SURIGAO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, INC. AND SURICON EMPLOYEES & LABORERS MUTUAL ASSOCIATION (SELMA), PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE LAND-AIR-SEA LABOR UNION (PLASLU) AND COURT OF…

Appeal interposed by petitioner Surigao
Consolidated Mining Company, Inc., hereinafter referred to as SURICON, and
SURICON Employees and Laborers Mutual Association (SELMA), intervenor,
from (1) an order of the Court of Industrial Relations dated March 13, 1964 in
Case No. 565-V approving the reports of the Court’s examiner; ordering SURICON
to deposit with the Cashier of the Court the amount of P215,819.55, and
ordering further that, of said amount, the sum of P172,655.64 be paid to the
members of PLASLU, and that the remaining P43,163.91 be paid as fees to PLASLU’s counsel; and (2) from the resolution of said court
of May 5, 1964 denying the motions for reconsideration filed by PLASLU and
SELMA.  The latter’s appeal, however, is
only in so far as the appealed order and resolution uphold the presentation of
the claims by PLASLU, its contention being that it is the one duly authorized
by the employees and laborers of SURICON to enforce their demands.

SURICON is the respondent in Case No. 565-V, while SELMA,
a duly registered labor union, intervenor, and
PLASLU, a duly organized and registered corporation
under Philippine laws, the complainant therein.

On April 23, 1951 PLASLU filed with the CIR a peti­tion
containing a set of demands, among others, for the increase of the salaries and
wages of the employees and laborers of SURICON by 100% over and above their
salaries and wages at that time; for the observance by SURICON of the
Eight-Hour Labor Law; for the payment of the employees and laborers of SURICON
who had rendered overtime work and those who had worked on Sundays and
holidays, 50% over and above their respective regular rate etc.

In due time SURICON answered the petition alleging, inter alia:  that over 90%
of its employees and laborers were members of SELMA with whom on November 16,
1949 it had entered into a collective bargaining contract which, at the time of
the filing of the petition, was still in force; that, this being so, SURICON
was not in a position to consider or entertain the demands of PLASLU; that SURI­CON
had been paying to all its employees and laborers the standard salaries and
wages for employees and laborers in the mining industry in the locality and
which were equal to, if not higher, than the salaries and wages fixed by the
CIR for the employees and laborers of the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.;
that the economic conditions did not warrant further increases in the salaries
and wages of its employees and laborers; that SURICON had not dismissed any one
of its employees or laborers for union activity or affiliation, nor for
membership in PLASLU.

On May 15, 1951
SELMA, with previous leave of the
CIR, filed a petition in intervention alleging, among other things, that nearly
all the employees and laborers of SURICON, eligible for membership in a labor
organization, were and had been its members; that it had an existing col­lective
bargaining contract with SURICON since November
16, 1949.  As a consequence
it prayed for the dismissal of the petition of PLASLU and for the continued
enforcement of its collective bargaining contract with SURICON.

On October 8, 1953,
SURICON filed a motion to dismiss the main case upon the ground that PLASLU was
not a legi­timate labor union and, therefore, had no capacity to sue, and also
upon the further ground that PLASLU had failed to prosecute its case for an
unreasonable period of time.

Hearing of the case was set for November 25 and 26, 1953 in Surigao, Surigao.  On the first date, Atty. Felix Ramirez
appeared for SURICON, but nobody appeared for PLASLU, this being the reason for
the cancellation of the hearing set for that day.  On the following day, as Atty. Ramirez again
appeared for SURICON but nobody appeared for PLASLU, the hearing went on for
the reception of SURICON’s evidence, albeit under the
condition that its witnesses testifying on that day could be cross-examined
later by the adverse party, and also without prejudice to the pre­sentation of
evidence for PLASLU at some other date.

