BERNARDINA FLORENDO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BONIFACIA FLORENDO, DOROTEA FLORENDO AND RUFINA FLORENDO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

The validity of an order of a lower court of March 19, 1965, denying
a petition for relief from judgment predicated on the right to be heard not
having been respected, is before us on appeal, defendants-appellants making
much of such an alleged grievance.

The facts would show that in an ejectment
suit filed as far back as September 15, 1962, an order was issued setting for
hearing the case on the merits, copy whereof having been sent to the house of
the then counsel of record.  The envelope
con­taining the same was, however, returned with the notation that it was unclaimed
by such counsel.  On the date of the
hearing, on August 27, 1964,
the lower court allowed plaintiff-appellee to present
her first witness in the absence of defendants-appellants.  After one witness had
testified, and upon motion of plaintiff-appellee, the
continuation of the hearing was set on a subsequent date, October 21, 1964.  Again, a notice
thereof was sent to the same attorney of defendants-appellants with the same
result.  Under the circumstances, the
lower court, being of the belief that such a failure to claim his mail was
willful, plaintiff-appellee was allowed to proceed to
the trial of the case and to present further evidence on the date above
mentioned.  Thereafter, came a decision of October
31, 1964 in favor of plaintiff-appellee.

In a motion for reconsideration of November 17, 1964, defendants-appellants sought an
opportunity to present their evidence, alleging that there was no such willful
failure of their counsel to receive his mail. 
After an order of January 5,
1965, by the lower court, denying such motion for re­consideration, came the petition for relief from judgment
instituted by defendants-appellants through a new counsel.  It was asserted therein that
defendants-appellants were never notified of the hearings held on August 27,
1964 and October 21, 1964, notices to their then counsel of record being un­availing
as he was’ then taking a seminar in Manila preparatory to his assumption of
office of election registrar.  While it
was admitted that certain persons found in the house of
such counsel did receive such notices, he was not informed, however, of such a
fact.

The petition would then stress that such failure on the part of
counsel to get such notices of hearing constituted “excusable
negligence” because during that time the then counsel “was then
temporarily in Manila attending seminar and doing field work as election
registrar, as aforesaid, and on the days that he [went to look for his mail] in
the Post Office of Gerona, Tarlac, said notices were
no longer there because they were already returned to sender; * * *.“^[1]
Such petition would likewise raise the point that upon the acceptance by
previous counsel of the position of election registrar, defendants-appellants
did automatically lose the services of the lawyer to protect and defend their
interest as he was further prohibited from the practice of his profession.^[2]
The motion was denied on March 19,
1965.^[3]

For defendants-appellants, the above circumstances constituted a
denial of their day in court.  Their
claim is thus buttressed on procedural due process.  It is a fair restatement of this cardinal
precept that due process in a judicial proceeding is satisfied if there be a
competent court, not susceptible to the reproach that its actuation is tainted
by bias and partiality,^[4] possessed
of jurisdiction to hear the matter before it, with the parties therein being
accorded the right to be heard at every stage of the proceed­ing and with
judgment to be rendered by the application of the appropriate law on the facts
as duly ascertained.^[5]

The crucial question, therefore, is whether or not under the
circumstances detailed above defendants-appellants were not vouchsafed their
day in court?  The answer must be in the
negative.

The lower court saw to it that notices for the trial of the case
on the merits on the respective dates of August 27, 1964 and October 21, 1964 be furnished
defendants-appellants.  The very petition
for relief from judgment admitted that the registry notices were in fact
delivered in the house of the then counsel for defendants-appellants.  There could be no denial, therefore, of their
having been received by persons there present, although he apparently could not
have personal knowledge, as he was then in Manila
doing seminar work, preparatory to his assumption of the office of election
registrar.  What cannot be denied,
however, is that the lower court did everything that was required of it under
the law.

