G.R. No. L-23279. January 31, 1968
ALEJANDRA CUARTO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ESTELITA DE LUNA, LEONARDO DE LUNA, IRENE CASTILLO, BONIFACIO NAKPIL AND AIDA SOLIMAN, DEFENDANTS, BONIFACIO NAKPIL AND AIDA SOLIMAN, …
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Plaintiff Alejandra Cuarto
is the widow of Sotero de Luna. In her complaint, against Estelita
de Luna, Leonardo de Luna, his wife, Irene Castillo and the spouses Bonifacio Nakpil and Aida Soliman – hereinafter referred to as the Nakpils – it is alleged that plaintiff and her deceased
husband had, during his lifetime, acquired, as conjugal properties, Lots 11-A
and 12, Block 53, of the San Juan Heights Subdivision, containing 433 and 503
square meters, respectively, and are more particularly described in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 12999 and 10383 of Rizal;
that, by virtue of a simulated deed of sale, dated November 13, 1947, Sotero purported to sell said lots, for an alleged
consideration of P1,000.00, which was never paid, either wholly or partly, to
his daughter by a previous marriage, defendant Estelita
de Luna, in whose favor, upon cancellation of said transfer certificates of
titles, TCT Nos. 6544 and 6545, were issued; that, subsequently, Estelita de Luna simulated another sale of said properties
to her brother Leonardo de Luna – another offspring of Sotero
de Luna by a previous marriage – and his wife, Irene Castillo, in whose favor
TCT Nos. 24871 and 74965 were, in turn, issued, upon cancellation of TCT Nos.
6544 and 6545; that, on December 29, 1962, Mr. and Mrs. Leonardo de Luna
simulated a third sale, for a stated consideration of P20,000.00, to the Nakpils, in whose names TCT Nos. 106286 and 106287 were
issued, in lieu of TCT Nos. 24871 and 74965; that all of these transactions are
fictitious and simulated, as well as without any consideration; that before the
properties in question were placed in their name, the Nakpils
knew that the title of their codefendants was void or defective and that
plaintiff has a valid claim over said properties or, at least, to over one-half
thereof; that plaintiff was not cognizant of these simulated transactions until
February, 1963, when she came to know about the same; and that, in view of the
conjugal nature of the properties in question, she is entitled to, at least,
one-half (1/2) thereof. Hence, she
prayed that the transactions above-referred to be declared simulated, and,
accordingly, null and void, insofar, at least, as her share therein is
concerned and, in the event that the Nakpils be found
to have validly acquired title to the other half of said properties, that she
be authorized to redeem the same.
The Nakpils moved to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that plaintiff’s action is for the recovery of title to
real property, which is barred by extinctive as well as by acquisitive
prescription, under sections 40 and 41 of Act No. 190. Despite plaintiff’s opposition to said
motion, the same was, on September 5, 1963, granted by the lower court, which
dismissed the complaint upon the theory that the questioned transactions are
merely voidable, that the properties involved therein are covered by
certificates of title, which had no infirmity or defect, and that more than
ten (10) years have elapsed from the first transaction. A reconsideration of this order having been
denied, on October 18, 1963,
plaintiff appealed from the order of this date and that of September 5, 1963, to the Court of Appeals. The trial court, however, certified the
Record on Appeal to the Supreme Court, only questions of law being raised in
the appeal.
The orders appealed from should be reversed. A motion to dismiss admits, hypothetically,
the truth of the allegations of the complaint,[1]
pursuant to which the three (3) transactions therein impugned are “fictitious,
simulated and without any consideration.” Under these allegations, said
transactions are, not merely voidable, but
inexistent. It is well-settled, not only
in our jurisprudence,[2]
but, also, by specific legal provision[3]
that “the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe.”
As regards the acquisitive prescription invoked by the
defendants, it should be noted that real property cannot be acquired by this
means unless there is “actual, adverse possession” by one
“claiming to be the owner” of said property,
“uninterruptedly” and continuously for ten (10) years. In the case at bar, the complaint does not
show that the lands in litigation have been so held by defendants herein. On the contrary, this is impliedly, but,
necessarily negated by the allegations in the complaint – which are
hypothetically admitted in the motion to dismiss – to the effect that each and
every one of the transactions above referred to are fictitious, simulated, and
without consideration, and that the defendants are and were aware of such fact.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from should be and are
hereby reversed and the records of this case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, with the costs of this instance against defendants Bonifacio Nakpil and Aida Soliman.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., did not take part.
[1] Republic of the Philippines vs. Patanao, L-22356, July 21, 1967; Vda. de Valencia vs. Deudor, et al., L-21598, May 19, 1966; AIquique
vs. De Leon, et al., L-15059, March 30, 1963; Reinares
vs. Arrastia, et al., L-17083, July 31, 1962; Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works &
Communications, L-10405, Dec. 29, 1960; Tupas vs.
Parreño, L-12545, April 30, 1959; Wise & Company vs.
City of Manila, 54 Off. Gaz., 4245; Carreon vs. Province of Pampanga,
et al., 99 Phil., 809; Community Investment & Finance Corp. vs.
Garcia, 88 Phil., 215; Piñero vs. Enriquez, 84
Phil., 774.
[2] Quetulio vs.
Ver, L-6831, June 29, 1956;
Corpus vs. Beltran, 97 Phil., 772; Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil.,
67.
[3] Article 1410, Civil Code of the Philippines.