At the beginning of the hearing held before the Com­missioner on November 26, 1953, Atty. Ramirez, SURICON’s counsel, made the following statement:

“Now, in connection with our motion to
dismiss, dated October 8, 1953,
the only evidence that would be necessary to support the same is the letter of
the Secretary of Labor rejecting the renewal of the permit previously granted
to the petitioner.  This letter is dated August 25, 1950, a copy of which is
attached to the said motion.  We do not
have a certified copy of this letter, but we believe the Court can take
judicial notice of the fact, not only because the said letter is an official
document which can easily be verified, but also the fact that this question, as
to the non-registration of the petitioner union, has been decided in the case
entitled ‘Philippine Land-Sea-Air- Labor Union versus The Court of Industrial
Relations G.R. L-Nos. 5654, 5698, promulgated on September 28, 1952.  In addition to our ground stated in the said
motion, we would like to make another ground for the dismissal of this case
based on the fact that the demands made in the petition of the petitioner have
been enjoyed and are still being enjoyed by the laborers and em­ployees of the
respondent company even before the filing of this petition.  For this purpose, we will present the General
Superintendent of the respondent company. 
This evidence, however, is only to support this additional ground for
dismissal and should not be interpreted as an evidence
on the main case.”

Thereafter Atty. Ramirez placed Mr. J. B. Harrison, general
superintendent of SURICON, on the witness stand, the substance of his testimony
being as follows:

“That in April, 1951, when the petition in the main case was
filed, which was prior to the Minimum Wage Law, the minimum wage paid by
SURICON was P2.00 a day, with some exceptions; that SURICON has been observing
the EIGHT-HOUR Labor Law; that there is no overtime pay due to its workers
since the year 1939 that has not been paid; that SURICON has been granting 15
days’ vacation leave and 15 days’ sick leave with pay to its employees and
laborers who have worked 290 days during the year; that SURICON has been
providing free hospitalization, medical and dental services to its employees
and laborers, and has been granting maternity leave according to law; that
SURICON provides housing facilities for those employees and la­borers who
desire to live in its houses; that SURICON has entered into a collective
bargain­ing contract with SELMA with respect to wages and other working
conditions; that the various privileges granted by SURICON to its workers prior
to the filing of the petition in the main case were in accordance with the
existing collective bargaining contract between SU­RICON and SELMA; that the
present minimum wage, i.e., when he testified on November 26, 1953, that
SURICON has been paying its employees and laborers was P4.00 a day; that the
employees and laborers working at night have been paid an additional
compensation of twenty-five cent­avos a shift; that, for eight-hour work per­formed
on Sundays and legal holidays, SURICON has been paying 25% additional
compensation; that, after a few days’ trial, all the employees and laborers
hired by SURICON are considered permanent employees or laborers; that SURICON
has never dismissed, laid-off, suspended, or transferred any employee or
laborer by reason of the commencement of the main case (t.s.n.,
pp. 7-21, session of November 26, 1953).”

At a subsequent hearing held on February 25, 1954 in Manila
the following took place –

“A P P E A R A N C E S

For the
Petitioner:

Atty. EMILIO LUMONTAD – counsel for the Philippine
Land-Air-Sea Labor Union

For the
Respondent:

Atty. FELIX B. RAMIREZ – counsel for the Surigao
Consolidated Mining Co., Inc.

-o0o-

THE
COMMISSIONER:

Are the parties ready?

ATTY.
LUMONTAD:

Yes, we are ready.

ATTY.
RAMIREZ:

I would like to make it of record that, as
far as I can recall, the evidence presented by the respondent in this case,
that the hearing held in Surigao on November 25 to
28, 1953 in the absence of the petitioner, for the purpose of showing that the
demands contained in the petition have become purely academic, in the sense
that said demands have, up to the time, been enjoyed by the laborers and
employees of the respondent company.  The
following appears to have been proved by the said evidence:

That Demand No. 2 has all the time been complied with by the
respondent even prior to the filing of the pe­tition up to the present
time.  De­mand No. 3, that the respondent
gives over time pay to its laborers and employees even before the filing of the
petition twenty-five per cent (25%) additional pay for overtime work done on
regular days.  Demand No. 4, that the
respondent company have all the time been giving twenty five per cent (25%)
additional pay for overtime work done on Sundays and holidays, and another
twenty five per cent (25%) for night work. 
This also covers Demand No. 5.

ATTY.
LUMONTAD:

Demand No. 5 is different . . . .

ATTY.
RAMIREZ:

For night shift on Sundays and legal holi­days, the company
has also been giving extra pay of twenty five per cent (25%), all in accordance
with law.

With respect to Demand No. 7, that all the laborers and
employees of the res­pondent have always enjoyed even prior to the filing of
the petition, fifteen days (15) vacation leave and fifteen (15) days sick leave
with pay.

