G. R. No. L-17757. May 30, 1962

MAMERTA DE LA MERCED, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS AND AMPARO MACAPAGAL, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 30, 1962 BARRERA, J.:
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BARRERA, J.:


This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the original decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija (in Civil Case No. 946), upholding the right of ownership of
Ezequiel Santos over Lot No. 395 of the Rizal (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre.

As may be gathered from the extant records, the facts of the case are:

In a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
dated May 3, 1952, which was later amended, Ezequiel Santos (and his
wife) claiming ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue
of an adjudication of the cadastral court denied December 26, 1923 in
favor of his father, sought recovery of ownership and possession
thereof from the named defendants, and of the landlord’s share in the
harvests for the agricultural years 1950-1956.

Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs’ claim and asserted
their ownership over said property as evidenced by Original Certificate
of Title No. 3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on
October 10, 1931 and their continuous possession of the land for more
than 30 years.

In the course of the proceedings, Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate
daughter of Juan de la Merced, was allowed to intervene and make common
cause with the defendants.

On January 16, 1957, the court rendered a decision for the
plaintiffs after making a finding that Lot No. 395 was part of the
Original Certificate of Title No. 425, issued on May 30, 1916 in the
name of the spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal,
parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos; that in a decision rendered by
the cadastral court on December 26, 1923 (Cad. Case No. 14, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 281), the said lot was also adjudicated in favor of the
conjugal partnership of Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina
Macapagal; that pursuant to said decision, the cadastral court issued
on December 17, 1925 an order for the issuance of a certificate of
title for the said property; that on December 8, 1926, Transfer
Certificate of Title No; 1971 was issued in the name of Ezequiel Santos
in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 425 which was cancelled;
that on December 28, 1926, the cadastral court declared lot 395 public
land, as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced, after filing a
homestead application therefor, was able to obtain Original Certificate
of Title No. 3462 on October 10, 1931. Holding that the cadastral court
had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot public land,
and, therefore, the same as well as the certificate of title issued
thereafter was null and void, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT
No. 3462 in the name of Juan de la Merced; directed defendants to
vacate Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre and surrender possession
thereof to plaintiffs; and to pay the latter as the landlord’s share,
50 cavans of palay yearly for the agricultural years 1950 to 1956 or
their equivalent, and costs of the suit; and the receiver to deliver to
plaintiffs the palay in his custody representing the harvest for the
agricultural years 1953-1955.

Upon defendants’ motion for reconsideration, however, the
promulgation of the decision was ordered suspended and the case was
reset for hearing for reception of additional evidence.

On August 6, 1957, the court amended its original decision, thus:

“The plaintiffs now admit that the litigated ‘Lot
No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, is outside the parcel of
land described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 425, both of which cover Lot 396’. They,
however, claim ownership over said Lot 395 by virtue of the decision
rendered on December 26, 1923 in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec.
No. 21, entitled ‘Government of the Philippines versus Justo Abacan, et
al.,’ (Exh. A-1), and the other dated December 17, 1925 directing the
issuance of a decree pursuant to said decision (Exh. V-2, p. 10, rec.
of exhibits).

“No decree has yet been issued pursuant to the
said order, Exhibit B-2, much less was there a title issued in the name
of the plaintiffs over the said lot.

“The defendants, on the
other hand, predicate their claim of ownership over the said lot of
Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued on October 10, 1931 in
favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to
a homestead patent issued on September IS, 1931 (Exh. 1, for the
defendants and intervenes), contending that the decision of December
26, 1923, adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, was still subject to
review since there was no decree issued pursuant thereto.

“The
position of the defendants and intervenor would have been correct if
there was actually a petition for review of the decision of December
26, 1923, or a new trial or a reopening of the case concerning Lot No.
395. The fact of the matter is that Original Certificate of Title No.
3462 was issued pursuant to a homestead patent long after Lot No. 395
was declared a public land in a decision dated March 29, 1926 at Rizal,
Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December
28, 1926 at Manila for Cabanatuan City (Exh. 4) states that Lot No.
395, together with Lots Nos. 394 and 2044, was declared a public land
and was the object of a homestead application by the respective
concessionaires (p. 21, rec. of exhibits). * * *.

“It would
seem that the cadastral court in the same cadastral cases No. 14,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281, entitled Government of the Philippines vs. Justo
Abacan, et al. erroneously reopened the hearing of Lot 395 which was
already adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff by the decision dated
December 26, 1923 (Exh. A-1, and A-2, pp. 2 and 5, rec. of exhibits)
and decreed that lot 395 is public land. The same cadastral court
should have taken judicial notice of the said decision and the other
promulgated therein for the issuance of a decree in favor of the
plaintiffs over Lot 395 (Exh. B-2).”

