G.R. No. L-27826. December 18, 1967
PASTORA GASPAY, FRANCISCA RAMOS, MALO CORME, VALERIANO BENGO, PEDRO CASTILLO AND LUIS FELIZCO, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. THE HON. CESAR SANGCO, JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF MANI…
FERNANDO, J.:
Citing the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court,[1]
respondents-appellees moved for the dismissal of the
appeal on the ground that the brief of petitioners-appellants “makes no
specific assignment of errors and does not contain any page references to the
record as required by the rules * * *.” In support of such a motion to
dismiss, respondents-appellees state that the
requirement for an assignment of error under the Rules of Court as well as the
provisions on a statement of the case and a statement of facts “are not
mere ornaments in the brief. They are
intended to expedite the business of the appellate court, aid the justices in the
investigation of the matters submitted, and facilitate prompt and orderly
disposition of cases. They must,
therefore, be complied with if not strictly – at least substantially.”[2]
Petitioners-appellants, having been given an opportunity to
comment on the above motion to dismiss, filed their opposition. Thus:
“When the appellants brought the original case of certiorari with
the lower court, the same was decided on the sole question of whether or not
the Motion for Reconsideration of appellants filed with the city court was pro forma. As the
trial court rendered judgment against appellants, the latter elevated their
case to this Court raising the same and only legal question as put up by them
in the lower court. Having in mind
therefore the rules of brevity as the primordial element in a brief, the
appellants did not find it necessary to include an assignment of error in their
brief, for the simple reason that there is only a single issue raised thereof
as indicated in the heading ‘Arguments’.
The appellants respectfully maintain that their brief has substantially
complied with the requirements of the New Rules of Court.”[3]
If the question presented
by the appeal were substantial and the alleged error into which respondent
Judge was alleged to have fallen in dismissing the appeal on the ground that
the motion for reconsideration is pro forma manifest, then perhaps the above opposition
would be persuasive and the motion to dismiss appeal denied. Such is not the case however.
The five-page brief
submitted on September 22, 1967, by petitioners-appellants was
deficient. It did not have as appendix,
the decision of the court below questioned in this petition for
certiorari. Only after counsel for
petitioners-appellants was reminded of his duty to do so and after 18 days from
receipt of the brief was there such compliance.
A perusal of both brief and the lower court decision leads to the conclusion
that the appeal is devoid of merit and should be dismissed.
No effort of persuasive character was made in the brief of
petitioners-appellants to show that the City Court of Manila in holding that
the motion for reconsideration was pro forma acted
illegally, much less arbitrarily. It is
understandable why. In the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, where a petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition was filed to test the validity of the action taken by the city
court in holding the motion for reconsideration pro forma, such
motion was carefully scrutinized. The
two grounds on which it was based, namely, lack of previous notice to the
defendants, petitioners-appellants herein to vacate, this being an ejectment case, and non-payment of rentals as constituting
a ground for ejectment there being an alleged condonation of their unpaid rentals in arrears, were duly
considered.
As to the defense of
non-payment of rentals which was reiterated in the motion for reconsideration,
the decision of the Court of First Instance appealed from stated the
following: “Defendants pretend
that they were not given notice to vacate the premises before plaintiff filed
the complaint for ejectment against them. It appears, however, that due notice was
served upon them as early as February of 1966, but that they refused to receive
the same, hence plaintiff wrote to them, inviting them to an amicable conference
in its office, which they attended. This
they did not refute, which shows to the satisfaction of the Court that there
was indeed notice. There is, therefore,
bad faith on the part of petitioners, hence they cannot now be heard to invoke
lack of notice. They refused to receive
the notice, and they refuse to acknowledge the fact of notice. No person is entitled to profit from his
wrong act of commission or omission.”[4]
Concerning the defense of condonation,
this is what appears in the lower court decision: “Now, respecting this alleged condonation of unpaid rents. Defendants-petitioners allege that plaintiff
condoned their unpaid rents, therefore it is now in estoppel
to invoke nonpayment of rent as ground for their ejectment. This is untenable because there is no proof
of condonation, and even if true, it would only show
gracious condonation of debt which defendants could
not or would not pay anyway in the light of this action, and it is preposterous
and revolting to good human conscience for the defendants-petitioners now to turn around and blame plaintiff
for its liberality to them. Shortcoming
deserved no premium, and good deeds are inflicted punitive action.”[5]
What other conclusion can there be in the light of the above than
to hold such a motion for reconsideration as being pro forma
as set forth in the decision of the lower court dismissing this petition for
certiorari now on appeal to this Court.