With respect to the Demand No. 8, the evidence also shows that
all laborers and employees who have worked proba­tional
period of three (3) months are considered permanent.  With respect to the Demand No. 9, the company
has not dismissed, suspended or laid off or transferred any employee without
any justifiable cause nor for being a member of the petitioning union.  Demand No. 10, this demand has also been
enjoyed even prior to the fil­ing of the petition by the employees and laborers
of the respondent com­pany.  They are
given free hospita­lization, medical and dental services, and that women
employees are given maternity leave in accordance with law.

The Commissioner can also take no­tice of the fact that the
respon­dent maintains a hospital as well as a dental clinic within the compound
of the respondent company.

With respect to Demand No. 11, the evidence also shows that
all the employees and laborers of the res­pondent are provided free housing
facilities, water supply, toilet and lighting facilities.  The Com­missioner, who investigated this
case, can also take notice of the fact that housing and facilities I have just
mentioned are provided by the company within the compound of said company.  This does not in­clude, however, the
employees and la­borers who, on their own volition, desire to live outside the
premises where they have their own homes.

In view of this evidence, we would like to know if the
petitioner de­sires to present any other evidence in support of those petitions.

ATTY.
LUMONTAD:

Before answering the manifestation of the counsel for the
respondent, I would like to request his categorical answer with respect to
Demand No. 1 inasmuch as in his manifestation this demand was ne­ver touched.

ATTY.
RAMIREZ:

With respect to Demand No. 1, the evi­dence presented by
the respondent shows that at the time the petition was filed the respondent was
giving a minimum wage of P3.00 which is over and above the schedule of being
given by similar companies in the same locality particularly, in reference to
the Mindanao Mother Lode which is a mining com­pany operating in Surigao which, as far as I recall, gives a mini­mum wage in
accordance with the decision rendered by the Court of Industrial Relations,
giving its employees, only employees and la­borers, a minimum wage of P2.75
(PLASLU vs. Mindanao Mother Lode, Case No. 644-V) which judging by said
decision, the pay given to the employees and laborers by the respondent were
getting much more than that award in the said case.  However, with the effectivity
of the Minimum Wage Law, all the em­ployees and laborers of the res­pondent are
getting the minimum in accordance with said law.  The evidence also shows that there have been
increases even after the filing of the complaint to some laborers and employees
of the respondent based on efficiency, fitness and other considerations which
justified their promotions.

ATTY.
LUMONTAD:

The herein petitioner is withdrawing the Demand No. 6
because this demand is covered up by the Demands Nos. 3, 4 and 5.  Demand No. 12 is hereby with­drawn.

With respect to the manifestation of the respondent company on
Demand No. 1, this representation has no objec­tion to his statement citing
that that the respondent was complying with the provisions of law even prior to
the filing of the petition.  The
petitioner has no objection to the manifestation of the compañero
on Demand No. 3.  Therefore, I would like
to request the compañero to answer the following:

Do we understand from the counsel for the respondent that
Demand No. 2 will be granted?

ATTY.
RAMIREZ:

As we have stated, this Demand No. 2 has all the time been
followed by the respondent company being a requirement of law.  We have, therefore, no reason to grant the same
because it is a requirement of law which has been followed by the respondent
company all the time.

ATTY.
LUMONTAD:

In answer to the attorney of the res­pondent in connection
with all the demands, except those withdrawn, this representation moves that
this Honorable Court to ren­der its decision in accordance with the
manifestation and evidence of the attorney of the respondent which petitioner
hereby adopts as our own.” (Underlines supplied).

On March 11, 1954 the CIR, through the Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan, as a result
mainly of the state­ments made in the course of the hearing held on February 25
of the same year, issued an order of the following tenor:

“This case involved petitioner’s
demands, to wit:

‘1.    That the salaries and wages of the em­ployees
and laborers of the Surigao Consolidated Mining Co.,
Inc. should be increased by ONE HUNDRED PERCENT (100 percent) over and above
their present salaries and wages, effective on the date of demand;

‘2.    That the company should observe the EIGHT-HOUR
LABOR LAW;

