NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NEW EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION AND THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

The issue raised, one of first impression by the way, is simple
and uncomplicated.  In deciding two labor
cases on June 30, 1970,^[1]
this Court resolved to refer the matter back to respondent Court of Industrial
Relations so that the claim of petitioner National Power Corporation, the
employer, that the strike of the labor union was illegal, could be determined
before the economic demands that had to be considered in Such cases should be
passed upon.  Once remanded and the
hearing set before respondent Court, there was an order by its Presiding Judge,
Arsenio I.  Martinez,
to the effect that there would be a simultaneous reception of evidence on both
the legality of the strike as well as such economic demands.  Petitioner duly made its objection, but it
did not prevail.  It would insist on a
prior resolution of the legality of the strike. 
It was opposed to another kind of evidence being offered in the
meanwhile.  It brought the matter to
respondent Court en banc. 
It was rebuffed a second time. 
Hence this petition for review. 
As noted at the outset, the question does not possess too much
difficulty, but in view of its novel character, the petition was given due
course.  After a study of the matter, it
is the conclusion of this Court that the order of respondent Court challenged
is not tainted by any legal error of consequence.  The petition must be denied.

The dispute arose in this wise. 
Our June 30, 1970
decision remanded the labor cases to respondent Court for this reason:  “No adverse effect would be entailed if
the Court of Industrial Relations would pass upon squarely as to whether the
strike was legal before deciding the other issues.  There was no question as to the legality of
its power in the meanwhile to order the strikers to go back to work and thus
avoid the dire possibility foreseen in the certification of ‘huge economic
losses, untold inconveniences and grave dangers to safety and human lives.’ The
Court is of the opinion that while the doctrine of the Philippine Can Co. case
had been relaxed where we felt that the legality of a strike need not be
inquired into, the situation confronting the Court of Industrial Relations here
was such that a determination of the validity of this strike is crucial to the
proper disposition of the matter.”^[2]
After the remand, petitioner filed a motion for the deferment of further
hearing on the matter until after the issue of legality of the strike of August
30, 1968 was finally resolved, On November 7, 1970, as noted, its Presiding
Judge issued an order denying such motion. 
It was his view that a simultaneous hearing on the legality as well as
the economic issues raised would not be inconsistent with the ruling of this
Tribunal.  As was therein stated:  “A joint hearing of the strike legality
and the economic issues, *** is not inconsistent with the above ruling.  But before passing upon the economic issue
this Court would decide the question of whether the strike of August 30, 1968 was legal or not, if
legal, dispose of the economic issue in the same decision and appeals, if any,
could be made to the Supreme Court questions of fact and law on all issues
raised in one proceeding.  To defer
hearing on the economic issue until the legality of the strike is finally
resolved would mean delay.  With the view
to facilitating the early termination of the cases, considering that the issues
are before the same Sala of this Court and the
evidence in both issues are common or identical, it will be for an orderly
administration of justice that the question of whether or not the strike was
illegal and the economic issue be heard jointly.”^[3]
There was a motion for reconsideration of such order of November 7, 1970,
but it was denied by the respondent Court en banc on March 11, 1971.  Hence this petition for review.

The issue raised, as was made clear at the outset, calls for an
answer adverse to that of petitioner. 
Respondent Court; in sustaining the order of its Presiding Judge, did
not act in contravention of law.  There
is no merit to this petition for review.

1.  Why such should be the
answer is not difficult to understand.
There has been throughout all these years a recognition of the broad range of
discretion vested in respondent Court. 
That is necessarily so in line with the responsibility thrust upon it as
the governmental agency for effectuating the state policy on the solution of
labor disputes.  The assumption has been
that with the wealth of experience thus gained in coping with the specific and
limited sphere with which it deals, it could be trusted on the whole to arrive
at solutions that are in accordance with the objectives of the law.  Thus we do not feel called upon to set aside
or disregard what it has decreed, save in clear cases of non­compliance with
the applicable juridical norms.  This is
so with reference to the result reached.^[4]
It is no less true as to the procedure followed by it.^[5]
The same approach is thus reflected both as to what has been done and how it
has come about.  So it has been in the
past.  So it should be in this case.

In this, as in so many branches of public law, Justice Laurel
blazed the trail.  In the first case, Goseco v. Court of Industrial Relations,^[6]
where the extent of the power of respondent Court to fashion its procedural
ways was passed upon, the basic principle was stated by him thus:  “Justice, equity and the substantial
merits of their cases are the keynote and
controlling considerations of the law,”^[7] How such a doctrine did apply to the facts
of this particular dispute, he explained in this wise:  “It is in this obvious spirit of the law
that the respondent court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
assailing its jurisdiction, in the following words:  ‘In view of the substantial merits of the
case and in the interest of justice and equity, we are inclined to disregard in
the present instance in favor of the laborers the application of the rigid
rules of procedure and to declare, as we hereby do, without merit the second
ground of the motion.’ *** To rule, therefore, that the decision of the
respondent court of December 28, 1937, attained finality ten days after its
rendition in the sense that it became immune from further and subsequent
revision or amendment, and that the respondent court, in so amending what it
thought was not reflective of justice and equity, went beyond the bounds of its
jurisdiction, is to uproot the very purpose of the law and to countenance the
very mischief which it seeks to avoid, namely, the subjection of the respondent
court to the technicalities of procedure. 
This is one of the cases where this court, by self-imposed limitation,
should decline to override the judgment of the Court of Industrial
Relations.”^[8]

The liberality with which
the judiciary has appraised the modes of procedure of administrative tribunals
is equally evident in American Law. In his authoritative Administrative Law
Treatise,^[9] Davis summarized the matter as follows:  “Administrative hearings follow no
single pattern. * * * Practices are extremely diverse, sometimes even within
the same agency. Procedures vary all the way from a trial-type hearing to a
public meeting, with all proportions of mixture of the two. Rare cases in which
questions about hearing methods or order of proceedings have gone to court show
judicial reluctance to upset administrative discretion.”^[10]