“Clearly, there is nothing to it, no material allegation of any
essence to persuade a reasonable judicial mind to change its decision, for the
two pretended grounds of lack of notice and of supposed estoppel
through condonation of unpaid rent, lack merit.[6]
When a motion for new
trial or for a reconsideration may be considered as pro forma, has been aptly discussed in former Chief Justice Moran’s
work. Thus: “For this reason, where a motion for a
new trial is filed under the third paragraph of the preceding section
and fails to ‘point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the
judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law,
making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the
provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions,’ it
shall be treated as a motion pro forma intended merely to delay
the proceedings and it shall not interrupt or suspend the period of time for
the perfection of an appeal. However,
where the motion for reconsideration was based on a claim that the finding of
the trial court as to the authenticity of the disputed signature was not
justified by the evidence submitted, which is the testimony of the expert
witness denying such authenticity, it was held that the motion points out sufficiently why the finding of
the court is not justified by the evidence, and is not a pro forma
motion hence it suspends the period for perfecting an appeal. The rules has been liberalized in a recent
case where a motion for reconsideration pointed out specifically the findings
of the trial court that were not supported by evidence but without making
express reference to such evidence, but it also pointed out the conclusions
which were contrary to law reserving his right to submit written or oral
argument; our Supreme Court considered that the motion was a substantial
compliance with the rule.”[7]
Petitioners-appellants would invoke the two cases cited by former
Chief Justice Moran, Elnar v. Santos,[8]
and Ylanan v. Mercado.[9]
Neither case strengthens what is inherently a groundless appeal. In the Elnar case,[10]
the motion for reconsideration points two errors allegedly committed by the
trial court, one on a question of fact and another on a question of law. As to the former, petitioner pointed out the
findings or conclusions by the court which in his opinion “are not
supported by the evidence, although he does not make any express reference to
such evidence, and as to the latter, he also points specifically the findings
or conclusions which, in his opinion are contrary to law.” Moreover, there
was a reservation of his right to submit written or oral argument to
substantiate his motion within such period of time as the trial court might
grant him, a request which was ignored by the court denying outright his motion
for reconsideration. Under the circumstances,
this Court held: “We believe that
the above averments when considered in the light of the decision on the merits
may be considered substantial compliance with the rule and may come under the
exception pointed out by former Chief Justice Moran. Here is where we may properly apply the
principle that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the
interest of justice.”
In Ylanan v. Mercado,[11]
the opinion likewise made clear, why unlike in this case, the motion for
reconsideration could not rightly be considered pro forma. According to the opinion penned by the then
Justice Labrador: “The only question
at issue in this Court is whether the motion for reconsideration filed in the
municipal court is a pro forma motion. The question must be decided in the
negative. The motion was based on the
claim that the finding of the trial court as to the authenticity of the
disputed signature to Exhibit A was not justified by the evidence submitted,
which is the testimony of the expert witness denying such authenticity. This is a motion which points out why the
finding of the court is not justified by the evidence, and is clearly not a pro
forma motion for new trial or reconsideration. The Court of First Instance erred in holding
that it did not suspend the period for perfecting the appeal.”
All relevant matters having been brought to the attention of this
Court and the brief for petitioners-appellants having been accorded the weight,
or lack of it, which it deserves and there being a motion to dismiss appeal,
based on Section 16 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court made applicable to this
Court by Section 1, Rule 56, which has not been followed, there is more than
sufficient justification for the final disposition of this litigation.
WHEREFORE, such motion to dismiss the appeal is granted,
and the appeal is hereby dismissed with costs against petitioners-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
and Angeles, JJ., concur.
[1]
Section 16, Rule 46 made applicable to this case by Section 1 of Rule 56.
[2]
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, p. 2.
[3] Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal, p. 1.
[4] Order, May 26, 1967, p. 3.
[5] Ibid, at pp. 3-4.
[6] Ibid, at p. 4.
[7] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
II, 1963 ed., pp. 213-214.
[8] L-13113, August 13, 1959.
[9] 94 Phil. 769 (1954).
[10] L-13113, August 13, 1959.
[11] 94 Phil. 769 (1954).