‘3.    That the employees and laborers of the
Company who have rendered overtime work (work in excess of eight hours daily)
and those who have worked an Sundays and Holidays, should be paid their
corresponding salaries and wages, of FIFTY PERCENT (50 percent) over and above
the regular rate, for each overtime work and work done on Sundays and Holidays,
effective from the date of employment;

‘4.    That all the employees and laborers of the
company should be granted FIFTY PERCENT (50 percent) additional salary and or
wages, for the overtime work and/or for the work done on Sundays and Holidays,
and another FIFTY PERCENT (50 percent) additional salaries or wages for those
who are working at night;

‘5.    That the employees and laborers work­ing at
nightshift be given FIFTY PERCENT (50 percent) additional salaries or wages
from the basic salaries or wages;

‘6.    That the Surigao
Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. should be required to pay the back overtime
rendered on regular working days, Sundays, Holidays, and nightshift works by
the employees and laborers of the said company, im­mediately after the
liberation up to the time of the filing of this demand to the amount of TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00);

‘7.    That all employees and laborers of the
Company should be granted FIFTEEN DAYS (15) vacation leave and another FIFTEEN
DAYS (15) sick leave, per annum, both leaves with pay from the time of their
employment;

‘8.    That all the employees and laborers of the
company who have worked therein for a period of THREE MONTHS (3) or more shall
be considered permanent;

‘9.    That the company should not dismiss,
suspend, lay off and transfer to another as­signment any employee or laborer
without justifiable cause or for being a member of the PHILIPPINE LAND-AIR-SEA
LABOR UNION (PLASLU) INC.;

‘10.  That all employees and laborers of the company
who were injured contacted sickness in line of duty be given free hos­pitalization,
medical and dental services; women employees and laborers be given maternity
leave in accordance with law;

‘11.  That all employees and laborers of the company
be given free house, sanitary water supply, toilet and good lighting con­ditions;

‘12. That the
PHILIPPINE LAND-AIR­-SEA LABOR UNION (PLASLU) INC. be recognized as the
collective bargaining agency of the SURIGAO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY INC.’

“At the hearing of this case on February 25, 1954, counsel for
petitioner withdrew Demands Nos. 6 and 12, for reasons stated.  This withdrawal is hereby approved.  With respect to the other demands, counsel
for peti­tioner manifested as follows:

‘In answer to the attorney of the
respondent in connection with all the demands, except those withdrawn, this
representation moves this Honorable Court to render its decision in accordance
with the manifestation and evidence of the attorney of the respondent which
petitioner, hereby adopts as our own.’

The evidence and manifestation for
respondent company however, tends to show that even before the institu­tion of
the instant case, the laborers and employees in respondent company had already
been enjoying the benefits sought in all the remaining demands with the
exception of Demand No. 1, regarding which counsel for the company also
manifested and pleaded as follows:

(a)   
That at the time the petition was
filed the company was giving P3.00 as minimum wage and that this minimum was
over and above the schedule of wages being given by similar companies in the
locality;

(b)   
That upon the passage of Republic
Act No. 602, otherwise known as the Minimum Wage Law, the company started complying
with the pro­visions thereof; and

(c)   
That increases were given to
laborers and employees, even after the filing of the complaint, based upon
efficiency, fitness, etc.

The Court takes the manifestation of
counsel for the petitioning union as an admission of the truth and veracity of
the manifestation and evidence presented by respondent company and, therefore,
considers that all the disputes raised in the present case have become moot and
academic.

“In view thereof, this case is hereby declared closed and
terminated.

“SO ORDERED.”

Both parties agree that the above order became final and executory, neither one of them having appealed from it.

On May 7, 1954, – undoubtedly on the strength of what, in its
opinion, the order of March 11, 1954 meant and was intended to be – PLASLU
filed a motion praying that the court order its Examiner to proceed to SURICON’s establishment or office at Mainit,
Surigao to examine its books of accounts, vouchers,
payrolls and all other per­tinent company records to determine the money value
of the awards granted in the aforesaid order, and to determine further the
money value of all rights, benefits and privileges granted thereby in
accordance with the statement made by SURICON’s
counsel.  Resolving said motion the CIR,
in an order dated June 23, 1954, said and provided for the following:

“In order to determine whether the employees and laborers of
the respondent com­pany had been really enjoying the benefits and privileges
contained in the awards of the Court dated March 11, 1954, as mani­fested by
the counsel for the respondent, and in order to properly implement the said
Order, the Chief Examiner of the Court, or any of his assistants, is hereby
ordered to proceed as soon as possible to the offices of the Surigao Consolidated Mining Company, Inc., located at Mainit, Surigao, and to examine
its books of accounts, the vouchers, payrolls, time books or time cards and all
other pertinent records with the view to determining whether the employees and
la­borers of the respondent company had been actually enjoying all the rights,
benefits, and privileges mentioned in the Order of the Court dated March 11,
1954; and, in case they have not been enjoying the same, to compute the money
value of all such rights, benefits, and privileges from April 23, 1951, up to
the present, and to submit his report as soon as possible for further
disposition of the Court.

“Considering that the company has many employees and laborers
who may thereby be affected and that the Court cannot afford to send more than
one examiner for lack of personnel in its Examining Division, the respondent
company and the petitioning union are likewise ordered to send at least three
(3) representatives each to assist the exam­iner of the Court and to facilitate
the submission of the report.”

Months later, on December 27, 1954, PLASLU filed another motion
praying that the court order its Chief Examiner or one of his assistants to
continue with and terminate the examina­tion of the records of SURICON and
thereafter render a com­plete report.  In
its order of August 23, 1955 resolving this motion, the CIR said and provided
for the following:

“The partial report of examiner dated October 15, 1954, shows
that the employees and laborers of the Surigao
Consolidated Mining Company, Inc., have not been actual­ly and fully enjoying
all the rights, benefits, and privileges contained in the order of the Court
dated March 11, 1954, as manifested by counsel for the res­pondent during the
hearing of the case on February 25, 1954. 
The said report also laid down the bases of the computation for
subsequent examinations and computations to be ordered by this Court.

“Considering the motion filed by counsel for petitioner to be
well taken, the Chief Examiner of this Court or any of his assistants, is
hereby directed to proceed to the premises of the Surigao
Consolidated Mining Company, Inc., located at Mainit,
Surigao, and continue with the examination of its
books of accounts, payrolls, vouchers, time books or time cards and all other
pertinent records for the pur­pose of determining the money value of all the
rights, benefits, and privileges not actually enjoyed by its employees and
laborers from April 23, 1951, up to the present, and to submit his report as
soon as possible for further disposition of the Court.

“The parties are likewise hereby directed to send at least
three (3) representatives each to assist the Examiner of the Court so as to
facilitate the early submission of his report.”

Pursuant to the abovementioned orders of June 23, 1954 and August
23, 1955 (Annexes J and K of the petition) an Examiner of the CIR examined the
pertinent records of SURICON and thereafter submitted reports on the money
value of such benefits as were covered by the statement made by SURICON’s counsel in the latter’s behalf during the hearing
of the case held on February 25, 1954.

According to the record the Court Examiner submitted several
partial reports, the ones particularly involved in the present petition being
the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th.

It is to be observed that notwithstanding the order issued by the
CIR for the parties to send their respective representative to assist the Court
Examiner in the examina­tion of SURICON’s books etc.,
and in the computation of the money value of the awards, PLASLU did not send
any re­presentative, while, on the other hand, SURICON was always represented
by one of its employees designated by J. B. Harrison, SURICON’s
general superintendent to assist the Court Examiner.  As a matter of fact, the reports contain a
statement to the effect that SURICON’s representative
assisted the Examiner in obtaining the necessary data and in the computation of
the money value of the rights, benefits and privileges not actually or fully
enjoyed by the employees and laborers of SURICON, contrary to the statement
made by the latter’s counsel during the hearing held on February 25, 1954.

It is, however, SURICON’s contention in
this regard – obviously to avoid being held bound by the reports – that its
representative made the computations upon which the several reports were based
in the manner, procedure and upon the basis laid down by the Court Examiner,
without said representative of SURICON having used his own judgment.  In fact, SURICON objected to all said
reports.

In the course of the hearing held thereon, the CIR directed its
Examining Division, in open court, to amend the 7th and 8th partial reports by
excluding all the computations prior to April 23, 1951.  Having com­plied therewith, the Chief
Examiner of the CIR submitted thereafter an amended report in which the
aggregate amount of the money value of the awards was reduced to the total sum
of P259,071.98.

