not been notified. Another setting was made for July 17, 1995.

On July 3, 1995, the complainant saw the accused in Rosario, La Union. He learned that the accused was already out on bail although the petition had never been heard. Upon investigation, he discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29, 1995 was issued on the basis of a marginal note dated June 22, 1995 at the bottom of the bail petition, written by Assistant Prosecutor Manuel Oliva, which read: no objection, 80,000 pesos. The note was signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by the respondent judge.

In his comment, the respondent judge said he granted the petition based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose it and the recommended bailbond of 80,000 pesos. He claimed discretion to approve it once the prosecution chose not to oppose, and that he could presume the prosecutor knew what he was doing, having conducted the preliminary investigation. He added that the private prosecutor was not around when the public prosecutor recommended bail. He also said the bailbond was later cancelled and a warrant of arrest issued on the complainant's motion for reconsideration, and that the accused was then confined at the La Union Provincial Jail.

Issues

• Whether or not a judge may grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense on the sole basis of the prosecutor's marginal note of no objection, without conducting a hearing and receiving evidence on the strength of the evidence of guilt.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law or willful disregard of established rules in granting bail in that manner.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

This is the provision the Court construes: because bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses, the judge must first determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong, and that determination requires a hearing.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge gravely erred. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, and that discretion may rightly be exercised only after evidence is submitted to the court at a hearing, with the prosecution given the right to cross-examine and to present rebuttal evidence. The Court stressed that this discretion is not absolute; it must be sound and guided by law, not by humour, and must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. A hearing, whether summary or otherwise, must actually be conducted even where the prosecution chooses merely to file a comment or leaves the application to the court's discretion. The Court reviewed a long line of cases, from People versus Sola in 1981 through Buzon versus Velasco in 1996, all holding that denying the prosecution the opportunity to be heard violates procedural due process and renders the order granting bail void on that ground. The prosecutor's marginal note of no objection did not excuse the judge from holding a hearing.

On the second issue, the Court found the respondent judge administratively liable. His reliance on the prosecutor's note, without any hearing, was a disregard of settled doctrine. The Court imposed a fine of 20,000 pesos and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

Doctrine

When bail is discretionary, as in capital offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing is mandatory before bail may be granted. At that hearing, whether summary or in the course of trial, the prosecution must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all evidence it desires to show that the evidence of guilt is strong, and the defense may rebut. The judge's discretion lies not in deciding whether to hold a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the evidence once heard. Failure to conduct the hearing denies the prosecution procedural due process and renders the order granting bail void. A prosecutor's comment, recommendation, or marginal note of no objection does not dispense with the hearing.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent judge administratively liable and ordered him to pay a fine of 20,000 pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

Memorize the line: in capital offenses, bail is discretionary, and discretion can be exercised only after a hearing where the prosecution is heard. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory hearing requirement for bail and the administrative liability of judges who grant bail on a prosecutor's mere note of no objection.