While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the
public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant
the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared
nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued therefor,
the said lot may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as defendants
had been in possession of the property for over 20 years, they were
declared to have acquired the right over the same by prescription. The
complaint was consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No. 3462 cancelled
and a new one issued to defendants in lieu thereof; and plaintiffs were
directed to vacate the one-third portion of Lot No. 395 occupied by
them, and to pay the costs.

Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, in its decision of July 20, 1960, sustained the
contention of appellants on the basis of the doctrine laid down by this
Court in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abural
(39 Phil. 997), that upon the finality of the decree by the cadastral
court, adjudicating ownership of the land, the title thereto becomes
incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by prescription. And, as
the land was no longer part of the public domain when the homestead
patent was obtained by Juan de la Merced, the same can not prevail over
the cadastral court’s decree of registration of Lot No. 395 in favor of
appellant Santos’ predecessor.

Hence, the filing of the instant petition for review of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals.

The questions actually raised by the present appeal are: What is the
effect of the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923
adjudicating the lot in favor of Santos, and the subsequent order dated
December 17, 1925, directing the issuance of a certificate of title to
Inocencio Santos? Did those orders constitute registration under the
law even though the corresponding certificate of title has not been
issued? In the affirmative, could the property thereby affected still
be lost by adverse possession?

For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts must be considered:

By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos’ title to Lot No.
395 was definitely confirmed as against the whole world, including the
Government;

That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19,
1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to Issue the
certificate of title to Inocencio de los Santos, although no such
certificate was actually issued; ‘

That under date of December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without
reopening the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result
of which Juan de la Merced, after due application, was able to obtain
therefor a homestead patent and OCT No. 3462 on October 10, 1931;

That as found by the Court of Appeals, Juan de la Merced, until his
death in 1931, was the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a big
portion of land which included Lot 395 in question and was, therefore,
a trustee for said lot at the time he applied for ft as a homestead;

That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed in 1952.

There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by
specific provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the same, and such registration
shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province
where the land lies. (Sec. 122, Act 496). In other words, in cases of
public lands, the property is not considered registered until the final
act or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds had
been accomplished.

With respect to private lands, however, the pertinent provisions of Act 496 are:

“SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the
applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or
adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto,
subject only to the exception stated in the following section. It shall
be conclusive upon and against all persons including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice or citation, op included in the general
description ‘To all whom it may concern’. Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgment or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree
of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of
First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the
decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every
decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section
shall be incontrovertible
. * * *.” (Italics supplied.)

“SEC. 40. Every
decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute
of its entry, and shall be signed by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office
(now Land Registration Commissioner). * * *. The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of titles hereinafter mentioned.” (Italics supplied.)

It is apparent from the foregoing provisions that a decree of
registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two
different things. And it is the decree of registration, to be issued by
the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be the basis of the
certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding
register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land.

But, it must be remembered that the abovementioned provisions apply
only to voluntary registration under the Land Registration Act. With
respect to lands titled through compulsory proceedings, the Cadastral
Act prescribes:

“SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any
convenient place within the province in which the lands are situated or
at such other place as the court, for reasons stated in writing and
filed with the record of the case, may designate, and shall be
conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the
Court of First Instance and shall be governed by the same rules. Orders
of default and confession shall also be entered in the same manner as
in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same effect. All
conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees
awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the various
parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis
for original certificates title hi favor of said persons which shall
have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application
for registration of land under the Land Registration Act.
* * *.” (Italics supplied.)

Confronted with the question of when title to the land in a
cadastral proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government
of the Philippine Islands vs. Abural,[1] said:

“After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are
taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the
claimants. This constitutes the decision—the judgment—the decree of the
court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The second action is the
declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the
issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the
date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the
decision. This again is judicial action, although to a less degree than
the first.

“The third and last action devolves upon the
General Land Registration Office. This, office has been instituted ‘for
the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the
registration of land.’ (Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 174.)* * *.

“The
judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree,
is a judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is
the base of the certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the
Land Registration Office is a ministerial act. The date of the title
prepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has
taken place and all that is left to be performed is the mere
formulation of the technical description. * * *.

“As a
general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is
final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of the
thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the
party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership
without any step having been taken to perfect an. appeal. The
prevailing party, may then have execution of the judgment as of right
and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the
Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision
providing for fraud.”

Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the
land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to
appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court,
without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title
would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of
subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no
longer be necessary.

As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the
issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over
Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the
said property had already become final, and there being no imputation
of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership
on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of
such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had
become, from that time, registered property which could not be acquired
by adverse possession.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed,
with costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.


[1] 39 Phil. 997.