If fault there be then, it could not be attributable either to
plaintiff-appellee or to the lower court.  Defendants-appellants had only themselves to
blame.  Under the circum­stances, it
would be right to cast on them the duty, as would be in keeping with the normal
course of events, to make the proper inquiries of their counsel as to when the
suit was to be heard.  They failed to act
with due prudence and diligence.  Their
plea, therefore, that they were not accorded the right to procedural due
process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy.  The denial of their petition for relief from
judgment cannot be stigmatized as contrary to law.

A semblance of plausibility might have been imparted to the due
process argument if the petition for relief gave any indication that a
meritorious defense could have been inter­posed if the case were reset for a
rehearing, wherein defendants-appellants could have presented such
evidence.  That is not the case,
however.  All appearances would indi­cate
that a petition for relief cannot be distinguished from a tactic dilatory in
character.  The reality might have been
otherwise, but there is nothing in the record from which such a conclusion
could be legitimately based.

As a matter of fact, in the very petition for relief itself, all
defendants-appellants could allege was that in possessing the land in
controversy, “[they] were [of] the honest belief that they are entitled to
the same; * * *.”^[6]  What could be more eloquent of the absence of
any valid defense. 
Perhaps, in order not to trifle with the truth, they did not assert any
right to the land in question.  All they
were relying on was their “honest belief” justifying their possession
thereof.  If, from their own pleading,
the positive averment that would signify that their claim was entitled to
serious consider­ations was lacking, how could the lower court be considered as
acting other than the way it should in accordance with the law when it denied
such petition?

One more thing.  Defendants-appellants submitted an eight-page
brief.  There was nothing in what they
referred to as the exposition of the case and brief statement of facts that
would in any wise show any right on their part to the land in controversy.  When it came to their lone assignment of
error, they merely contented themselves with the allegation that they did file
a petition for relief within the reglementary period sufficient
allegedly in form and substance under the governing procedural rules.  Less than two pages of their far
from-extensive brief were devoted to such an assignment of error.  It is noteworthy that their sole reliance was
on the alleged failure of the lower court to abide by what they considered,
albeit erroneously, to be the controlling procedural doctrine.  Parenthetically, it may be observed that not
one decision from this Court was cited in support of such an untenable plea.

What is equally undeniable, defendants-appellants did not,
perhaps because they could not, even intimate that the oppor­tunity for a
rehearing, if granted, would be fruitful in the sense that they could justify
their possession of the land in controversy. 
It would be, therefore, both time-consuming as well as futile and would
undoubtedly result in a denial of justice, if the lower court did indulge them
by assenting to their unwarranted petition for relief.  Fortunately, such was not the case.  What the lower court did finds support no
less in the controlling legal principles than in the interest of what is fair
and what is just.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of October 31, 1964, in favor of
plaintiff-appellee and against defendants-appellants
as well as the order of March 19, 1965,
denying the latter’s petition for relief from judgment, are affirmed.  With costs against
defendants-appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Record on Appeal, p. 79.

^[2] Ibid, p. 80.

^[3] Ibid,
pp. 83-84.

^[4]
Gutierrez v. Santos, 2 SCRA
249 (1961); Austria
v. Masaquel, L-22536, August 31, 1967; Zaldivar
v. Estenzo, L-26065, May 3, 1968.

^[5]
As set forth in the leading case of Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca
(37 Phil. 921 (19181), due process in a judicial proceed­ing requires that
“(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed, with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the
subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon law­ful hearing.” This case
has been cited with approval in In re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156 (1918); Riera v. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105 (1919); PMC v. Imperial, 47
Phil. 810 (1925); Rivero v. Rivero, 59 Phil. 15 (1933); Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 (1939); Co Tiamco
v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672 (1946); People v. Lopez, 78 Phil. 286
(1947); Mabanag v. Gallemore,
81 Phil. 254 (1948); Sandejas v. Robles, 81
Phil. 421 (1948); Joson v. Nable,
87 Phil. 337 (1950); Dizon v. Leal, 105 Phil.
729 (1959); Pantaleon v. Asuncion, 105 Phil.
761 (1959); Koppel Phil. v. Magallanes, 107
Phil. 931 (1960); Rojas v. Papa, 107 Phil. 983 (1960).

^[6]
Record on Appeal, p. 81.