THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOEY NUCUP Y PADILLA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
TOLENTINO, A.G., J.:
The accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Section 11, Article II, RA 9165, in an Information[2] dated January 28, 2008, which reads as follows:
“That on or about the 27th day of January, 2008 in the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have in his possession, custody, and control one (1) piece of small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing Marijuana Fruiting tops weighing of (sic) ONE GRAM AND TWELVE HUNDREDTHS (1.12), OF A GRAM, a dangerous drugs (sic).
Contrary to law.”
When the case was called for arraignment on February 8, 2008, the accused-appellant pleaded “NOT GUILTY”.
The version of the plaintiff-appellee, as summarized in its Counter-Statement of Facts,[3] is as follows:
“On January 27, 2008, at around 8:20 p.m., PO2 Manuel Dimla (PO2 Dimla) and PO1 Jerome Bugarin (PO1 Bugarin), while on duty, received a call from the Radio Operator of San Fernando Police Station, PO3 Manuel Santos (PO3 Santos), informing them to check on an alleged commotion and pot session ensuing at Food House Videoke/Beerhouse near the Water District, about two (2) kilometers away from their location.[4] They were informed that the target person was wearing a long sleeved shirt with orange stripes and with a “pandi”or bandana on the head.[5]
Upon their arrival at the area, PO2 Dimla and PO1 Bugarin immediately entered the Beerhouse and found Joey Nucup (appellant) on the left side, fitting the description relayed by PO3 Santos.[6] As they approached appellant, the police officers smelled marijuana and saw appellant sniffing the prohibited drug. At that instant, PO2 Dimla and PO1 Bugarin informed appellant that they are police officers and instructed him to stand up and empty his pockets. As appellant was complying, one (1) plastic sachet of marijuana fell from his pocket.[7] That police officers then informed him that he is being (sic) brought to the station . He was also apprised of his rights. The two police officers then called PO3 Barredo, Police Investigator who arrived together with another police officer, PO3 Abad. PO2 Dimla eventually turned over the confiscated drug items to PO3 Barredo, and appellant was brought to the police station.[8]
At the station, PO2 Dimla marked the seized items, “MDS” for the stick of marijuana, while “MD 1” for the plastic sachet of marijuana.[9] A Request for Laboratory examination was prepared by PO3 Barredo, who was accompanied by PO1 Bugarin when they submitted the same to the Crime Laboratory together with the seized items.[10] After a qualitative examination was conducted over the heat-sealed plastic transparent sachet containing dried marijuana fruiting tops and one (1) marijuana cigarette, Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundra David, Forensic Chemist, indicated in the Chemistry Report that the tests yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug.”[11]
On the other hand, the version of the accused-appellant, is as follows:
“On January 27, 2008, at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, JOEY NUCUP (“Joey”) was drinking beer at Foodhouse Videoke Bar together with a certain Mysis Cunanan. At around 11:20 o’clock p.m., there was a commotion outside the bar. When he went (sic) take a look, he saw that more or less eight (8) people were fighting . Upon seeing this, they decided to stay inside the videoke bar to keep out of harm’s way. At around 11:30 o’clock p.m., two (2) policemen entered the videoke bar and talked with each other. One of the policemen (whom he later came to know as PO2 Dimpla) went outside to look for the persons who cause (sic) the commotion, while the other policeman (PO1 Bugarin) went to stand near their table.[12]
Thereafter, PO2 Dimla came inside the videoke bar again and immediately went to Joey’s table and asked him and his companion if they could invite them to the precinct to which he answered “Opo.” Thereafter, Joey and Mysis were boarded to a mobile patrol and were brought to the City Hall of San Fernando, Pampanga where they were turned over to Investigator Barredo.[13]
Investigator Barredo commanded him to empty his pockets, which he did, yielding one (1) pack of Marlboro Lights, one (1) cellular phone, and two (2) pieces of fifty (50) peso bill (sic). Mysis, who was just sitting in a chair, was not asked to do the same. Investigator Barredo did not know what happened to Mysis and neither did he know why he was placed inside the jail.[14]”[15]
After considering the evidence for both sides, the trial court rendered the challenged decision, finding the accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
“PREMISES GIVEN, the Court orders the following:
i. The Accused JOEY NUCUP Y PADILLA is found GUILTY in Criminal Case No. 15794.
ii. He is ordered to serve IMPRISONMENT with a MINIMUM of Twelve (12) years and One (1) Day to a MAXIMUM of Twelve (12) Years and Ten (10) Months and pay a FINE in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,00.00).
iii. He shall be credited with the period he served in detention.
SO ORDERED.”[16]
Hence, we have this appeal.
THE APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT.
In his Brief, the accused-appellant assigned the following errors:[17]
“I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHOSE GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION ESTABLISHED THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.”
On the other hand, the plaintiff-appellee, in refutation of the errors assigned by the accused-appellant, avers that:
1. The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant violated Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
2. Non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not render the seized items inadmissible.[18]
The accused-appellant asserts that the police officers failed to account for the chain of custody of the seized items alleged to be Marijuana. He maintains that the specimen, which PO2 Dimla turned over to PO3 Barredo, may no longer be the same specimen taken from him.