Before the close of the hearing on the reports, the Chief
Examiner was again ordered to recompute the 7th, 8th,
and 9th partial reports.  Having complied
with this order, the Chief Examiner subsequently submitted his report of recomputation, as a result of which, the ori­ginal
computation of P65,002.54 and P224,243.05 of the 7th and 8th partial reports,
respectively, or a total of P289,245.59 – an amount subsequently reduced, as
stated heretofore, to the total sum of P259,071.98 – was further reduced to
P24,614.90, while the original computations for the 9th report amounting to
P26,577.67 was also reduced to P26,440.24.

In the final analysis, therefore, the amounts covered by the
partial reports in question are as follows:

“Second Partial Report:	P 80,226.94
Third Partial Report:	5,945.26
Fourth Partial Report:	30,177.62
Sixth Partial Report:	29,551.85
Seventh & Eight Partial Report:	24,614.90
Ninth Partial Report:	26,440.24
Tenth Partial Report:	18,862.74
TOTAL – – – – –	P215,819.55”

________________________________________________________________________________________

On November 19, 1960, after the hearings held on the reports, the
CIR, through Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista, rendered its decision thereon
(Annex Q attached to the petition).  We
need not deal with this decision in detail for the reason that in a resolution
of October 12, 1961 the CIR en banc set it aside.  The pertinent portions of said resolution are
the following:

“The only issue in this case is whether the trial court can
set aside the order of March 11, 1954 and June 23, 1954 which had been affirmed
by the Court en banc and the Supreme Court.

“It should be remembered that the ori­ginal action arose from
the twelve (12) demands for payments for increase in wages, work rendered
beyond eight hours, overtime rendered during Sundays and legal holidays,
increase of 50% for nightshift workers, va­cation and sick leave for 15 days,
and other demands which are deemed bargainable.  How­ever, on February 25, 1954 hearing, demands
number six and twelve were withdrawn refer­ring to back overtime rendered on
ordinary days, Sundays and legal holidays immediately after liberation and
recognition of PLASLU, respectively.

“Respondent contended that all the demands were complied with
even before their filing, with the exception of demand No. 1 referring to 100%
increase of wages.

“Late presiding Judge, Hon. Arsenio
C. Roldan, in order to verify which of the two
averments were correct pursuant to an order of March 11, 1954, issued another
order on June 23, 1954.

“The Examining Division was specifically ordered to comply
with the following:

(a)    
Determine whether the employees
and laborers of respondent com­pany had really been enjoying the benefits and
privileges con­tained in the awards of the Court dated March 11, 1954;

(b)    
Examine the books of account,
vouchers, payrolls, time books, time cards, and all pertinent records with the
view of determining whether the employees and laborers had been actually enjoy­ing
all the rights, benefits, and privileges mentioned in the order of March 11,
1954;

(c)    
Compute the money value of all
such rights, benefits, and privileges, from April 23, 1951 up to the present;

(d)    
Submit his report for further dis­position.

“Respondent filed a motion for reconsidera­tion on this order
(June 23, 1954) but was denied by the Court en banc unanimously
in its resolution on July 3, 1954. 
Having failed to secure the re­versal, respondent appealed by certiorari
to the Supreme Court, and again it was dismissed for lack of merit – G.R. No. L-7966.”

x x x                             x x x                             x x x                             x
x x

“Undoubtedly, the order of June 23, 1954, empowering the
examining division to render a report on the equivalent money value of all
their claims, except those demands withdrawn and those within the scope of
bargaining negotiations, was final.  Note
that under the second paragraph of June 23, 1954 order, it partially stated
that:

‘x x x and, in case they have not been
enjoying the same to compute the money value of all such rights, benefits, and
privileges from April 23, 1951 up to the present, and to submit his report as
soon as possible for further dispo­sition of the Court.’

The whole order of June 23, 1954 which the
above quotation was found was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G. R. No.
L-7966).  It became final and executory.  To reopen
or set aside on the Theory of ‘erroneous orders’, as pointed by the trial court
is a total reversal of the resolution of July 3, 1954 (Resolution en banc)
and the Supreme Court G.R. No. L-7966 at a time when the particular order is no
longer under the jurisdiction and control of the trial court.  Although the motion of respondent dated
October 19, 1959 for the re-examination of the records by the same Examiner who
submitted the various partial reports was granted by the trial court in its
order on 4 November 1959 without a motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner, yet the Court feels that such order (4 November 59) could no longer
be legally done as the original orders of March 11, 1954 and June 23, 1954
which could serve as the bases of the succeeding proceedings became final and executory.

“What is left now, if there is one, is for respondent to prove
that the reported money value are not correct because it had already paid the
claimants long before the institution of the present action, indeed, the
examination of those books and the determination of the amount due the
claimants remained uncontroverted.

“In short, the Examining Division had veri­fied for the Court
that the Company had not paid complainants – contrary to what it had manifested
on February 25, 1954 hearing.  Because of
this finding, the burden of proof lies on the res­pondent to prove
otherwise.  But for the trial court to
make another ruling that the order of June 23, 1954 is erroneous thus getting
aside all other orders emanating therefrom would in
effect subject the affirmation (G. R. No. L-7966 and G. R. No. L-10346) made by
the Supreme Court to review by a lower court, when in fact what is left is the
deliberation on the correctness of the reports for speedy disposition of this
case.

“On the whole, what is left here is the determination of the
correctness of the report as implementations of the orders of this Court which
have as afore-mentioned become final and executory –
but never to reopen the case to the extent of setting aside the affirmed orders
of March 11, 1954 and June 23, 1954, and much less to adopt an independent
truism of ‘erroneous orders’.

“This is not a case of asking for relief of judgment or
modification of the award and/or decision of the Court as provided for by the
Rules of Court and/or the organic act of this Court.  The whole proceeding is on the report of the
auditing division on the liability of the Company based on the finality of the
orders of the Court.

“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order of November 19, 1960 is set
aside and thereafter to proceed on the hearing of the partial reports now sub­mitted,
of course, with the modification on the computation that it should start from
April 23, 1951 pursuant to the order of June 23, 1954.”

Pursuant to the resolution of October 12, 1961 just quoted above,
further hearings were held in connection with the partial reports of the Court
Examiner and there­after, or more specifically on March 13, 1964, the CIR,
through Judge Jose S. Bautista, issued the complained order attached to the
petition under consideration as Annex A. 
After the motions for reconsideration filed by SURICON and SELMA had
been denied by resolution of March 13, 1964, said parties perfected the present
appeal.

As far as the appeal of SELMA is concerned, the following is
pertinent.

To settle the issue of whether it is PLASLU or SELMA who should
be recognized as the appropriate bargaining representative of the employees and
laborers of SURICON since April 23, 1951 (when Case No. 565-V was commenced),
and should represent them in the case, SELMA filed a peti­tion for
certification election on August 4, 1959, the same having been docketed as Case
No. 681-MC of the CIR.  By order of the
CIR issued on December 12, 1959, the Department of Labor conducted the
corresponding election, the result being that SELMA won overwhelmingly.  As a consequence, in an order dated April 18,
1960, the CIR certified SELMA as the sole and exclusive representative of all
the employees and workers of SURICON. 
This must be deemed final as to the issue between these two parties.

THE APPEAL OF SURICON

SURICON, an the other hand, poses mainly the following
issues:  (1) the computations ordered by
the CIR – assuming that said order is correct and valid – should have been on
the basis of the testimony of J. B. Harrison, SURICON’s
general superintendent, instead of the statement of facts by its counsel, Atty.
Felix Ramirez; (2) the order of March 11, 1954 in fact awarded nothing, as
shown by its dispositive portion which declared the
case “closed and terminated”; (3) the CIR acquired no jurisdiction
over the case because PLASLU had presented no evidence at all to prove its
allegation to the effect that by reason of its demands a strike was likely to
be declared.

We shall first dispose of the jurisdictional question.

PLASLU’s petition in the main case
alleged that by reason of the demands therein made a strike was likely to be
declared.  SURICON impliedly admits that
this allega­tion was sufficient to place the case within the juris­diction of
the CIR when, to support its contention that the CIR did not “acquire
jurisdiction over the main case”, it relies exclusively on the fact that
PLASLU had pre­sented no evidence to prove that there was an impending
strike.  That no such evidence was
introduced was obviously due to the fact that the parties, as well as the CIR,
had assumed all along – and had acted accordingly – that such jurisdiction
existed.