In a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.[19] The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.[20]
For an accused to be convicted of illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.[21]
All these require the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.[22]
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
1)The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the arresting officers, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling the evidence.
A perusal of the records shows that the apprehending team, upon confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the accused-appellant and the seized specimen to the police station. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of the appellant or his counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official.
We stress that based on the facts established by the prosecution, PO2 Dimla and PO1 Bugarin arrested the accused-appellant, they called Police Investigator PO3 Barredo, who arrived together with PO3 Abad. PO2 Dimla then turned over the confiscated drug items to PO3 Barredo and thereafter, they all proceeded to the police station. It was only at the police station when PO2 Dimla marked the seized items. At no time during PO2 Dimla’s testimony did he even intimate that the group inventoried or photographed the confiscated item.
A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, shows that the Supreme Court Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the proper procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974.[23] Section 1 of this Regulation requires the apprehending team, having initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to immediately inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused and/or his representatives, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Courts must remain vigilant in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drugs were observed after the passage of R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Lorenzo,[24] the Supreme Court acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and inventory the seized items. People v. Garcia,[25] likewise resulted in an acquittal because no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165.
The Supreme Court had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,[26] People v. Denoman,[27] People v. Partoza,[28] People v. Robles,[29] and People v. dela Cruz,[30] where the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of complying with the required procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
To be sure, Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e., “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]” This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and, thereafter, explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.[31]
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized items.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti — the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.[32]
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as “the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.” As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would, thus, include a testimony about the every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it was offered in court as evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit as to how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.[33]
In the present case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the marijuana presented in court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant.
The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachet from the accused-appellant. From the testimonies of PO2 Dimla and PO1 Bugarin, it is clear that the police did not mark the confiscated sachet upon confiscation. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting,” or contamination of evidence.[34]
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from PO2 Dimla to the police station. Both PO2 Dimla and PO1 Bugarin testified that they brought the appellant and the seized item to the police station. As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized item was forwarded to the Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory Office, Camp Olivas, City of San Fernando, Pampanga. To harp back to what we earlier discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the seized drug after it left the hands of PO2 Dimla. We cannot, therefore, presume that PO3 Barredo had custody of the specimen in the interim. We also stress that the identity of the person who received the seized item at the crime laboratory was not clearly established as he was not presented.
Due to the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized marijuana that the prosecution introduced into evidence. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.
In convicting the accused-appellant, the trial court also relied on the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be stressed, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. The presumption, in other words, obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. But where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course.[35] As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Sanchez:
“While the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant’s conviction because “First, the presumption is precisely just that — a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, . . . [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.” The presumption also cannot prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights of the accused. In short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.”[36]
All told, we find merit in the accused-appellant’s claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, due to the substantial gaps in the chain of custody, raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the December 17, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42 in Criminal Case No. 15794. The accused appellant JOEY NUCUP y PADILLA is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Jail Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), San Fernando District Jail, San Fernando, Pampanga, is DIRECTED to cause the release of JOEY NUCUP y PADILLA from confinement without DELAY, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to INFORM the Court of his release or the reasons for his continued confinement within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Rosario and Barrios,[*] JJ., concur.
[*] Vice Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, per Office Order No. 199-14-ABR dated May 9, 2014.
[1] Rollo, pp. 56-66.
[2] Rollo, p. 56.
[3] Rollo, pp. 83-84.
[4] Pp 4-5, TSN dated February 23, 2009, Testimony of PO2 Manuel Dimla.
[5] P. 6, ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] P. 11, TSN dated March 28, 2011, Testimony of PO1 Jerome Bugarin.
[8] Pp. 4-5, TSN dated May 6, 2011, Testimony of PO1 Jerome Bugarin.
[9] P. 5, TSN dated November 16, 2009, Testimony of PO2 Manuel Dimla.
[10] P. 9, TSN dated October 10, 2011, Testimony of PO1 Jerome Bugarin.
[11] P. 12, TSN dated March 15, 201, Testimony of Ma. Luisa Gundra David.
[12] Judicial Affidavit of the accused, July 12, 2012, pp. 1-2.
[13] Ibid., p. 2.
[14] Ibid., p. 3.
[15] Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[16] Rollo, p. 66.
[17] Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 3; Rollo, p. 41.
[18] Rollo, p. 84.
[19] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 207.
[20] People v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 273, 283.
[21] People v. Lagata, 452 Phil. 846, 853 (2003).
[22] People v. Pagaduan, G.R. No. 179029, August 12, 2010.
[23] People v. Magat, G.R. No. 179939, September 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 86, 95.
[24] G.R. No. 184760, April 23, 2010.
[25] G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259.
[26] G.R. No. 179213, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 92.
[27] G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 257.
[28] G.R. No. 182418, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 809.
[29] G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647.
[30] G.R. No. 181545, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 273.
[31] People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259.
[32] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 207, citing People v. Kimura, 428 SCRA 51 (2004) and Lopez v. People, 553 SCRA 619 (2008).
[33] People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 140, 149.
[34] People v. Coreche, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350, 357.
[35] Cariño v. People, G.R. No. 178757, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 388, 406.
[36] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 221.