Moreover, while this action was commenced on April 18, 1951,
it is only at this stage that SURICON raises this question of lack of
jurisdiction of the CIR, this in spite of the fact that innumerable hearings
were held before the CIR and the parties had even taken up their controversy to
this Court.

Furthermore, SURICON, through employees duly designated, actively
cooperated with the CIR and its Chief Examiner in the examination of its own
books and in the computation of the money value of the questioned awards.  As a matter of fact, its only objection
against the reports themselves was that they were not correctly based, meaning,
that instead of the examination and computation being based on the tes­timony
of SURICON’s general superintendent, they were based
on the statement made in open court by SURICON’s
counsel subsequent to the giving of such testimony.  At the very least, therefore, it seems clear
that SURICON must be deemed barred from now saying that the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the demands of PLASLU.

With respect to the proper basis which should have been used in
the computation of the money value of the awards in question, it is true that
there is some difference between the pertinent portions of the testimony of J.
B. Harrison, SURICON’s general superintendent, on one
hand, and the statement in open court made by SURICON’s
counsel in the course of the hearing held on February 24, 1954.  But it must be borne in mind firstly, that
counsel’s statement regarding the same matter covered by the testimony of
Harrison was subsequent to the latter and, secondly, that the statement
of Atty. Ramirez having been made in his capacity as counsel of record of
SURICON, the same is deemed to be in the nature of a judicial admission made by
him on behalf of his client.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that neither the CIR nor its
Chief Examiner nor the latter’s assistant com­mitted any error in relation to
this particular issue under consideration.

Finally, SURICON contends that the order of March 11, 1954 made no award of any kind and
that, in fact, it con­sidered the case “closed and terminated”.  This is a belated attempt to construe that
order differently from what, according to the record and the subsequent conduct
of the parties and of the CIR, was the real intention and meaning thereof.

It is to be noted that said order was issued not only as a result
of the testimony of SURICON’s general superin­tendent
and the statement made in open court by its counsel of record, but also of the
following petition made in open court by PLASLU’s
counsel, Atty. Lumontad, in the course of the hearing
held on February 25, 1954:

“ATTY.
LUMONTAD:

In answer to the attorney of the respondent in connection
with all the demands, ex­cept those withdrawn, this representation moves
that this Honorable Court to render its decision in accordance with the manifestation
and evidence of the attorney of the respondent which petitioner hereby adopts
as our own.” (Underlines supplied).

It is quite apparent, We believe, that
Atty. Lumontad prayed for the rendition of a judgment
in accordance with the admissions made by SURICON, through its general
superintendent and its counsel of record. 
The contested order, therefore, must be reasonably construed in the
light of the foregoing circumstances.  As
a matter of fact, it was so construed by the CIR and the parties to the case
themselves, as demonstrated by the fact that subsequent to the issuance of the
aforesaid order of March 11, 1954, PLASLU filed several motions for the CIR to
order its Chief Examiner or the latter’s assistant to examine SURICON’s corporate books etc. and to proceed to make the
required computation of the money value, of the awards assumed to have been
made in the contested order, to which SURICON never objected upon the ground
now it relies upon.  To the contrary,
after the court had granted said motions, the Chief Examiner made the
examination and compu­tations required with the active assistance and
cooperation of SURICON’s representatives.

Moreover, the resolution of the CIR en banc of October 12, 1961
(Annex R attached to the petition under considera­tion) expressly states that
not only the aforesaid order of March 11, 1954 but also that of June 23 of the
same year, had been affirmed by the Court en banc and by the Supreme
Court.  This resolution became final
apparently with SURICON’s full acquiescence.  As it will be remembered, the order of June
23, 1954 directed the Examining Division of the CIR to render a report on the
equivalent money value of all the claims or demands of PLASLU, except those
which had been withdrawn – obviously to implement the previous order of March
11 of the same year.

WHEREFORE, the order and resolution appealed from being in
accordance with law, the same are hereby affirmed, except that the amounts due
to each of the employees and laborers of SURICON under the order appealed from
should be paid to each of them through whichever duly registered Labor Union
they presently belong or to the Union that has a bargaining contract with
SURICON.  With costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C.J.), Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Concepcion C.J., and Ruiz Castro, J., on official leave.

Teehankee, J., took no part.